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Spring 1981

Everett Carll Ladd — The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election

Demetrios Caraley — Do Congressional Liberals Really Need to Tremble?

Samuel F. Wells, Jr. — The Origins of Massive Retaliation

Thomas E. Cavanagh — Changes in American Voter Turnout, 1964–1976

Charles H. Levine
Paul L. Posner — Austerity and the Intergovernmental System

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Book Reviews

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From the Editor

In this issue . . .

EVERETT CARLL LADD examines the behavior of the U.S. electorate in the 1980 presidential election within the context of the long-standing argument over whether party "realignment" is occurring. He concludes that it is not realignment but the continued progress of "dealignment" that gives the 1980 election its distinctive cast.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY does a quick analysis of the 1980 congressional election returns and concludes that liberal members of Congress did not suffer disproportionally large erosion of support.

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR., examines the popular understanding of the concept of massive retaliation and its refinement in the early months of the Eisenhower administration. He shows that the Truman administration had developed both the doctrine and the defense programs that formed the basis of its successor's new declaratory policy.

THOMAS E. CAVANAGH discusses the changes in the demographic patterns of American voter participation since 1964. He finds that the recent turnout decline has been concentrated among lower-status groups in the population and suggests that this trend may be related to changes in the power of various interest groups to control the political agenda.

CHARLES H. LEVINE and PAUL L. POSNER argue that federal grants to state and local governments have eroded the autonomy of such governments, and that that erosion is being accelerated because of the problems of fiscal retrenchment.

MARTHA WAGNER WEINBERG chronicles the career of Boston Mayor Kevin White and relates the reasons for White's survival in an era when modern mayors seem doomed to short tenure in office. She concludes that even electorally successful mayors must engage in a delicate and high-stakes balancing act in seeking and holding onto political power.

JUDITH CHUBB discusses the bases of support for an urban political machine in Palermo, Italy. She concludes that the strength of the machine does not depend primarily upon the quantity of resources that it distributes but rather in its domination of virtually all transactions between the citizen and public power.

After reviewing several recent works on comparative legislatures, JEFFREY OBLER concludes that such studies rely too exclusively on functionalism and systems analysis for their theoretical orientation and ignore pressing political questions in order to establish the bland propositions that legislatures help political systems survive.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election

EVERETT CARLL LADD

In the wake of the 1980 presidential balloting, an important debate has sprung up over what the election results actually mean and what their long-term consequences are likely to be. On the one side are those who argue that a marked ideological change has occurred in the United States in recent years—the populace has "swung to the right"—and that Ronald Reagan and the Republicans are building what is likely to be a lasting new majority on the more conservative public mood. On the other side are proponents of the view that the election was simply the rejection of an ineffective president who had to confront some intractable problems, and that at most the GOP won "an opportunity" to show that it could govern successfully.

This is not the first time in modern politics, of course, that some observers have detected the emergence of a coherent new majority. In the Eisenhower years, many concluded that the growing post-World War II prosperity, manifested in the burgeoning new suburbs, was prompting a long-term shift to the Republicans.[1] Then, between 1968 and 1973, a number of students of American

[1] For statements of this Republican realignment position in the 1950s, see Louis Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954); Edward Banfield, "The Changing Political Environment of City Planning" (Paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1956); Frederick Lewis Allen, "The Big

EVERETT CARLL LADD is professor of political science and director of the Institute for Social Inquiry at the University of Connecticut and executive director of The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. He is the author of numerous books and articles on American political parties and elections, including *Transformation of the American Party System*, 2d ed., rev. (with Charles Hadley), *American Political Parties*, and *Where Have All the Voters Gone?*

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politics again thought they saw the emergence of a new Republican majority. The social issue conservatism of many of the groups—including blue-collar workers, Catholics, and white Southerners—that had long been mainstays of the Democratic majority seemed to be the critical development.[2] In between these three (including that of 1980-81) "emerging Republican majority" interpretations, there were two "decimation of the Republican minority" interpretations, following the 1964 Goldwater defeat, and again following Watergate. Something there is about journalism and social-science commentary that yearns for the decisiveness of a realignment.

The view that a new electoral majority has emerged, based on a decisive ideological change, appeals of course to those who desire a new popular majority to demand new programs and policies.[3] And in the same way, interpretations that minimize the 1980 election and paint its results as transitory, appeal to those who do not want to see sweeping partisan and ideological change. It is hardly surprising that many liberals and Democrats have argued since November 4 that the 1980 Republican victories resulted simply from the searching of a frustrated electorate for something new. Americans did not confer a broad new charter; rather, they simply said, "it is time for a change." In this view, Reagan and the Republicans will be unsuccessful in coping with the complex problems, foreign and domestic, that beset the United States, and voters will likely turn again as decisively in 1984 to the out-of-power Democrats as in 1980 they backed the out-of-power Republicans.[4]

This argument over the meaning of the 1980 election, then, is over the nature of the "mandate" that the voters conferred. Is it solid or brittle? This argument is important—indeed, the nature of the mandate seems to be the most important

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Change in Suburbia," *Harper's*, July 1954, p. 50; and William Whyte, *The Organized Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), esp. pp. 295-305.

[2] The best statement of this view was by Kevin Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969). See, too, idem., "How Nixon Will Win," *New York Times Magazine*, 6 August, 1972, pp. 8-9, 34-38; and idem., "The Future of American Politics," *National Review*, 22 December 1972, pp. 1396-98.

[3] Both Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, and Norman Podhoretz, for example, who have argued the case for seeing the 1980 election as a major ideological and partisan shift, acknowledge that they want to see the shift occur. See Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, "Is It the End of an Era?" *Public Opinion* 3 (October-November 1980): 2-12; and Norman Podhoretz, "The New American Majority," *Commentary* 71 (January 1981): 19-28.

[4] Democratic National Committee Chairman John White advanced this interpretation in a December 1980 interview. "As a nation we are now going through one of those very frustrating periods in our political life, in which we must try this and if it doesn't work we try that, and if that doesn't work we try something else. Americans may grumble but they are a people who will try different things. I am sorry that they tried the Republicans in 1980, but I am totally confident that the search for new answers will continue, since what the Republicans have proposed simply will not work. I think we are going through, for probably the rest of the century, a very unsettling political process in the United States. . . . This surely does not mean that our country has become more conservative, any more than the 1976 [Democratic] win meant that the country was more liberal" (Interview with John White, conducted by the author for *Fortune* magazine, 3 December 1980).

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question of interpretation of the 1980 election—but the self-serving and ideological cast that has been given it is not very productive.

For some time now, political scientists have been engaging in their own version of the argument—one that they have couched in terms of whether a "realignment" or a "dealignment" is occurring. A realignment, of course, involves the movement of large numbers of voters across party lines, establishing a new majority coalition or at least the radical transformation of the makeup of the old party coalitions. In a dealignment, voters move away from parties altogether; loyalties to the parties, and to the parties' candidates and programs, weaken, and more and more of the electorate become "up for grabs" each election.[5]

By now it is wholly evident that the dealignment interpretation of contemporary American electoral politics is correct. Ideological and partisan preference apart, there is an impressive body of theory and data which support the argument that the present era in American electoral politics is one of dealignment and party decay, which specify the sources of this development, and which identify its implications for American political life. The progress of dealignment gives its distinctive cast to the 1980 presidential election. And the 1980 mandate is brittle, not because some liberals and Democrats want it thus, but because it cannot be otherwise with a dealigned electorate.

Dealignment and the 1980 Election

For some time now, a pronounced growth has been evident in the proportion of Americans who think of themselves as independents, rather than as adherents of one of the political parties. Gallup surveys in the early 1950s, for example, showed the proportion of self-described independents in the range of 19 to 20 percent; by the 1970s, however, the proportion had climbed into the 30 to 35 percent range.[6] The 1980 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the University of Chicago found 38 percent of the public identifying as independents, and a poll taken by Market Opinion Research for the Republican National Committee in September 1980 placed independents at 40 percent—compared with 37 percent Democrats and 24 percent Republicans. Among younger Americans in professional jobs, and among those who have attended college, independents are now an absolute majority. According to Gallup polls in late 1980, for example, 50 percent of college

[5] I have reviewed this argument at length in another publication: Ladd, *Transformation of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s,* 2d ed., rev. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978). One of the most cogent arguments of the "dealignment" thesis has been provided by Walter Dean Burnham. See his *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970).

[6] The Gallup question is phrased, "In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?" The entire collection of Gallup Polls, comprising more than 1,000 separate surveys reaching back into the 1930s, is contained within the archive of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Storrs, Conn., and the distributions cited here are derived from scores of individual surveys within this collection.

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graduates under thirty years of age are independents, as are 50 percent of men and women under thirty who hold professional occupations. This substantial growth in the number of self-described independents has been paralleled by large increases in actions that indicate independent political behavior—that is, crossing party lines and ticket-splitting in election contests.[7]

Even more revealing of the rapid progress of electoral dealignment are data showing that the majority of Americans, including those who continue to think of themselves as Democrats or Republicans, no longer either rank the parties highly or believe that it makes a substantial difference which party wins. "Do you think there are important differences in what the Democratic or Republican parties stand for?" the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked its respondents in August 1980. Only 40 percent replied in the affirmative; and the proportion was not much higher—43 and 47 percent, respectively—among Democratic and Republican identifiers.[8] In July 1980, only 28 percent of the public gave the Democratic party a "highly favorable" rating in a survey conducted by the Gallup organization, down from 35 percent in 1970 and 42 percent in 1967. The Republicans' support also fell comparably: just 17 percent gave the GOP a highly favorable rating in the summer of 1980, as compared with 25 percent in 1970 and 34 percent in 1967.[9]

One of the most dramatic illustrations of the weakening of ties to the parties comes from a survey conducted by the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry near the height of the presidential campaign, in September 1980. Respondents were asked, "Which party, the Republicans or the Democrats, does the better job [handling a specified set of problems] or don't you think there is much difference?" Depending on the problem area, between 52 and 70 percent indicated that they really did not see much of a difference. On some of the questions there was a pro-Democratic margin, on others a pro-Republican edge, but these differences were incidental to the main finding: large majorities simply did not think one party was better than the other. Only 29 percent perceived a partisan difference of consequence on the matter of handling inflation, 33 percent on reducing unemployment, and a somewhat higher but still minoritarian 47 percent on the handling of foreign affairs. Connecticut Republicans were somewhat more inclined to see a party difference and to favor their own party than were Democrats, but even here it was the size of the pro-

[7] Walter DeVries and Lance Tarrance note that "throughout American history, most voters were straight-ticket voters, and until World War II more than 80% were still so classified. Through the 1950s, the statistic remained around 60–70%" (*The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972], p. 22). In the late 1960s, however, there was a big increase in the amount of ticket-splitting, and since then the rate has remained fairly stable, at an unprecedentedly high level. In 1980, Gallup again asked: "For the various political offices, did you vote for all the candidates of one party, that is, a straight ticket, or did you vote for candidates of different parties?" Of the respondents, 62 percent were identified as ticket-splitters, compared with just 38 percent voting a straight ticket. This Gallup Poll was taken between 7 November and 10 November 1980.

[8] Survey conducted by CBS News/*New York Times,* 2–7 August 1980.

[9] These data are from a Gallup Poll release of 13 July 1980.

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TABLE 1

*Question: "Which party, the Republicans or the Democrats, does a better job [on the specific problem] or don't you think there is much difference?"**

	Republicans	*Democrats*	*Not much Difference*		*Don't Know*
Controlling Inflation	23%	6%	63%	(70%)†	7%
Foreign Affairs	33	14	41	(53%)	12
"for people like you"	11	21	61	(68%)	7
Running Connecticut	16	33	32	(52%)	20
Reducing unemployment	14	19	59	(67%)	8

Source: These data are taken from Connecticut Poll no. 9, conducted by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, 11–16 September 1980.

* Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

† The figures in this column are the total percentage of the respondents who either thought there was not much difference or did not know.

portion that did not believe there was much of a difference that was most striking. With the Democrats in control of the presidency and both houses of Congress, while the country was in the midst of double-digit inflation, and with the Republican presidential candidate stressing this economic issue, 43 percent of the Connecticut Republicans said they did not see much of a partisan difference on the question of controlling inflation.

Dissatisfaction with the Presidential Nominees

Criticism of both the Republican and the Democratic standard-bearers was widespread in 1980. John Anderson's campaign grew out of a fairly general unease with the Carter-Reagan choice. The favorability ratings that Carter and Reagan received in October 1980 were the lowest for any pair of major-party candidates for president, going back to 1952 when Gallup first employed this measure. Ronald Reagan's 23 percent "highly favorable" was just 2 points higher than George McGovern's record low of 21 percent in 1972, while Carter's 30 percent compared unfavorably with his own rating of 41 percent in 1976 and with Lyndon Johnson's 49 percent in 1964.[10]

Some argue, of course, that the low rankings Carter and Reagan received in 1980 simply indicate that both major parties produced weak nominees that year. But as Carter adviser and pollster Patrick Caddell has pointed out, it was not just Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan who received popular approval rankings

[10] Gallup uses this item to compute its favorability scores: "You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five—for someone or something you have a very FAVORABLE opinion of—all the way down to the lowest position of minus five—for someone or something you have a very UNFAVORABLE opinion of. How far up or down the scale would you rate the following [candidates' names]?" The favorability score that Gallup has regularly released is the percentage of the public giving the candidate a "highly favorable" rating of +4 or +5. The 1980 ratings cited in the text are from Gallup Poll no. 163, conducted 10–12 October 1980.

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well below what presidential candidates in times past routinely enjoyed. No candidate for the presidential nominations in either party won broad approval.[11] In its test of candidate popularity, CBS News/*New York Times* asked, "Do you have a favorable or not favorable opinion about [various candidates for president and vice-president], or don't you know enough about him to have an opinion?" In mid-October 1980, when the proportion expressing a favorable opinion of Reagan was 41 percent among likely voters, and that of Carter was 44 percent, George Bush was favorably assessed by 41 percent, Walter Mondale by 45 percent, and John Anderson by just 30 percent of the probable electorate.[12]

As party ties have grown weaker and the public's confidence in the parties has diminished, contenders for the presidency have been denied a measure of party-derived backing that has helped bolster them in times past. Neither Reagan nor Carter was able to count on a very large measure of approval by the rank and file of their fellow partisans on party loyalty alone.

Throughout his presidency, Jimmy Carter received unusually low scores from the public, when asked whether they approved "the way [he] is handling his job as President." Even more striking is the depths to which Carter's backing dropped among Democrats. Thus, his lowest approval rating among Democrats came in the summer of 1979, according to Gallup polls, when just 34 percent of Democrats endorsed his conduct of the presidency. This was the lowest proportion endorsing a president of their own party since Gallup began using this measure during the second term of Franklin Roosevelt. Harry Truman's lowest approval among Democrats was 42 percent, Lyndon Johnson's 48 percent, John Kennedy's 71 percent, and Franklin Roosevelt's 79 percent; Richard Nixon never received, even at the depths of Watergate, the approval of less than 51 percent of Republicans, Gerald Ford not less then 60 percent, and Dwight Eisenhower not under 80 percent.[13] Party identification is increasingly nominal; it confers little automatic approbation of a president among the rank and file in his party. The 1980 election was held at a time when virtually all of the candidate and leadership rankings were at their all-time lows.

Certainly the trend toward negativism in public assessments of presidential candidates, evident over the 1970s, accelerated in 1980. "Are you satisfied in choosing among Carter, Reagan and Anderson this fall, or do you want other choices?" the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked respondents in mid-September of 1980. Only 50 percent of all respondents said they were satisfied, and the proportion expressing satisfaction was just 58 percent among those who planned to vote for Carter and 57 percent of those for Reagan.[14] "Did you decide on your candidate mainly because you liked him, or because you didn't

[11] Interview with Patrick Caddell and Richard Wirthlin, conducted by the editors of *Public Opinion* magazine, 3 December 1980. Portions of this interview were published in *Public Opinion* 3 (December-January 1981): 2–12.

[12] These data are from a survey by CBS News/*New York Times,* 16–20 October 1980.

[13] These data, derived from Gallup Polls reaching back to 1936, have been summarized in *Public Opinion* 2 (October-November 1979): 21.

[14] Survey by CBS News/*New York Times,* 10–14 September 1980.

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like the others?" the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked respondents just after the November election. Among those who had voted, just 50 percent said they picked their candidate primarily because they liked him: 50 percent among Carter voters and 51 percent among Reagan supporters.[15] A postelection poll by the Roper organization found only 21 percent of those who voted for Carter and 43 percent of those who backed Reagan saying that they had "a good deal of enthusiasm" for their man.[16] The loss of confidence in the parties and the weakening of the party ties have necessary adjuncts in the loss of confidence in and approval of the parties' nominees.

Volatility

Given the weakness of the public's attachment to the parties and candidates in 1980, it is hardly surprising that the electorate was so unstable throughout the campaign. "Volatility" was the watchword throughout much of the campaign, and though overused it was an apt description.

Obviously, the only real landslide was the one Ronald Reagan won on November 4. But the polls show that there were a number of other "landslides" in voter sentiment, the first of which came in the fall of 1979 and was won by Democratic contender Edward Kennedy. As Jimmy Carter's support plummeted in the wake of his "malaise" speech in August, and as more and more Democratic leaders began looking to an active Kennedy candidacy, the senator's public support soared. As the data in Table 2 attest, among Democratic identifiers Kennedy achieved a margin of roughly two-to-one in trial heats with Carter in September and October 1979; and he had solid margins over both Reagan and Ford within the general public.

After Kennedy formally declared his candidacy in November 1979, however, he stumbled badly. A variety of different factors—including renewed criticism of his role in the tragedy at Chappaquiddick Island, scrutiny of his stands on various issues, poor personal campaign performance, and the nation's rallying behind the president after the seizure of American embassy employees in Iran—presumably came together to erode Kennedy's position and to usher in the Carter "landslide." In February 1980, the incumbent president was the choice of Democrats for the party's 1980 nomination by a margin of roughly two-to-one, and he was backed by decisive margins of the public at large over Reagan, Ford, and Bush, as well as other Republican hopefuls.

In the spring and early summer of 1980, however, Carter's public standing once again declined precipitously. He was under attack by a reinvigorated Kennedy campaign; the hostage situation continued without observable progress, much

[15] Survey by CBS News/*New York Times,* 7–12 November 1980.

[16] The question was: "Did you vote for [your candidate] with a good deal of enthusiasm, or with a feeling that you were making the right choice but with no real enthusiasm, or without even being sure you were picking the best man in the race?" This poll by the Roper organization was conducted 8–15 November 1980.

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TABLE 2
The Several "Landslides" of 1980 Campaign

	Candidate Trial Heats							
Nomination	*Intraparty Trials*		*Interparty Trials*					
Choice	*Kennedy*	*Carter*	*Kennedy*	*Reagan*			*Kennedy*	*Ford*
7-10 September 1979			65	35			60	40
28 September-1 November 1979	69	31						
12-15 October 1979	67	33	59	41			55	45
2-5 November 1979	64	36						
16-19 November 1979	60	40	57	43				
	Kennedy	*Carter*	*Carter*	*Reagan*	*Carter*	*Ford*	*Carter*	*Bush*
4-6 January 1980	42	58	65	35	61	39		
1-4 February 1980	34	66	66	34	57	43	62	38
29 February-2 March 1980	29	71						
			Reagan		*Carter*		*Anderson*	
18-21 July 1980			55		27		19	
			Carter		*Reagan*		*Anderson*	
10-14 September 1980			44		40		16	
19-21 September 1980			47		42		11	

Source: The September-November 1979 data are from surveys by the Gallup organization: the January-February 1980 data are also from Gallup polls. The July 1980 data come from an ABC News/Harris Survey; while the September 1980 data are from a poll conducted by CBS News/*New York Times*.

less a resolution; and the economy deteriorated. Polls conducted after the Republican convention in Detroit, which saw Reagan nominated in relative harmony, showed the makings of a third landslide—this one "won" by Reagan. The Republican nominee was preferred by roughly a two-to-one majority of voting-age Americans.

Following his nomination in August and the early stumbles of the Reagan campaign following the convention, Jimmy Carter came back strongly, according to every major national poll. Two national surveys conducted by CBS News/*New York Times* in September actually showed Carter leading Reagan, with the lead at 5 percentage points in the poll of September 19-21.

That there would be some variations in candidate standings over the year preceding the 1980 election is hardly surprising. The early judgments—for ex-

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ample, that of October 1979 with Kennedy ahead—were obviously highly tentative and hypothetical. And the polls conducted between the two national conventions necessarily overstated the president's electoral weakness. Still, the magnitude of the shifts reflected by these various "landslides" and comebacks are unprecedentedly large. The potential for volatility that party dealignment creates was amply realized over the 1980 campaign.

The Decision Postponed

The weakness of voters' ties to the parties and to the candidates in 1980 was also apparent in both the high measure of uncertainty about how to vote and the unusually late decision by many voters. The NBC News/Associated Press (AP) polls asked respondents during the last three months of the campaign whether "you [have] made up your mind for whom you will vote in the presidential election in November, or are you not planning to vote?" Of the likely voters, 52 percent said in early August that they had not yet made up their mind for whom to vote. And the last time NBC News/AP asked this question, in late October, the proportion undecided remained a very high 25 percent. More independents and Democrats than Republicans had not made up their mind how to vote.

The proportion of the electorate undecided in the last week or two of the campaign was the highest it has been in the last three decades, the period for which comparable survey data are available, and almost certainly the highest in American history. In 1952, only 11 percent of the voters polled said they made up their mind how to vote within the last two weeks before election day; in 1956, it was just 9 percent. The proportion was at 13 percent in 1972, but it jumped to 24 percent in 1976.[17] In 1980 the proportion deciding late was higher still. The election day poll of CBS News/*New York Times,* which had the lowest estimate, found 25 percent of all voters making up their minds during the "last week" of the campaign; according to the ABC election day poll, the proportion deciding within the "last week" before the November 4 balloting was 28 percent. The postelection poll of the Roper organization showed 34 percent deciding sometime during the two weeks preceding the election. According to the postelection poll of the Gallup organization, an extraordinary 37 percent made up their minds sometime during the last week of the campaign, with 10 percent saying they decided on election day itself!

With so many people so weakly tied to the presidential candidates in 1980 and with so many undecided how to vote late in the campaign, the potential for a large, late-breaking move to one candidate or another was especially great. And

[17] The data for each presidential year from 1952 through 1976 are taken from the election surveys of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of the University of Michigan. The CPS question was framed the same way in each instance: "How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way that you did?" The two late decision categories offered in this structured question were "decided within two weeks of the election" and "on election day." The 1980 Michigan data were not available when this article was written.

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TABLE 3

Question: "Have you made up your mind for whom you will vote in the presidential election in November or are you not planning to vote?"

	Made Up Mind	*Have Not Made Up Mind*
5-7 August 1980	48%	52%
15-16 August 1980	59	41
September 1980	62	38
8-10 October 1980	69	31
22-24 October 1980	75	25
By Party:		
Republicans	81	19
Independents	68	32
Democrats	72	28

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of 22-24 October 1980.

there was reason to expect, therefore, that the Carter-Reagan debate, coming one week before the election, would be very influential.

Although no systematic study of the effects of the debate is available, some preliminary analysis does indicate that the debate in fact had a major impact.[18] For example, a study in Connecticut based on surveys conducted immediately prior to and immediately following the debate suggests strongly that the debate served to change significantly voters' perceptions of Reagan and their overall judgments about the nature of the presidential contest. The Republican came to be seen as more credible and presidential. The proportion of Connecticut voters describing Reagan as "forceful," as compared to "rash," increased substantially from the predebate to the postdebate poll. Similarly, the proportion believing the Republican candidate to be inclined to speak "carelessly, without having considered the consequences," dropped sharply in the postdebate survey. A large plurality of Connecticut voters before the debate said they thought that Carter would win the November election; in the postdebate poll, however, a clear plurality believed that Reagan would be elected president.[19]

Whatever the precise importance of the Carter-Reagan debate in shaping the

[18] A number of national survey organizations asked respondents who they thought did the best job in the debate and whether the debate had changed their minds. The CBS News/*New York Times* poll conducted 30 October-1 November posed the question: "Which candidate do you think did the best job—or won the debate—Carter or Reagan?" In this instance, as in most of the other survey inquiries, a plurality was shown believing Reagan did the better job, but the margin was modest: 44 percent thought Reagan did the better job, 36 percent gave victory to Carter, 14 percent thought the debate was a draw, and 6 percent had no opinion.

[19] The question was asked: "Regardless of who you *want* to win in November, who do you think will win?" Before the debate, 30 percent said Reagan, 43 percent Carter, and 26 percent "don't know"; after the debate, 40 percent said Reagan, 34 percent Carter, and 26 percent "don't know." These data come from surveys conducted by the Connecticut Poll, a unit of the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry. Two independent surveys were conducted, one during October 25-27, the other October 29-31. Additional data on these survey findings have been published in *Public Opinion* 3 (December-January 1981): 34-35.

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outcome of the election, there seems little doubt that the volatility of the electorate, which had been evident at earlier stages in the campaign, continued over the final week, with a decisive late-break to Reagan taking place. All of the principal national polls conducted from October 29 to November 1, including those done for the major-party candidates, showed the contest to be very close—although all had Reagan ahead, by margins between 1 and 5 percentage points over Carter. If Ronald Reagan in fact had a solid lead at this time and the polls were underestimating his margin, perhaps because of the phenomenon of "closet Reaganism," then one must accept the somewhat ironic explanation that even Reagan's own polls were unable to detect "closet Reaganism."[20]

What is much more likely is that every poll was underestimating Reagan's final popular vote margin in the October 29–November 1 period—the last time most of the polling organizations were in the field before the vote—because *Reagan increased his margin substantially between November 1 and November 4.* The daily tracking polls of Patrick Caddell for the Democrats and Richard Wirthlin for the Republicans support this conclusion. Caddell estimated Reagan's margin over Carter at 5 percentage points on the Sunday before the election and at 11 points on Monday; Wirthlin's daily polls showed a comparably sharp move to the Republican candidate over the last few days.

The Disappearance of Stable Alignments

In a *realignment,* some old divisions within the electorate weaken, of course, but new ones appear in their place. In a *dealignment,* however, the old lines of cleavage erode without any new ones of a persisting sort arising in their stead. A dealigning electorate becomes increasingly less anchored by group loyalties and attachments to the parties.

For some time it has been possible to see an erosion of historic group attachments, but the 1980 presidential election extended this feature of the dealignment process. Many of the differences in the vote of various social groups that were so much a part of the New Deal configuration were scarcely evident in the 1980 voting. Consider, for example, the presidential choices of the various white ethnic groups. According to the large election day survey con-

[20] See Everett Carll Ladd and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., "Were the Pollsters Really Wrong?" *Public Opinion* 3 (December-January 1981): 13–20, for a discussion of the performance of the various national polls in the 1980 presidential election. It might be noted here that some confusion has arisen about whether the findings of polls of Cambridge Survey Research (Caddell) done for the Democrats, and those of Decisionmaking Information (Wirthlin) conducted for the Republicans, contradict one another with regard to the question of a late decisive swing to the Republicans. In fact, the findings of these two candidate polls are basically consistent. The confusion in press treatment was created in part because Caddell released his data identifying the polls with the day the field work was done, while Wirthlin released his data in three-day "rolling averages." That is, the Wirthlin figure for November 3 actually encompasses three polls—conducted on November 1, 2, and 3. Combining three days' polls, and weighting them, serve to produce averages that even out the considerably greater day-to-day voter movement and contribute to a seeming discrepancy with the Caddell findings.

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ducted by ABC News, Jimmy Carter received the support of 32 percent of those of German ancestry, 31 percent of the English and Scots, 39 percent of the Irish, 32 percent of the Scandinavians, and 38 percent of the Italians.[21] Historically, of course, persons of Irish and Italian ancestry were vastly more Democratic than those of British stock. In 1980, only blacks and Hispanics, of all the principal ethnic collectivities in the United States, showed any substantial electoral distinctiveness: Hispanics were 18 percentage points more for Carter than for Reagan, while blacks gave Carter a huge 69 percentage point margin.

Throughout U.S. history, Protestants have been far more Republican than have Catholics. The Protestant-Catholic divide, a product of various salient ethnic and cultural differences, has encompassed some of the sharpest and most persisting electoral divisions that American politics has produced.[22] Over the last two decades, however, there has been a pronounced secular erosion of Protestant and Catholic voting differences (Figure 1). In 1960, with John Kennedy on the ticket as only the second Roman Catholic to be nominated for president by a major party (and the first to win the presidency), Roman Catholics were 28 percentage points less Republican than the entire electorate, while Protestants were 12 percent more Republican. By this measure, Protestants and Catholics in the 1960 presidential contest were 40 percentage points apart in their presidential support. In 1964, Protestants were 6 percent more Republican than the national estimate, while Catholics were 15 percent less Republican, for an intergroup difference of 21 percentage points. Since 1964, there has been a steady decline of these differences, and in 1980 Protestants were just 3 percent more Republican than the country as a whole, and Catholics just 3 percent less so. This interreligious group vote difference of just 6 percentage points is decisively the smallest in U.S. history.[23]

Regionalism

Just as the New Deal alignment had a clear ethnic and religious cast, so was there a large regional component, with the South solidly Democratic as it had been since the Civil War. The ending of this distinctive attachment of white Southerners to the Democrats was accomplished in stages over the 1940s, 1950s,

[21] ABC News election day poll, 4 November 1980. The raw data files are available to researchers through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, as are data from most of the other polls cited in this article.

[22] For data on the Protestant-Catholic electoral differences historically, see Everett Carll Ladd, *American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1979), pp. 291–94; and idem., *Transformations of the American Party System,* esp. pp. 46–57, 116–24, 271–74. Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 58–88, provides some revealing data on the extent of religious differences in voting in various midwestern counties in the late nineteenth century.

[23] If one looks only at *white* Protestants and Catholics *outside* the South, one sees a comparably large shrinkage of group differences.

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FIGURE 1

Deviation of Protestants and Catholics from the National Percentage of the Vote for the Republican Presidential Candidate, 1960 to 1980



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TABLE 4
Democrats and Republicans Percentage of Popular Vote in the 1980 Presidential Election

	Democrat	*Republican*
New England	41%	45%
Middle Atlantic	44	49
East North Central	42	51
West North Central	40	53
South Atlantic	45	50
East South Central	49	50
West South Central	42	56
Mountain	30	62
Pacific	38	53

Source: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 8 November 1980, pp. 3338-45.

and 1960s.[24] By 1976, even with a native of the deep South the Democrats' presidential nominee, there was only a very limited restoration of Southern attachments to the national Democratic party. While Jimmy Carter received the electoral votes of every state of the old Confederacy except for Virginia, he was unable to win majority support from white Southerners. Only a large black vote permitted Carter to carry his region.

In 1980, there was simply no trace of the historic attachment of the white South to the Democratic party. The South Atlantic and South Central states split their presidential votes very similarly to New England and the Middle Atlantic states—their historic regional rival (Table 4).

The West generally, and the Mountain States in particular, were more Republican than the country as a whole in the 1980 presidential voting. This might suggest the birth of a new east-west regionalism, in place of the old one which was north-south. In fact, though, closer examination of the polling data indicates that the east-west split in 1980 was a function of the contrasting ethnic makeup of these sections, rather than of the emergence of new regional loyalties. For example, the 1980 presidential vote of *whites only* by region—the Northeast and the Southeast have much larger black (and heavily Democratic) populations than does the West—establishes the 1980 election as the flattest in American history from a purely regional standpoint. Carter was backed by 34 percent of whites in the Northeast, by 36 percent of whites in the North Central states, 37 percent in the South, and 32 percent in the West. Among white voters, Ronald Reagan's best region was actually the South, not his native West.

Group Divisions without Memory

In this setting where groups are moving away from their historic ties to the par-

[24] For a full discussion of the ending of the attachment of Southern whites to the Democratic party, see chapter 3, "First Rendings: The Case of the South," in *Transformations of the American Party System*, Ladd, pp. 129-77.

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TABLE 5
*1980 Presidential Vote by Region of Whites, White Protestants, and White Catholics**

	Anderson	Carter	Reagan	Other
All White Voters				
Northeast	13%	34%	51%	2%
North Central	9	36	53	2
South	5	34	60	1
West	11	32	54	4
White Protestant				
Northeast	11	24	64	1
North Central	7	30	61	1
South	3	31	65	1
West	8	28	61	2
White Catholic				
Northeast	11	41	46	3
North Central	9	43	45	3
South	5	37	58	1
West	10	35	52	3

Source: 1980 ABC election day poll.
* Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

ties, there are of course still divisions in the electorate—it is not a case of every group voting alike—but the new divisions tend to be election-specific. They are dictated by the particular appeals of a given campaign. In the absence of stable party ties, there is little "memory." This year's striking division may not be seen at all in the next election. Perhaps the most interesting group split in the 1980 voting that is new and not likely to persist is that on sex lines. Men and women usually vote alike, but they did not do so on November 4. According to the election day poll of CBS News, male voters gave Reagan a 17 percentage point margin over Carter (54 percent to 37 percent) while women split essentially even (46 percent for Reagan, 45 percent for Carter).

In an election distinguished by weak party ties and a high measure of voter indecision, Reagan's position and that of the GOP platform on the Equal Rights Amendment apparently cost the Republicans some support among women. It is also likely that the perception of Reagan as "tougher" than Carter, perhaps even more "rash," in foreign affairs cut into his vote; women have regularly shown themselves to be more worried than men about the prospects of war. Women were much less inclined than men to agree with the proposition, posed in the CBS News election day poll, that "we should be more forceful in dealing with the Soviet Union even if it increases the risk of war." And whereas Reagan won the votes of 64 percent of women who thought the United States should be more forceful in dealing with the Soviet Union, he was backed by only 29 percent of those who opposed such an American assertiveness (Table 6).

Interestingly, the difference between men and women in the 1980 presidential voting was limited largely to the college-trained and professional segments of

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TABLE 6

*1980 Presidential Vote, by Various Social Groups**

	Carter	Reagan	Anderson	Carter 1980 % minus Carter 1976 %†
Women	45	46	7	–5
Men	37	54	7	–13
High-school-educated women	45	48	5	NA
High-school-educated men	45	52	2	NA
College-educated women	44	41	13	NA
College-educated men	29	58	11	NA
Women, favor Equal Rights Amendment	54	32	11	NA
Women, oppose Equal Rights Amendment	29	66	4	NA
Women, agree U.S. should be more forceful dealing with USSR	30	64	6	NA
Women, disagree U.S. should be more forceful dealing with USSR	59	29	9	NA
Catholics	40	51	7	–14
Jews	45	39	14	–19
Protestants	37	56	6	–7
White Protestants	31	62	6	NA
Born-again white Protestants	35	61	3	NA
All other white Protestants	30	60	8	NA
Born-again white Catholics	35	58	6	NA
All other white Catholics	39	51	8	NA
Family finances—everyone				
Better off than a year ago	53	37	8	–23
Same	46	46	7	–5
Worse off than a year ago	25	64	8	–52
Family finances—Blue-collar worker				
Better off than a year ago	73	22	2	NA
Same	55	39	6	NA
Worse off than a year ago	30	62	5	NA
Blacks	82	14	3	0
Hispanics	54	36	7	–21
Whites	36	55	8	–11
Family income				
Less than $10,000	50	41	6	–8
$10,000–14,999	47	42	8	–8
$15,000–24,999	38	53	7	–10
$25,000–50,000	32	58	8	–4
Over $50,000	25	65	8	NA
Professional or managerial	33	56	9	–8
Clerical, sales or other white collar	42	48	8	–4
Blue-collar workers	46	47	5	–9
Agriculture	29	66	3	NA
Looking for work	55	35	7	–10

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TABLE 6 (Continued)
*1980 Presidential Vote, by Various Social Groups**

	Carter	Reagan	Anderson	Carter 1980 % minus Carter 1976 %†
Education				
High school or less	46	48	4	−11
Some college	35	55	8	−16
College graduate	35	51	11	−10
Labor union household	47	44	7	−12
No member of household in union	35	55	8	−8
18–21 years old	44	43	11	−4
22–29 years old	43	43	11	−8
30–44 years old	37	54	7	−12
45–59 years old	39	55	6	−8
60 years old or older	40	54	4	−7
Democrats	66	26	6	−11
Independents	30	54	12	−13
Republicans	11	84	4	+2
Liberals	57	27	11	−13
Moderates	42	48	8	−9
Conservatives	23	71	4	−6

Source: 1980 Election day surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*; the comparison with 1976 is with the 1976 CBS News/*New York Times* election day survey and (for selected variables) with the 1976 election day survey by NBC News.

* Figures may not add to 100 either due to rounding or to fractional support for a candidate other than the three listed.

† The right-hand column in this table compares Carter's 1980 vote within each group with his 1976 vote. Thus, the "minus 14" for Catholics means that Jimmy Carter's 40 percent support among Catholics in 1980 was 14 percentage points less than what he received from Catholics four years earlier.

the population. Men and women high-school graduates voted much the same in 1980, just as they had done in the past. But according to the CBS election day poll, Reagan carried male college graduates by an extraordinary two-to-one margin, 58 percent to 29 percent, while he actually trailed the president narrowly, 41 to 44 percent, among female college graduates. Seemingly this male-female split, not based on clear and persisting group interests but rather substantially symbolic, was confined to those segments of the population where there is the greatest sensitivity to the symbolic dimension of politics.

The Born-Again Vote

What was expected to be an important new division in the 1980 presidential balloting—that separating Evangelical, or born-again, Christians from other

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Christians—did not materialize. Born-again white Protestants, and all other white Protestants, voted essentially the same in the 1980 presidential election. Indeed, according to these CBS data, Jimmy Carter actually received a slightly higher proportion of the born-again Protestant vote than of the vote of other Protestants—even though spokesmen for various evangelical groups had criticized the president's positions and indicated a clear preference for Reagan's stands.

If born-again white Protestants were in fact more conservative than other white Protestants, they might well have voted more heavily for the conservative Republican nominee. But, in fact, as a group the born-agains are not ideologically distinct. On such issues as whether unemployment or inflation should be emphasized, cutting taxes, and U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, born-again white Protestants and other white Protestants took identical stands in 1980.[25] And even on various social and cultural issues, according to two large surveys conducted by the Gallup organization in August 1980, Evangelical and non-Evangelical Christians hold very similar views. A few questions such as prayer in public schools, Gallup found, do indeed leave evangelicals and nonevangelicals sharply at odds. But there are no general ideological differences between these groups. Born-again Christians simply are not more conservative than other Christians, and they did not vote differently in 1980.[26]

Class Differences

The salience of class in American electoral politics has declined since the New Deal. In recent years the split between those of higher status and lower status has been further blurred by the rise of new issues that do not evoke the traditional class alignments. In the New Deal setting, higher-status Americans were fairly consistently and clearly more conservative than those in lower socioeconomic positions. Over the last two decades, however, precisely the opposite relationship has been found on many social and cultural questions, with those in the upper socioeconomic positions, especially those of college training, consistently and often sharply more in favor of liberal social change than the lower socioeconomic, noncollege populace.[27]

Given this recent experience, it surely is not surprising that the 1980 presidential election, pitting a moderate Democrat whose custody of the White House coincided with high inflation, high unemployment, and diminished economic growth against a Republican who assiduously sought out the middle ground

[25] These data are from the CBS News election day poll, 4 November 1980.

[26] The findings of the Gallup organization on the views of Evangelical and non-Evangelical Christians are reported in the Gallup Poll release of 8 September 1980.

[27] I have discussed these findings at great length in other publications. See, for example, Ladd, "Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Winter 1977-78): 557-600; idem., "Pursuing the New Class: Social Theory and Survey Data," in *The New Class,* ed. Barry Bruce Briggs (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1979); and idem., "The New Divisions in U.S. Politics," *Fortune,* 26 March 1979, pp. 88-96.

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during the campaign even though he had long worn the conservative mantle, did not evidence sharp class differences of any kind. Reagan apparently won a slight plurality among blue-collar workers, although he did better, as Republicans usually do, among people in professional and managerial occupations. Reagan's support within the various education strata was remarkably even—45 percent of those with less than a high-school education backed him, compared with 52 percent of high-school graduates, 52 percent of those with some college, and 50 percent of college graduates.[28] Low-income Americans were much more supportive of Carter than those in middle and upper incomes, but even here there was hardly any real polarization. Jimmy Carter had only a 9 point margin over Ronald Reagan among persons with annual family incomes of under $10,000—50 to 41 percent, with 6 percent for Anderson (Table 6).

Frustration with high inflation is apparent all across the social spectrum, but it has been especially strong among the Democrats' traditional constituents, the less affluent.[29] And working-class Americans, fully as much as those in the upper-middle class, now believe that it is the workings of contemporary government, more than the actions of business and labor, that has brought about the inflationary surge. The electoral impact of the extraordinary shift in class perceptions of government and the Democrats' handling of it—together with the general weakening of group ties to the parties—was felt in 1980 as the Democrats suffered their greatest losses among Americans who thought they were in trouble economically.

"Compared to a year ago," the CBS News election day poll asked respondents, "is your financial situation better today, worse today, or about the same?" Among those who thought they were better off, Carter outpolled Reagan by 53 to 37 percent (Table 6). On the other hand, among that third of the electorate who believed their economic position had declined, Reagan led Carter by a massive 64 to 25 percent. Reagan split the traditionally Democratic working-class vote with Carter, but most strikingly he did best among blue-collar workers who thought their economic position was deteriorating. Of the workers who believed they were better off than a year earlier 73 percent voted for Carter, compared with just 30 percent of those who considered themselves worse off. In 1980, not much could be seen of the Democrats' historic status as the party of the economically dispossessed.

In this era of electoral dealignment, an ever larger slice of the electorate is "up for grabs" each presidential contest. Part of this process, necessarily, entails the erosion of the partisan attachments of the various social, economic, religious, ethnic, and regional groups in the population without—as would be the case if realignment were in process—the emergence of persisting new group alignments. In any given election, of course, a candidate may well appeal to certain groups and offend others, producing large splits; electoral dealignment

[28] These data are from the ABC election day poll, 4 November 1980.

[29] For further treatment of this, see Everett Carll Ladd, "What the Voters Really Want," *Fortune,* 18 December 1978, pp. 40–48.

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does not mean that there cannot be large group differences in voting. It does mean that *the stable and persisting group ties,* which in times past have been an integral part of the fabric of the party system, are being removed.

Sources of Electoral Dealignment

Discussions of the progress of electoral dealignment typically emphasize two broad sources—which may be called the *sociological* and the *political-institutional.* The sociological explanation properly notes that an affluent, leisured, highly educated public no longer perceives the need for political parties as intermediary institutions in the processes of representative democracy to the degree that less-educated and less-secure publics in times past have looked to the parties. The political-institutional explanation stresses the simultaneous deterioration of political-party organizations—producing a situation where the increasingly enfeebled and inefficacious party bodies hardly give voters reason to back them strongly—and the assumption by other institutions such as the national communications media and the welfare state of functions that the parties once performed.

These factors are surely important. There is another important precipitant of dealignment, though, that has received little attention. Large segments of the American public have become so ambivalent and undecided about the proper course of public policy that they are unable to give a clear endorsement to the stands of the parties. The parties offer contrasting approaches—arguably as distinct as at any time in American politics—but the people do not endorse their answers.

An examination of the platforms adopted by the Democratic and Republican parties in 1980 reveals sharp and consistent partisan differences across all of the principal policy areas. Although the Republicans and Democrats are not divided nearly so fundamentally as were, for example, the Gaullists, the Communists, and the Radical Socialists in Fourth Republic France, they are as much at odds as one could expect in the case of two large, diverse, middle-class parties in a country that has a remarkably unified ideological inheritance and history.

In their 1980 platform, the Democrats showed far more enthusiasm for the state and much more confidence in the capacities of governmental intervention than did the Republicans. Their greater governmental liberalism was matched by greater support for extensions of social liberalism. The Democrats opposed a constitutional amendment, for example, to overturn the 1973 Supreme Court decision allowing abortions, and they backed the use of Medicaid funds for abortions—whereas the 1980 Republican platform endorsed a constitutional amendment banning abortions. The Democrats passionately committed themselves to the Equal Rights Amendment, while the Republicans refused to endorse the ERA's ratification. On foreign affairs the Democrats talked much more about the need for a successful American accommodation to the aspira-

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tions of the nations of the Third World, the GOP more of the need for firmness and military strength.[30]

Popular Ambivalence

But if the political parties are thus committed to coherent and sharply contrasting positions, the voters themselves are in the middle, at once attracted to and put off by central features of each party's appeals. This public ambivalence is clearly evident on the basic question on the role of government and its appropriate interventions in American economic life. By the early 1970s, survey data make clear, Americans of all classes and most social positions had come to accept two basic propositions: first, that there is no alternative to a major role by government in regulating the economy, providing social services, and assuring economic progress; and second, that these generally desired interventions by the state frequently cause problems.

The broad support of Americans in all social strata for the "service state" is shown clearly by data from the General Social Surveys, conducted annually since 1973 by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. NORC has asked respondents whether they think government spending in various sectors is too high, too low, or about right.[31] The NORC data show that support for government service was at, or near, record levels in 1980 in virtually all of the specified program areas. Large majorities of Americans in 1980 believed that current spending was either too low or about right on environmental matters, health, the problems of big cities, controlling crime, combatting drug addiction, education, defense, meeting the needs of blacks, and the space program; only "foreign aid" and "welfare" found majorities of the public maintaining that current spending was too high (Table 7).

Various other measures employed by survey organizations make clear that the NORC findings are a faithful rendering of public sentiment: Americans want government to do a lot in many different areas. But at the same time, confidence in government performance and in political leaders has dropped sharply. Various surveys show that large majorities of the public blame government for super inflation. The sense is widespread across the United States that the state is clumsy, inefficient, and wasteful.[32]

[30] For further comparison of the 1980 Democratic and Republican platforms, see Everett Carll Ladd, "More than a Dime's Worth of Difference," *Commonsense* 3 (Summer 1980): 51–58.

[31] See Table 8 for the text of the NORC question.

[32] For an extended analysis of popular ambivalence, see Everett Carll Ladd, *Where Have All the Voters Gone?* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978); idem, "The New Divisions in U.S. Politics"; idem., "What the Voters Really Want"; Everett Carll Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy: Trends and the Likely Climate for the 1980's," in *The United States in the World of the 1980's*, eds. Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980); and Ladd and Lipset, "Anatomy of a Decade," *Public Opinion* 3 (December-January 1981): 2–9.

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TABLE 7
Public Opinion on Public Spending, 1980

Majorities say we are spending

Too little on		*Too little or about the right amount on*		*Too much on*	
Halting crime	(72%)	Halting crime	(94%)	Foreign aid	(74%)
Drug addiction	(65%)	Drug addiction	(92%)	Welfare	(59%)
Defense	(60%)	Health	(92%)		
Health	(57%)	Education	(89%)		
Education	(55%)	Defense	(88%)		
The environment	(51%)	The environment	(84%)		
		Big cities	(76%)		
		Blacks	(74%)		
		Space exploration	(57%)		

Question: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First [an item is read], are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on [the item]? (A) Space exploration program (B) Improving and protecting the environment (C) Improving and protecting the nation's health (D) Solving the problems of the big cities (E) Halting the rising crime rate (F) Dealing with drug addiction (G) Improving the nation's education system (H) Improving the conditions of Blacks (I) The military, armaments and defense (J) Foreign aid (K) Welfare."

Source: 1980 General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

It is not at all clear, then, which of the two partisan approaches to government finds the greater favor with the American people. The conventional wisdom in 1980 held that Americans were notably disenchanted with government—and thus much closer to the Republican position. In some areas that clearly was so. But at the same time, people had not stopped looking to government for solutions and assistance. The popular sense of government as a "problem" clearly squares with established Republican doctrine and thus contributes positively to the fortunes of the GOP. Americans of all classes, however, now expect high levels of service and performance by government—and this commitment squares with traditional Democratic doctrine and is of electoral benefit to the Democratic party. Overall, the American people have become inordinately ambivalent with regard to the state.

Had Americans turned decisively against government and adopted a generally conservative response on matters involving public spending for social programs, the 1980 presidential election might well have evidenced a realignment ushering in long-term Republican ascendancy. This has not occurred because the public's antigovernment mood remains balanced by its progovernment mood. Ambivalent about the contemporary state, Americans in 1980 were ambivalent about the parties and their contrasting approaches.

This response extends to a broad range of questions involving social and cultural change. Should women assume new roles? Should individual preference

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and choice take precedence over older moral strictures against premarital sex, divorce, abortion, and the like? Should such old middle-class values as hard work and frugality give way to greater emphasis on personal fulfillment and expression? Should civil liberties and civil rights be extended and enlarged? On these questions, it is simply not true that Americans have been moving to the right. In many ways the opposite is the case.[33] There can be no doubt that overall the American people in 1980 were more supportive of social and cultural "liberalism" than they were in the 1960s—and much more so than they were in the 1950s before America's "great cultural revolution" began.

At the same time, various surveys show that there is general concern with the overall rate and amount of social change, and with the kind of society it is producing, and that various groups are especially resentful of developments in specific areas. The result of this mixing together of general support for contemporary social changes and substantial unease about them has been a high measure of popular uncertainty and frustration.[34]

Questions on foreign policy and defense also reveal a high measure of uncertainty and contradictory inclinations within much of the public. Thus, Americans think national defenses should be strengthened; by overwhelming margins they support more defense spending. They believe U.S. foreign policy has been too weak and vacillating in recent years, and the negative assessment of Carter's handling of foreign affairs generally, and of the hostage situation in particular, almost certainly contributed significantly to his defeat.[35] Nonetheless, the public clearly does not want too much "firmness" in U.S. foreign policy. Thus, surveys show that large majorities of Americans basically approved Carter's "patience" on the hostage issue and believed that preserving the lives of the hostages outweighed "preserving U.S. honor."[36] A widespread perception of Reagan as potentially "rash" in foreign affairs seemingly held back his campaign more than any other stand he was perceived taking. Carter strategists considered it the Republican's prime weak spot. While voters considered Carter's foreign policy generally deficient, by a large majority they supported the president over the Republican nominee as the candidate "best able to keep us out of war."[37]

[33] For a close examination of survey data supporting this argument see Ladd and Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy."

[34] For further data on the uncertain and mixed assessments of Americans on governmental interventions and on social cultural change, see the "Opinion Round-Up" sections of *Public Opinion* 3 (December-January 1981): 19–42; and ibid. (June-July 1980): 21–40.

[35] According to surveys conducted by NBC News/Associated Press, large majorities of Americans throughout 1980 believed Carter's handling of foreign affairs was at best "only fair," and in September 1980, 78 percent gave the president this negative rating. The same NBC News/AP surveys showed a majority of Americans disapproving Carter's handling of the hostage situation after April 1980; in late October, 60 percent disapproved, while only 40 percent expressed approval.

[36] For supporting data see the ABC News/Harris Survey, release of 29 December 1980.

[37] Surveys by the Gallup organization conducted for *Newsweek*, the latest that of 17–20 October 1980. In the latter survey, 52 percent picked Carter, 23 percent Reagan, and 6 percent Anderson, with 19 percent undecided, as the candidate "best able to keep us out of war."

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Thus in all of the principal policy areas, Americans were of mixed minds in 1980. Such ambivalence and frustration is readily translated into an inclination to turn the "ins" out, but it hardly sustains a stable new majority.

The Brittle Mandate

Writing a decade ago, Samuel Lubell argued that the Republican coalition showed little prospect of becoming majoritarian and that there did not "seem to be much chance of reestablishing the New Deal coalition of its old form."[38] He saw party loyalties becoming ever more lightly held and the parties fading into the background before what he called "total elections"—in which presidents use their power in economic and foreign affairs in the attempt to orchestrate electoral results. When things go wrong, in this setting, the president is blamed massively and is banished from office. Thus the United States had arrived, Lubell argued, at an age of plebiscitary presidencies. These developments, contributing to an inability to establish any long-range resolution of conflicts dividing the country, produce "a new alignment of two incomplete, narrow-based coalitions polarized against each other," with the bulk of the populace dealigned and responding afresh every four years to the presidential "referendum."[39] Unfortunately, it now appears that Lubell was prescient in his 1971 argument, although few observers then appreciated this.

Much of the discussion following the 1980 presidential election has focused on the meaning of the "mandate." Is there a pronounced, persisting conservative swing in the populace, likely to sustain a coherent Republican majority for decades into the future? The answer seems clearly that the 1980 election manifested no mandate in this sense. Electoral dealignment was not interrupted in the 1980 balloting; it proceeded apace.

As they take office, Republican leaders are far from unaware of the limited nature of the mandate that the voters conferred upon them November 4. Such is the fluid and volatile character of the contemporary electorate that, although it voted decisively for the Republicans in 1980 "for a change," it could shift just as decisively against the party four years hence if its search for more effective leadership is not satisfied.

A president is elected, and Americans pile high on him both expectations and problems. We subject him and his administration to an intense scrutiny by news media which cannot fail to reveal inadequacies and which become part of the staple of political commentary. Without strong party ties in the electorate and effective party machinery within government to support him, the president finds it hard to sustain a coherent course of action. His difficulty is compounded by the electorate's uncertain and ambivalent mood on many pressing questions. All

[38] Samuel Lubell, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971), p. 278

[39] Ibid.

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this explains in part the fact that no president since Eisenhower has completed a second full term.

Voters want the Reagan administration to advance such general objectives as reducing inflation, increasing economic growth, and strengthening the U.S. position in foreign affairs. On this there can be no doubt about the clarity of the public voice. The test of a mandate comes, however, when one moves from general goals to the concrete measures needed to achieve them. And here the fact that a very large proportion of the electorate has been cut loose from relatively stable ties to the parties and party programs and has been left to float free compounds the fragility of the mandate a modern president actually enjoys. The continuing referendum on his performance chronicled in the public-opinion polls can almost instantly turn against him.

In one sense the election of 1980 was decisive, but central to that decisiveness is something that cannot leave either of the major parties notably optimistic. For what was indicated most clearly is a new order where each presidential election is disconnected from the partisan past, a highly volatile referendum of the public record of the previous four years.*

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to four people for their help in the preparation of this article: Sally Daniels, Jack Davis, Delores Irwin, and Marilyn Potter, all staff members of the Institute for Social Inquiry.

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Do Congressional Liberals Really Need to Tremble? A Quick Look at Some Hard Data

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

The conventional wisdom promulgated by journalists and politicians since November 4 is that the country has moved to the right politically, as evidenced by the massive electoral victory of Ronald Reagan, the Republican seizure of twelve new seats and control of the Senate, and the Republican capture of thirty-three new seats and working control, albeit not nominal control, of the House. The prescription drawn from the conventional wisdom is that the congressional liberals, mostly Democrats, who managed to survive should "tremble" over their past liberalism and shift their position to the right.

If this widely accepted view were true, the more liberal a member's voting record, presumably the more likely that member should have been to lose a seat or, if reelected, to lose support from his most recent previous election. A careful analysis of the actual November 4 congressional election returns for the 247 Democratic members of the House and the 18 Democratic senators who were seeking reelection reveals that in fact there was no relationship between their degree of liberalism and loss of electoral support. Democrats from all parts of the ideological continuum both lost seats and saw their previous margins of victory shrink.

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In connection with an ongoing study of congressional voting behavior,[1] I have generated what amounts to an index of domestic liberalism for all 535 members of the Ninety-sixth Congress. This index is based on forty-seven recorded votes in the House and on twenty-eight votes in the Senate on a variety of domestic spending programs such as food stamps, welfare, housing subsidies, community development grants, transportation grants, law enforcement assistance, CETA public-service jobs, general revenue sharing, and antirecession and targeted fiscal aid for states and localities.

Some of these votes were on final passage of bills and on adoption of conference reports, but primarily the votes were on amendments and recommittal motions at critical intermediate stages of floor consideration.[2] The liberalism scores ranged from 2 to 100 percent in the House and from 4 to 100 percent in the Senate.

When one examines where the twenty-seven Democratic House members who were defeated stood on this liberalism scale, one finds that the losers were definitely *not* all bunched at the top. Indeed only six were among the most liberal quintile of Democratic House members; six were from the second most liberal quintile; eight were among the middle quintile in liberalism; five were among the second least liberal quintile; and two were from the bottom quintile.

In the Senate, also, the losers did not all come from the ranks of the most liberal Democratic members. Only one member—George McGovern—came from the most liberal quintile of the Senate Democratic membership; three—Warren Magnuson, John Culver, and John Durkin—came from the second most liberal quintile; two—Birch Bayh and Gaylord Nelson—came from the middle quintile; and three—Herman Talmadge, Robert Morgan, and Frank Church—came from the second least liberal quintile.[3]

[1] Findings from this study were previously reported in Demetrios Caraley, "Congressional Politics and Urban Aid," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Spring 1976): 19–45; idem., "The Carter Congress and Urban Problems: First Soundings," in *American Politics and Public Policy*, eds. Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978); and idem., "Carter Congress and the Cities," in *Urban Policy Making*, ed. Dale Rogers Marshall (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979).

[2] The liberal position was considered to be: on the question of having or not having the domestic spending program, to have the program; on the question of having higher or lower funding or having a longer- or shorter-term authorization, to have the higher funding or the longer-term authorization; on the question of different allocation formulas for grants to cities or states, to have the allocation formula that tended more to "target" funds to so-called hardship cities (those larger and older cities primarily in the Eastern and Midwest snowbelt that have the most serious economic and social problems) rather than to "spread" those funds more evenly among all cities and states; and on the question of different eligibility standards and benefit levels for individuals, to make it more, rather than less, easy to qualify for individual benefits such as food stamps or housing-assistance payments and to have higher, rather than lower, benefit levels. The index of domestic liberalism was generated by dividing the number of times a member voted the liberal position by the total number of times he voted on the selected votes.

[3] No Democratic senator from the least liberal quintile of the Democratic membership was run-

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FIGURE 1

Liberalism and Erosion of Electoral Support, Democratic members of the House of Representatives



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A more exact way to look at the relationship between liberalism and strength or weakness at the polls is to calculate the statistical correlation between the liberalism of the Democratic members running for reelection and the change in the percentage of the vote cast for them between their last previous election and 1980. When that is done, the actual correlation between the liberalism score of the 247 House Democrats and their loss of electoral support between 1978 and 1980 is so low that statistically, degree of liberalism accounted for less than 1 percent of their loss of electoral support ($R = -.043$; $R^2 = .002$). The correlation between the liberalism of the 18 Democratic senators and their loss of support from 1974 to 1980 was even closer to zero with liberalism accounting statistically for less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the support they lost ($R = .009$; $R^2 = .0008$). Figure 1 makes the same point for the House pictorially: 1A shows what a scatterplot might have looked like if there had been a strong relationship between the liberalism of House Democrats running for reelection and their loss of electoral support, while 1B shows the lack of any pattern whatever in the scatterplot of the actual relationship.

*

What the Democratic House and Senate members who lost their seats and the reelected Democratic members who saw their margins of victory shrink on November 4 had in common was not that they were too liberal. What they had in common was that they were Democrats and therefore unfortunate enough to be running on a ticket headed by a Democratic president widely perceived to be the most incompetent and unpopular in modern American history.[4]

That president will not be on the Democratic ticket during the next congressional elections, in 1982, nor will the Republican ticket be headed by Ronald Reagan, whose coattails clearly did provide support in 1980 for Republican House and Senate candidates. That alone will almost certainly improve the average Democratic percentage in the 1982 House elections.

The evidence from the 1980 congressional elections thus contradicts the conventional wisdom by showing there was no simple relationship between liberalism and either defeat or erosion of support at the polls. There is, therefore, no need based on electoral exigencies for the surviving liberals in the House and Senate to "tremble" and try to fashion a more conservative voting record than is in accord with their own principles and their view of the public interest.

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ning in the November elections; one, Richard Stone of Florida, was up for reelection in 1980 but lost his bid for renomination in the primary.

[4] The correlation, for example, between the statewide Carter percentage of the popular vote and the statewide percentage for Democratic senators running for reelection was a moderately high and statistically significant (sig. = .05) one of 0.42. The breakdown of the presidential vote by congressional district was not available at the time of this writing so that the correlation between the Carter vote and that of House Democratic candidates could not be calculated.

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The Origins of Massive Retaliation

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.

On 4 November 1952 the American voters elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president with a clear "mandate for change" in foreign and defense policy. The Truman administration's national security policies over the previous two years had alienated the people and the Congress. Truman's decision to commit American forces to check the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 had initially commanded great popular support. So too had the broad and expensive military buildup that the administration had begun after the outbreak of hostilities. But enthusiasm for both the war and the rearmament drive that accompanied it had waned considerably by 1952. Voter frustration at the apparently deadlocked fighting in Korea proved especially potent, and the Republicans exploited it skillfully. They were probably headed for victory in any case when on 24 October Eisenhower promised if elected to visit the battlefield in Korea. This pledge, which seemed to indicate that Eisenhower would take a fresh look at a stalemate the Democrats seemed willing to ignore, quickly became the most effective slogan of the campaign. On its strength, in the last ten days before the election, probable victory became a landslide.[1]

Beyond benefiting from Truman's difficulties, Eisenhower also won support on the basis of his campaign pledges for new departures in policy. Chief among these was his promise to lower federal spending in general and defense spending in particular. The military budget, since it consumed about 70 percent of federal expenditures, was the most obvious target for spending reductions. Through the

[1] See, for example, Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 26–75; Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* 4 (Fall 1979): 116–58; Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Years, 1952–1961* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 1–25.

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Republican party platform Eisenhower was also committed to the design of a new foreign policy—"a policy of boldness" that would reject "the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' " and would regain for the United States the initiative in the international arena that the Democrats had surrendered to the Soviet Union in the years since 1945.[2]

All Republicans could agree on the need to cut the budget, but forming a consensus on the shape of a new foreign policy was not so easy. This task required a delicate balancing act. Eisenhower had, on the one hand, to consider the wing of the party led by Senator Robert Taft, his opponent for the Republican presidential nomination. Taft and his supporters, aptly called "the unilateralists," found the Democrats too eager for foreign alliances (especially NATO) and insufficiently attentive to the threat of Chinese communism and the strategic importance of American air power. On the other hand, Eisenhower had to take into account the "internationalist" wing of the party with which he was personally identified and which was firmly committed to the importance of NATO and the defense of Europe. Further complicating the equation was the pressure to adopt a policy of genuine novelty. As a result of the bitter feeling over American involvement in Korea, bipartisanship in foreign policy had lost its appeal even to the internationalists, and after twenty years of Democratic control of the White House few Republicans were satisfied with a policy that did not represent a clear break with the past.[3]

Eisenhower's National Security Team

To help carry out this difficult shift in government priorities, Eisenhower named to key cabinet and advisory positions men who differed strikingly in background from their counterparts in the Truman administration. His appointees came almost to a man directly from high positions in private business. The new secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson, came from the presidency of General Motors; Roger Kyes, Wilson's principal deputy, came from the same company. George Humphrey, the secretary of the treasury, had been a Cleveland industrialist, and Joseph Dodge, director of the Bureau of the Budget, was a Detroit banker. John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, was a slight exception. Despite his background in diplomacy, Dulles retained the logical mind of a seasoned corporation lawyer skilled in precedent law. Like the others, he had never held a major executive position in the government. For one of his most trusted

[2] Eisenhower to General Alfred Gruenther, 4 May 1953, Papers as President of the United States (hereafter called Ann Whitman File), DDE Diary Series, Folder: "DDE Diary December 52–July 53 (3)," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL); Congressional Quarterly, *Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964*, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), 1: 390–91; the Republican platform can be found in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Fred Israel, eds., *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789–1968*, 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), 4:3281–92.

[3] Alexander, *Holding the Line*, pp. 3–6; James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), pp. 474–96.

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advisers Eisenhower created a post that had not existed in the Truman administration; he made Robert Cutler, president of Old Colony Trust in Boston, the special assistant for national security affairs. Cutler's primary responsibility was to organize the National Security Council (NSC) for the first time as the government's formal mechanism for long-range planning and decision making in foreign and defense policy. Eisenhower also made Treasury Secretary Humphrey and Budget Director Dodge regular members of the NSC so that the two officials most directly responsible for determining the size of the budget were directly involved in the national security policy process. All these changes and appointments reflected the president's desire to make national security planning an efficient business, with the emphasis placed on organization and economy.[4]

Despite this drive for efficiency, almost a year passed between Eisenhower's inauguration and the declaration of the new national security policy. This delay resulted from an intense internal debate during the reexamination of American military force posture that produced what is known as the "New Look." Hints of the new direction appeared throughout the year, but Eisenhower chose to wait until his State of the Union address on 7 January 1954 to advance a complete description. As his first principle in the section of the speech devoted to foreign affairs, he affirmed the paramount importance to American security of maintaining good relations with its allies. As the introductory principle to the section devoted to defense, he declared that American policy was to deter aggression by maintaining "a massive capability to strike back." Later he explicitly mentioned the "heavy emphasis" that navy and air force air power would receive in his administration. Thus the speech neatly combined ideas cherished by the two conflicting wings of his own party. Elaborating on defense planning, Eisenhower pledged to "take into full account our great and growing number of nuclear weapons," and he mentioned explicitly weapons designed for "tactical use." He went on to say that introducing the new weapons would permit reductions in manpower needs. He also stressed the importance of centrally locating reserve forces and of strengthening the nation's continental defense. The economic implications of these decisions became clear two weeks later when Eisenhower submitted the fiscal 1955 budget to Congress, which called for new military spending authority of $31 billion, down $3.5 billion from the previous year. This, in turn, represented a substantial decrease from the $41.5 billion recommended by Truman in his last budget message of January 1953.[5]

[4] Alexander, *Holding the Line*, pp. 25–35; Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 83–87; Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 293–314; Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), pp. 14–21.

[5] Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets*, Warner Schilling et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 383–524; "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 6–23; Congressional Quarterly, *Congress and the Nation*, 1: 275, 280.

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The Rhetoric of Massive Retaliation

Five days after the State of the Union address Secretary of State Dulles took up the president's theme of the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons at greater length and in more strident tones. On 12 January 1954, in a speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Dulles for the first time as secretary expounded a strategic doctrine that will forever be associated with his name—massive retaliation. In his opening paragraphs, Dulles argued that the foreign-policy actions of the Truman administration, such as the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the commitment of forces to Korea, while praiseworthy, were ultimately inadequate because they were "emergency" reactions to Soviet initiatives. Dulles argued that what he referred to as the "free world" community needed to imitate its opponent and adopt a strategy "suitable for an entire historical era." Its objective was to deter Communist aggression, but in pursuing it the free world community could not attempt the economically exhausting task of matching "the mighty land-power of the Communist world." Instead it had to make clear to any potential attacker that it faced resistance not confined to the point of attack.

Later in his speech when touching on changes in military planning, Dulles pointedly restated the type of response the new administration proposed to make on behalf of the free world. He informed his audience that the president and the National Security Council had decided "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing," and that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could begin to plan accordingly. As proof that the policy could work, Dulles held up the example of the truce concluded in Korea six months before. "The fighting was stopped on honorable terms," he argued, "because the aggressor . . . was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected." The unmistakable message of this rhetoric was that the adminstration had made the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against an enemy's homeland the cornerstone of its national security policy.[6]

Contrary to most current references, massive retaliation was not just a doctrine of strategic deterrence. This speech, entitled "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," was an attempt by the secretary of state to place American international policy on an entirely new footing. It was Dulles's attempt to discharge the responsibility that the Republicans had assumed during the campaign of 1952 to develop a foreign policy fundamentally different from that of the Democrats. Gone was the talk of "liberation of captive peoples" that had been featured in the campaign. But Dulles did posit the threat of massive retaliation as the strategy that would restore the initiative to the free community and remove its harmful dependence on reactive measures. He linked this strategy to the hope

[6] John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 30 (25 January 1954): 107-10.

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that, with the long-term security such a policy would provide, the free world would eventually prevail in its struggle with communism. He firmly believed that Communist leaders could not forever suppress the basic human desires of the people they enslaved. The combination of massive retaliation with the hope of an eventual triumph over communism satisfied all the requirements for a new Republican international policy. It exploited America's technological superiority and provided the basis for reduced federal spending; it had broad popular appeal; and it flowed from the strong belief of the president and his top advisers in the utility of nuclear weapons for both deterrent and actual military missions.[7]

Eisenhower's discussion of military planning in the State of the Union address did not arouse particular public comment or criticism, despite his pledges to maintain a massive capability to strike back and to take into full account the United States's great and growing number of nuclear weapons. The same did not hold true for Dulles's speech, which elaborated the same themes, albeit in more bombastic terms. Reaction at home and abroad was angry and skeptical. Democrats charged that the administration had placed the United States in the untenable position of having constantly to choose between total nuclear war and the acceptance of limited Communist aggression. Allies feared that they might be dragged into a major war fought over minor issues about which they cared nothing. Strategic analysts outside the government argued that it was absurd to expect the United States to defend Western Europe by striking the Soviet Union with atomic weapons, since this would invite similar retaliation upon its own cities.[8]

Pronouncements by other administration spokesmen in the weeks after Dulles's speech did nothing to allay the fears of any of these groups. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, in a reply to criticism by Adlai Stevenson, described the doctrine: "Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose. We adjusted our armed strength to meet the requirements of this new concept and, what was just as important, we let the world and we let the Communists know what we intended to do." The effect of these and other statements was, as James Reston declared, to create the impression throughout the world that "in the event of another proxy or

[7] Neither of the two most recent surveys of American nuclear strategy relates the rhetoric of Dulles's massive retaliation speech to the administration's political need to formulate a new foreign policy. See Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 11–17; and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 46–54.

[8] Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1976), pp. 147–51; Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), pp. 199–201. For one of the first and most trenchant strategic analyses of the supposed shortcomings of massive retaliation, see William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in *Military Policy and National Security*, ed. William Kaufmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 12–38.

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brushfire war in Korea, Indochina, Iran or anywhere else, the United States might retaliate instantly with atomic weapons against the U.S.S.R. or Red China."[9]

Never again did Dulles espouse massive retaliation in terms as extreme as those he had used in his speech before the council, and he moved quickly to distance himself from reckless statements like that of the vice-president. An article by Dulles appeared in the April 1954 issue of *Foreign Affairs* which defined for the careful reader a strategic doctrine quite different from the popular interpretations of massive retaliation. Not surprisingly, Dulles toned down his criticisms of the Truman legacy, which he now called bipartisan, necessary, and of much worth. He also devoted much less space to the prospects for a softening of Communist rule, declaring, "Despotism is entrenched as never before." The portions of the article devoted to defense policy read almost like a retraction of his earlier speech. Dulles did reiterate that in order to deter aggression "the main reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at places of its own choice." But he also cautioned that "massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances," and he reminded his readers that the strengths of the free world "include, especially, air and naval power and atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range, suitable not only for strategic bombing but also for extensive tactical use." Dulles explicitly denied that the new doctrine meant "that if there is a Communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industrial centers of China or Russia." On balance, the article represented an appreciable cooling of the rhetorical climate.[10]

Despite this attempt at clarification, the belief prevailed that the Eisenhower administration might react to virtually any international provocation by dispatching the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to Moscow. The record was straight, for those who wanted to read it, that no decision had been taken to depend exclusively on retaliatory air power. If others—especially the potential adversaries the administration wanted to deter—thought any differently, no overwhelming pains were taken to correct them. One must assume that Eisenhower, never as unsubtle as commonly believed, desired this result. He was perfectly aware of the advantages of studied ambiguity in public foreign-policy statements, especially those concerning the possible use of American military forces. But intellectuals and scholars have been somewhat unkind to Eisenhower for failing to spell out exactly what his administration meant by massive retaliation. As a consequence, massive retaliation retains its reputation as almost a caricature of intelligent strategic doctrine—inflexible, incredible, and very dangerous.[11]

[9] Nixon is quoted in the *New York Times*, 14 March 1954; Reston's column is in ibid., 17 January 1954.

[10] John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 32 (April 1954): 353–64. This article was drafted for Dulles by Robert R. Bowie, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

[11] For a fascinating insight into Eisenhower's view on the advantages of vagueness, see

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The time for a tentative reassessment of the nuclear strategy of the Eisenhower administration has arrived. The story is by no means complete, but enough documents have now been declassified to give scholars insight into how Eisenhower and his associates viewed the operational and psychological utility of nuclear weapons. A new evaluation should start from the realization that massive retaliation as popularly construed—the indiscriminate lashing out with SAC forces—never was the operational policy of the Eisenhower administration. This does not mean that strategic retaliatory bombing was not important in its defense planning. It was, in both deterrent and war-fighting roles, in both general and limited wars. Nor does it mean that Dulles's pledge to "retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing" was all bluff, as many scholars and analysts have since maintained. The evidence is unmistakable that Eisenhower and his associates did intend to use nuclear weapons in military situations short of total war. For example, at a high-level conference in the president's office in June 1954 they resolved that "in the event of overt, unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia . . . the U.S. should then [after getting a declaration of war from Congress] launch large-scale air and naval atomic attacks on ports, airfields and military targets in mainland China, using as militarily appropriate 'new weapons.' "[12] These are not the words of an administration espousing a doctrine for propaganda purposes only.

Close analysis of ths contingency plan provides one clear measure of the administration's strategy. In the first place, Eisenhower and his top colleagues explicitly identified overt, unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression as the cause for American intervention. Thus they implicitly ruled out one common interpretation of their doctrine, which held that the United States might react to "proxy" aggression by smaller states with atomic strikes against the Soviet Union or China. One could have inferred this from Eisenhower's refusal to intervene at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam less than two months before, but the evidence from the June meeting strongly corroborates the inference. In the second place, this group agreed that if attacks were ordered against the Chinese, they would be limited to "military targets." Whether such attacks would have caused extensive civilian casualties is an important but separate question. What matters here is that the administration did not consider unrestricted attacks against urban areas—another common interpretation of massive retaliation—a real policy option. In the third place, and probably most important, Eisenhower and his staff saw no reason, save military utility, to distinguish between conventional armaments and "new weapons"—the unmistakable euphemism for nuclear explosives. They were completely indifferent to the concept of a

Eisenhower to Gruenther, 1 February 1955, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Folder: "Gruenther, Alfred 1955 (4)," DDEL; for an extreme version of massive retaliation, see Edgar M. Bottome, *The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 19–25.

[12] Robert Cutler, "Memorandum for Secretary John Foster Dulles," 2 June 1954, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Folder: "Cutler, General Robert L. 1952-55 (4)," DDEL.

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"nuclear firebreak" that figures so importantly in later American defense planning. In the words of one of their most significant national security planning documents, they believed that the United States should "consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions."[13]

The policy of massive retaliation thus is by itself inadequate, even as a convenient catchphrase, to sum up the nuclear strategy of the Eisenhower administration. The term massive retaliation now evokes images of SAC on the rampage that are probably indelible, and the administration played the most important part in the creation of these images. But the administration's strategy was more subtle than its spokesmen were willing to admit. Analysts of the period should no longer, twenty-five years after the fact, continue to be seduced by the rhetoric of the Eisenhower administration.

Eisenhower's Views on Strategy and Forces

Eisenhower's nuclear strategy consisted essentially of three elements which, taken together, yield a picture rather different from that usually conjured up by massive retaliation. First, the president believed that nuclear weapons presented real and usable military options. If deterrence failed and it proved necessary to commit American forces to battle, Eisenhower was prepared to order the use of nuclear weapons in any situation where they would be militarily appropriate. Second, he and the members of his administration publicized their willingness to employ nuclear force in the belief that it would deter both large- and small-scale Communist aggression. Third, he ordered the military planning and force posture of all three services to reflect the possible use of nuclear weapons across a wide range of contingencies. The objective of this strategy was to achieve both a defense posture adequate for the long haul and, through lowered manpower requirements, the reductions in the defense budget that Eisenhower deemed necessary to the economic well-being of the nation. In the short term, the strategy may be seen as the culmination of the review of defense planning undertaken in the first year of the Eisenhower administration and called the New Look. In a broader frame of reference, a full understanding of the strategy comes only through an examination of the development of American nuclear strategy since 1945.[14]

The New Look, based on a review of all aspects of defense policy, stemmed from the president's belief that the preservation of the nation's economic strength required major reductions in federal and defense spending. After nine months of intense bureaucratic infighting, a marked shift emerged in spending

[13] Cutler, "Memorandum for John Foster Dulles"; "Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on Basic National Security Policy," (NSC 162/2), 30 October 1953, in *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, 5 vols. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1971), 1: 426.

[14] Snyder, "New Look," pp. 383–524 passim; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 64–88; Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, pp. 1–36.

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and force posture priorities from those of the Truman administration. The most succinct explanation of the changes appears in Eisenhower's memoirs, in which he describes five "logical guidelines" that shaped the policy review process: the United States would never start a major war; U.S. forces should be designed "primarily" to deter a war, although they might be compelled to fight; national security has economic as well as military components; U.S. forces must be kept modern; and the United States must maintain an alliance system to spread the defense burden around the free world. The president described the decisions taken in light of these guidelines as twofold. First, he listed five kinds of forces he believed the country required to protect its interests—forces for nuclear retaliation, overseas deployment, maintenance of open sea lanes, air defense of North America, and reserves. The administration, reports Eisenhower, decided to place greater emphasis on the forces needed for retaliation and continental defense, while cutting back the other three categories. Second, the administration decided to put "greater emphasis than formerly on the deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, better means of delivery, and effective air defense units."[15]

Eisenhower believed that the two categories of forces stressed under the New Look would not be sufficient by themselves to give the United States a "war-winning" capability should deterrence fail and a major war break out with the Soviet Union. At a high-level conference in December 1954 he sketched out his views on the likely course of such a war. Since intelligence assessments of Soviet atomic capability suggested the possibility that the United States could "be knocked out within the first thirty days of combat," the overriding mission of American forces would be "to blunt the enemy's initial threat—by massive retaliatory power and ability to deliver it, and by a continental defense system of major capability." Although the army and the navy would "keep the land situation under control" and "keep the oceans clear," first priority would be given to retaliation and continental defense.

The president also expressed concern for the safety of American troops in Europe during this period, but he hoped that tactical atomic weapons could be used to protect them. In this manner, the New Look would provide forces for what Eisenhower pungently called "the aversion of disaster" phase of the next major war. Its second phase, when "we would go on to win," would be by implication a much more traditional campaign for which the force posture priorities of the New Look would not be especially suited. The second phase would involve clearing the sea lanes and assembling ships, men, and equipment for deployment overseas on a scale comparable to that during World War II. Since Eisenhower believed that the U.S. deterrent strategy would discourage the Soviets from taking action that might provoke all-out war and since lowered defense spending was of the utmost importance, the New Look's admitted operational shortcomings seemed an acceptable risk.[16]

[15] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 445–58.

[16] A.J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference With the President," 22 December 1954, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series, Folder: "ACW Diary Dec. 1954 (2)," DDEL.

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Eisenhower's repeatedly expressed concern over the size of the federal budget was genuine and long-standing. A look at his views on defense policy during the rearmament fever induced by the outbreak of the Korean War is enlightening in this regard. On 28 September 1950, while still president of Columbia University, Eisenhower addressed a group of prominent Americans meeting in New York to discuss defense needs. At this time, in the wake of General Douglas MacArthur's successful landing at Inchon in South Korea, it appeared that the Korean War would soon be over. Eisenhower warned his listeners that "the Korean affair is a mere incident in a long deliberate campaign" and that in waging that campaign, "*We must not go broke.*" He went on to say that "if our economy should go broke, the Russians would have won even a greater victory than anything they could obtain by going to war." He conceded that defense spending of $21 to $22 billion annually might be needed for the next few years to build sufficient military strength—quite a large increase over the spending limits imposed by the Truman administration prior to the Korean War, but not nearly as large as the budgets the administration would eventually recommend. Eisenhower maintained that the United States could not afford to have forces "at every danger spot" capable of defending "any sector wherever the attack might come." Instead the nation should have mobile and balanced forces "that can be quickly and efficiently transported to any danger point." The only suggestion he made at the meeting that would not eventually reappear in his administration was for the United States to institute universal military service, but even in making it Eisenhower urged that the conscripts be given "only nominal pay."[17]

By December 1950, after the Chinese intervention in Korea had convinced many Americans that World War III was imminent, Eisenhower's views had changed. On 11 December 1950 he met with a Council on Foreign Relations Study Group which had been organized to discuss American aid to Europe. He had served as the group's chairman; this was its last meeting before President Truman announced the general's return to active duty and his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This time Eisenhower's tone was very somber. He called for the dispatch of additional American troops to strengthen the defense of Western Europe and once more urged adoption of a program of universal military service to raise the necessary troops. With regard to manpower policies, he declared that the Pentagon needed "a system that would work over a long period of time"—precisely his own approach to defense planning as a whole two years later. "The trouble with [our current] approach," he observed, "is that we are now dangling on a thread over the edge of a cliff." The views suggest that at a time of major international crisis Eisenhower was willing to abandon the priority he attached to economy and the long haul. But in more

[17] Harry A. Bullis, minutes taken at "Citizens' Conference," 28 September 1950, Papers of Tracy S. Voorhees [hereafter Voorhees Papers], Alexander Library, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.

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normal circumstances, already in 1950 he was proposing that defense planning be put on a basis strikingly similar to that of the New Look.[18]

The evidence is much less clear as to when Eisenhower adopted the belief that massive retaliation should be the foundation of the United States deterrent strategy. At a meeting in Paris in May 1952, John Foster Dulles outlined for the future Republican nominee a foreign policy based on "the means to retaliate instantly." Eisenhower reports in the discussion of this meeting in his memoirs that Dulles's theories were "similar to ones I had long been pondering," although portions of his argument were "oversimplified." This account implies that Eisenhower and Dulles reached the same conclusion independently. It does not, however, jibe with an incident recounted by C. L. Sulzberger, who claims that Dulles inserted a phrase in the foreign-policy plank of the 1952 Republican platform about the importance of "retaliatory striking power" and that Eisenhower ordered it removed. In any case, by August 1952 Eisenhower had overcome his reservations; he declared in a campaign speech to the American Legion on 25 August that "we must have . . . security forces . . . whose destructive and retaliatory power is so great that it causes nightmares in the Kremlin whenever they think of attacking us."[19] What role Dulles played in Eisenhower's "conversion" to massive retaliation must remain an open question.

Dulles and Massive Retaliation

The evidence on the nature of Dulles's long-standing commitment to massive retaliation is much less ambiguous. In the bleak days of December 1950, when Dulles was serving as a consultant to the secretary of state with responsibility for negotiating a peace treaty with Japan, he delivered a speech to the American Association for the United Nations that strongly endorsed the Truman administration's five-year record in international affairs. But he cast his praise in terms that foreshadowed his doctrine of massive retaliation. In phrases that would soon become very familiar, Dulles warned of the impossibility of maintaining local forces strong enough to defend every possible point against Soviet attack. This statement was followed, however, by the claim that the free world could through economic, political, and military strength mount an effective defense against subversion, civil war, and satellite attack—a claim he would not repeat as secretary of state. As for dealing with direct Soviet aggression, Dulles held out the prospect of a strategy very much like that of massive retaliation—"the capacity of counterattack against the aggressor." In this con-

[18] Edwin C. Hoyt, Jr., "Council on Foreign Relations, Study Group on Aid to Europe, Digest of Discussion, Twentieth Meeting, 12/11/50," Voorhees Papers.

[19] John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, 19 May 1952, pp. 146–60; Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, pp. 124–33; Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 23; C.L. Sulzberger, *What's Wrong With American Foreign Policy?* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1959), pp. 41–43; Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech before the American Legion, 25 August 1952, reprinted in *History of American Presidential Elections*, Schlesinger and Israel, 4: 3297–3302.

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nection he mentioned explicitly the free world's "strategic air force and stock of weapons." With restraint he would later abandon, Dulles also cautioned that "total reliance should not be placed on any single form of warfare or any relatively untried type of weapon." He went on to argue for the importance of stronger naval power and ground forces, and he declared that "the arsenal of retaliation should include *all forms* of counterattack with maximum flexibility, mobility, and the prospect of surprise."[20]

When Dulles spoke again publicly on appropriate military strategy on 27 November 1951, the praise for the Truman administration found in his earlier remarks had almost disappeared. Although still serving as a consultant to Acheson, Dulles clearly sought to distance himself from the administration's record in foreign affairs. With the upcoming presidential election possibly in mind, Dulles on this occasion warned of the tendency to identify any one year as the "climax of danger," and he criticized the administration for stockpiling vast quantities of military equipment that "quickly becomes obsolete." He then asked rhetorically what had prevented the Soviets from seizing "their two most coveted prizes, Germany and Japan." Answering his own question, Dulles declared: "The most reasonable explanation is that the rulers of Russia knew that if they indulged in this open aggression in any area of vital concern to the United States or which by treaty we were bound to defend, their sources and means of power would have been visited with incredible means of destruction. Thus the free world has been getting the security of deterrent striking power." Elsewhere in the same speech Dulles stated, "The probability is, indeed, that for the last five years we have had that kind of [deterrent] protection, without fully realizing it." He went on to stress "the need to develop, consciously, dependence on punishing power as the means of community defense against direct aggression."[21]

Thus Dulles contended that the Truman administration had been reaping the benefits of a strategy of massive retaliation "without fully realizing it," and he asserted that the United States needed only to develop this policy more completely and more rationally. This was a strange and less than candid claim from someone who must have known that Truman and his associates often discussed openly their belief that fear of atomic retaliation deterred Soviet aggression against vital U.S. interests. Not surprisingly, he did not repeat it as secretary of state. It would have cast too much doubt on his later argument that massive retaliation was an essential part of the "New Look" in American foreign policy and strategic doctrine.

Dulles resigned his position as a consultant on 21 March 1952 after Senate ap-

[20] John Foster Dulles, "Where Are We? A Five-Year Record of America's Response to the Challenge of Communism," *Department of State Bulletin* 24 (15 January 1951):85–89 (emphasis added). At this time in private conversations, Dulles was critical of Truman's management of foreign affairs including the decision to intervene in Korea. See Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, pp. 114–66.

[21] John Foster Dulles, "Can We Stop Russian Imperialism?" *Department of State Bulletin* 25 (10 December 1951): 938–41.

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proval of the peace treaty with Japan. He was then free to pursue openly the position of secretary of state in the future Republican administration. Dulles first had to decide whether to support Taft or Eisenhower, the two leading contenders for the Republican nomination. After conversations with several prominent Eisenhower backers, Dulles concluded that the general's international views (and his prospects for election) were more attractive and that he should support Eisenhower. He withheld public announcement of his choice until he had had a chance to meet with Eisenhower in Paris in early May. Prior to this meeting Dulles prepared for the candidate's consideration the essay on a new foreign policy that appeared a few weeks later in *Life* magazine under the title of "A Policy of Boldness."

In the essay Dulles linked explicitly for the first time the deterrent protection offered by massive retaliation with the possibility of a more positive American policy for the "liberation of the captive peoples" of Eastern Europe. The general idea was that once the United States had regained the initiative in foreign affairs by threatening the destruction of the Soviets, it could turn its attention more positively to the enslaved nations. What effect this would have was never explained. In his memoirs Eisenhower notes his "substantial agreement" with Dulles's argument about massive retaliation; he passes over the argument's Eastern European corollary in silence. Most analyses of massive retaliation take this article as their point of departure, although it should be clear that, at least as far as military strategy was concerned, Dulles was only rehashing ideas he had held for a long time. The article did set the tone for the foreign-policy rhetoric that appeared in the Republican platform and that continued all through the campaign. After the election it disappeared, only to resurface without reference to liberation in the Council on Foreign Relations speech of January 1954.[22]

Developing the New Look

The actual process of developing the "New Look" with the subsequent adoption of Eisenhower's force posture priorities has been thoroughly treated elsewhere. For our purposes an overview of these events will suffice.[23] The process began immediately after the election, when Eisenhower was returning to the United

[22] Gerson, *John Foster Dulles*, pp. 68–80; Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, pp. 124–30; Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness."

[23] Excellent contemporary coverage of the policy-review process is found in the column "Defense and Strategy," which appeared monthly from May to December 1953 in *Fortune* magazine. The column was most likely written by C.J.V. Murphy, *Fortune's* defense correspondent, a reserve officer in the U.S. Air Force who maintained excellent connections with the air force bureaucracy in the Pentagon. Despite its air force orientation, the column is unusually well informed. See Philip M. Stern with the collaboration of Harold P. Green, *The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 201–4. The best subsequent study of the New Look is Snyder's "New Look"; useful supplementary information is found in Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, pp. 1–36.

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States after making the trip to Korea that he had promised in the campaign. On board the U.S.S. *Helena* Eisenhower met with several of his closest advisers, including the future secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, and with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, whom Eisenhower would soon appoint chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the beginning Eisenhower was insistent that his administration would put defense planning on a sound footing for "the long haul"—a concept that would figure prominently in the rhetoric of the New Look. What it meant in practical terms was that the highest priority would be given to cutting defense spending with the expectation of keeping expenditures at reduced levels for years ahead.[24]

Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and Deputy Secretary Roger Kyes tackled this project immediately upon assuming their jobs. They failed, however, to gain approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of any possible force reductions from the goals set in the Truman administration. Wilson and Kyes then set out to save money by implementing "sound management techniques"—a phrase which eventually meant the adjustment of procurement schedules. The results of their effort appeared in the fiscal year 1954 budget submitted to Congress in May 1953. The administration requested $36 billion in new obligational authority for the Department of Defense, down from the $41.2 billion originally requested by the Truman administration. Despite the size of the reduction, none of the leaders of the economy drive were satisfied, and they resolved to do better in fiscal year 1955. It was clear, however, that altered force goals, not improved management, would have to be the vehicle of future savings.[25]

While Wilson and Kyes were struggling with the defense budget, other senior members of the administration began reviewing the basic principles of American foreign policy. The exercise was called "Operation Solarium," after the room in the White House where the initial participants first met with Eisenhower to explain their plans. Ultimately the participants in this top-level reassessment decided not to undertake the policy of "rollback" promised in the 1952 campaign. Instead they committed the administration to continue Truman's policy of containment, backed by a more explicit reliance on the retaliatory deterrent. Despite published reports that he did not participate, there is good evidence that Dulles was one of the most active members of the study group. The administration made a brief but abortive attempt (probably suggested by public relations specialist C.D. Jackson) to change the terminology of containment. "Resistance," which presumably had more positive connotations, was to be the new catchphrase. But the new phrase was intended to cloak the fact that the administration had decided against changing policy. The final report of Operation Solarium evolved into the Basic National Security Paper NSC 162/2.[26]

[24] Snyder, "New Look," pp. 391-93.

[25] "Defense and Strategy," *Fortune*, May 1953, pp. 89-90; "Defense and Strategy," *Fortune*, June 1953, pp. 89-90; and Snyder, "New Look," pp. 393-400.

[26] Snyder, "New Look," pp. 406-10, does not mention Dulles as a participant in Operation Solarium. One active member, Robert Cutler, indicates, however, that Dulles not only participated

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Thus the overriding question for the administration in the summer of 1953 was how most appropriately to synthesize its two most important objectives—the continuation of containment and the further reduction of defense spending through lower force goals. Under intense pressure from the Republicans, Eisenhower had already in April 1953 decided to name new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to replace the incumbents whose terms would expire over the coming months. The arrival of a new set of top officers provided an excellent opportunity for a fresh examination of military needs as well, a fact that Taft and his supporters never failed to point out. Eisenhower instructed the new chiefs accordingly. In a memo of 1 July 1953 he requested that they, before taking office, examine all aspects of military policy, including strategic plans, service missions, composition of forces, the importance of new weapons, and military assistance. Although the memo did not specifically request lower force requirements, it was clear from the context that this "fresh view" was intended to be of use in the preparation of a new (and lower) defense budget.[27]

The new chiefs had little difficulty in endorsing a military establishment that emphasized those categories of forces that Eisenhower discussed in his memoirs, namely, those for retaliation and continental defense. But extracting from these new chiefs specific commitments to lower force levels proved almost as difficult as it had from their predecessors. After weeks of intense bureaucratic wrangling, on 13 October 1953 Secretary Wilson had to report to the National Security Council that in the opinion of the nation's military leaders reduced force levels would endanger the national security. This report shocked Eisenhower and his civilian advisers, and they ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the matter once more.[28]

At this point in the meeting Admiral Radford offered a suggestion that seemed to offer a way out of the impasse. Speaking for himself only (in fact, no other member of the JCS or civilian service secretary agreed with him), he argued that what prevented the chiefs from lowering force levels was their uncertainty whether nuclear weapons would be used in warfare. Heretofore the chiefs had assumed that under certain political and military circumstances a president might not approve the use of nuclear weapons. Hence in their planning they had had to consider the possibility of fighting an extended conventional war. If the chiefs could count on being able to use nuclear weapons, then smaller force levels were possible. The NSC adopted Radford's suggestion on 30 October 1953 by incorporating it into NSC 162/2. Thus the United States became officially

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but was the initiator of the entire project. There is little reason to doubt Cutler on this point. See Cutler, *No Time for Rest*, pp. 307–10. The attempt to replace "containment" with "resistance" is reported in "Defense and Strategy," *Fortune*, June 1953, p. 98.

[27] "Defense and Strategy," *Fortune*, September 1953, pp. 75–76; Snyder, "New Look," pp. 410–13; Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," 1 July 1953, Administration Series, Folder: "Joint Chiefs of Staff," DDEL.

[28] "Defense and Strategy," *Fortune*, December 1953, pp. 77–78; Snyder, "New Look," pp. 413–25.

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committed to the use of nuclear weapons across a wide range of possible military conflicts. Using this commitment as a basis for action, Radford and Secretary Wilson imposed upon General Ridgway and Admiral Carney, the chiefs of the army and navy respectively, reductions in the size of their two services.[29]

Was Radford's intervention essential to the administration's adoption of a strategy based primarily on nuclear weapons, as much of the available literature implies? Unfortunately, documentary evidence that might help resolve the question is not yet available. But Eisenhower did refer repeatedly in public and private statements throughout 1953 to the need for the services to integrate "new weapons" more efficiently into their planning. Under the phrase "new weapons" he almost certainly included, among other things, nuclear weapons. It seems fair to conclude that Eisenhower had at the very least given serious thought to the all-purpose nuclear strategy before Radford spoke up at the NSC meeting of 13 October and that he would have eventually ordered planning along the lines suggested in NSC 162/2 in any case.[30]

On 9 December Admiral Radford submitted to Secretary Wilson a memorandum that contained what the Joint Chiefs agreed was an appropriate "military strategy designed to implement national policies contained in NSC 162/2." This very important document contains a succinct explanation of the operational nuclear strategy worked out in the first year of the Eisenhower administration. It may most instructively be compared with the administration's rhetorical nuclear strategy as expounded by John Foster Dulles one month later at the Council on Foreign Relations. The chiefs declared that emphasis should be placed "upon the capability of inflicting massive damage upon the USSR by our retaliatory striking power as the major deterrent to aggression, and a vital element of any U.S. strategy in the event of general war." The chiefs also recommended "the provision of tactical atomic weapons for U.S. or allied military forces in general war or in a local aggression whenever the employment of atomic weapons would be militarily advantageous."[31] In a nutshell, the retaliatory force would be used to deter all kinds of aggression and invoked in response to aggression that meant *general* war. Tactical atomic weapons would be used in local conflicts or in general wars as appropriate. On the basis of these military decisions John Foster Dulles designed the rhetoric of massive retaliation.

The Eisenhower administration's nuclear strategy as endorsed by the JCS in their memorandum of 9 December 1953 rested on two operational elements and one doctrinal assumption. Among the operational elements, the first was a retaliatory strike force capable of delivering nuclear weapons at targets within the enemy's homeland. The second was a diversified array of nuclear weapons

[29] Snyder, "New Look," pp. 426–51; Lt. Gen. A.J. Goodpaster to author, 9 April 1980.

[30] Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management*, p. 24; Snyder, "New Look," pp. 426–28, 436–37; Eisenhower, "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," 1 July 1953.

[31] Arthur W. Radford, "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Attachments," 9 December 1953, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Folder: "Wilson, Charles (Secy. Def.) 1953 (2)," DDEL.

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suitable for use in military situations from the local battlefield to the strategic air offensive. Doctrinally, the basic assumption was that of deterrence—that fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons would prevent Communists around the world from undertaking a variety of actions inimical to U.S. interests that they otherwise might do. It is often forgotten in discussions of the New Look and massive retaliation that neither the operational elements nor the doctrinal assumption was the creation of the Eisenhower administration. It inherited both from its predecessor. One cannot hope to understand the origins of massive retaliation without probing into the operational and doctrinal legacy of the Truman years.

The Truman Administration and Strategic Deterrence

Between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean War prominent administration spokesmen frequently endorsed a strategic doctrine that can only be called deterrence. When John Foster Dulles claimed in his speech of 27 November 1951 that the United States had been enjoying the security of deterrence "without fully realizing it," he was quite plainly mistaken. Averell Harriman spoke for the mainstream of the civilian and military policymaking community when he testified in September of 1947 before the President's Air Policy Commission that the fear of American air atomic retaliation kept the Soviets from undertaking virtually unlimited military aggression. Of course, some military planners doubted the wisdom of placing the greatest emphasis on the threat of devastating the Soviet Union; the B-36 controversy and the "Revolt of the Admirals" proved that. But Harriman did capture, if somewhat hyperbolically, a widely shared belief when he declared that "there is only one thing which the leaders of the Soviet Union fear, and that is the American air force."[32]

This confidence did not disappear in the wake of the first detection of a Soviet atomic weapons test. In an article published three weeks after the public announcement that the Soviets had developed an atomic bomb, General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the United States could still preserve meaningful nuclear superiority. "As long as America retains (as it can) a tremendous advantage in A-bomb quantity, quality, and deliverability, the deterrent effect of the bomb will continue." In the same article Bradley mentioned two distinct missions for atomic weapons—the more traditional strategic countercity mission and the newer tactical battlefield mis-

[32] Testimony of Averell Harriman before the President's Commission on Air Policy, 18 September 1947, Papers of the President's Commission on Air Policy, Folder: "C2-1 Harriman (Sec. of Commerce) 9/8," Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter HSTL); on the air force and deterrence in this period see David MacIsaac, "The Air Force and Strategic Thought, 1945–1951," Working Paper no. 8 (Washington, D.C.: The International Security Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1979); on the B-36 see Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1964* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1974), pp. 129–34.

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sion. He waxed especially enthusiastic about the integration of atomic weapons into the defense of Western Europe because their enormous firepower would make possible turning "back invaders of vastly superior numbers."[33]

Bradley did not mention that these two missions for atomic weapons were widely perceived in the late 1940s to be in direct competition with one another. To understand the controversy one must examine briefly how thinking on atomic weapons had evolved since 1945. Before the *Sandstone* series of tests in the spring of 1948, strategic bombing had seemed the only appropriate military use for atomic weapons on basically three grounds. First, the weapons available or tested up to this point were so bulky that only a specially modified bomber could deliver them to their targets. Second, a team of physicists and engineers had to assemble each weapon individually in a laborious and expensive process. Third, the nation's supply of fissionable material was so limited that only a small number of atomic bombs could be produced each year. Data from the *Sandstone* test series made the first two of these reasons obsolete. Scientists in the weapons development program concluded quickly that the production of atomic weapons could be put on a standardized "assembly-line basis" and that smaller and more manageable atomic devices were possible. Suddenly a whole new vista of possible military applications opened up. Here the controversy arose. Leaders of the air force resisted the immediate exploitation of these technological breakthroughs. They argued that diverting scarce fissionable materials from the production of weapons to be used in the strategic air offensive might prejudice the air force's ability to carry out the nation's most important military mission.[34]

The obvious long-term solution to the problem was to expand the nation's production of fissionable material. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1949, strong pressure grew on President Truman, who alone could order such a move. It came from a variety of quarters—from Congress, where Senator Brian McMahon (D-Conn.) waged a personal crusade for the expansion of the atomic weapons program, and indirectly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Liaison Committee of the Defense Department, which by statute was responsible for the transmission of the military requirements for atomic weapons to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The detection of the Soviet atomic test in September 1949 gave an added urgency to the situation, and on 19 October 1949 Truman ordered the expansion. At the same time he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to indicate to him how the existence of the new fissionable material would alter strategic planning. The chiefs' reply, delivered 2 December 1949 and in effect confirming the position of the air force in the original controversy, noted that the development of new weapons and resulting changes in military strategy could come only after the new fissionable material became available. For the

[33] Omar Bradley, "This Way Lies Peace," *Saturday Evening Post*, 15 October 1949, p. 170.

[34] Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine*, pp. 104, 140–41; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. 2, *Atomic Shield, 1947–1952* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1972), pp. 164–65, 175–76, 178.

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time being, "the principal means of delivering the atomic weapon" would remain the heavy bomber. Evidently General Bradley's tactical atomic defense of Europe was still at least several years down the road.[35]

The primacy of the strategic deterrent over the creation of a tactical atomic arsenal received even stronger confirmation in January 1950 with President Truman's decision to approve accelerated development of the hydrogen, or "Super," bomb. In the debate over how to respond most appropriately to the Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons (which reached full intensity independently of the decision to expand the production of fissionable material which was in process before detection of the Soviet test), two schools of thought quickly emerged. One, led by J. Robert Oppenheimer and the General Advisory Committee of the AEC, called for the United States to devote its resources more heavily to the creation of tactical atomic weapons. The other, led by Edward Teller and Lewis Strauss, called for a major effort to develop a fusion weapon many times more powerful than the atomic fission weapons then available. The Joint Chiefs unanimously endorsed the Teller-Strauss position. They considered the "Super" bomb so important that its development was desirable even if that entailed a reduction in the production of atomic weapons. President Truman was of that opinion as well, and on 31 January 1950 he announced his decision to expand research on the "Super."[36]

One profound if indirect consequence of the outbreak of the Korean War was to eliminate the necessity for choice between nuclear weapons designed for strategic and tactical use. That choice had never been quite as clear-cut as Robert Oppenheimer maintained, since further refinement of fission weapons was necessary to develop an effective trigger for the fusion explosion of the "Super." But the outbreak of war, because it melted overnight Truman's long-frozen determination to emphasize spending austerity at the expense of military power, meant that suddenly sufficient resources would be available to pursue both objectives at a pace undreamt of before 25 June 1950.[37]

It has become part of the mythology of the Korean War that the purpose of the rearmament drive begun in the summer of 1950 was to lessen American dependence on nuclear weapons. Paul Nitze, for example, has argued that already in the winter of 1950 he and the other members of the State-Defense Policy Review Group who drafted NSC 68, a study recommending a massive military buildup against the Soviet Union, had identified the dangers implicit in complete reliance on the threat of atomic retaliation against the Soviet homeland to deter aggression. That much is true. But the corollary to Nitze's argument—that the buildup of American military power undertaken during the

[35] Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 179–84, 365–66, 370–73; Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 2, *1947–1949* (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1976), pp. 530–36.

[36] Herbert York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1976), pp. 40–76; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 362–409; Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949*, pp. 546–60.

[37] York, *The Advisors*, pp. 22–23, 26.

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Korean War to implement the directives outlined in NSC 68 emphasized conventional forces over nuclear weapons—is highly misleading. The Truman administration did build up conventional forces. But, just as important, it poured money at a furious rate into the improvement of American strategic nuclear forces and into the program for the creation of tactical atomic weapons.[38]

Truman's desire to boost the production of fissionable material for use in the weapons program became clear almost immediately after the North Korean invasion. On 7 July 1950 he asked Congress to provide the AEC with a supplemental $260 million appropriation. Neither Senator McMahon (now joined in his crusade by Congressman Henry Jackson, a recent convert to the advantages of an ever-growing weapons program), the Military Liaison Committee, nor General Bradley was satisfied with this increase. The president was sympathetic to their views, and on 8 August 1950 he ordered the Department of Defense and the AEC to undertake a study of the magnitude of effort required to achieve a large and immediate expansion of fissionable material production and the weapons program. Truman received the study, which used as its point of departure the assumption that both production and the stockpile were only about half as large as national security required, on 2 October 1950. It cited military requirements for the "strategic air offensive," and for "weapons to be used in direct support of our surface forces in . . . Western Europe and other areas vital to our defense" and cautioned that given the "still expanding" range of military applications, national security might require larger expansion at a later date. The study called for the establishment of additional "gaseous diffusion facilities," reactors for tritium production, and the acquisition of all available uranium ore.[39] President Truman approved the study a week later, on 9 October 1950.

The "still expanding" range of military application did in fact create momentum for yet another major expansion of the atomic weapons program in the spring of 1951. Once more Senator McMahon and the Military Liaison Committee (whose chairman, Robert Le Baron, was also Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall's assistant for atomic energy affairs) spearheaded the drive. This time, however, several commissioners of the AEC were hesitant about "giving the military a blank check" for atomic weapons procurement. They pressed hard for a more exact definition of the military requirements for another expansion than the military leaders were willing to provide. As a result of this disagreement, formulating an expansion proposal was more difficult than it had been the previous year. Each side presented its case to President Truman at a meeting in the Oval Office on 16 January 1952. Robert Lovett, who had become secretary of defense the preceding September, built his argument around the contention "that recent technological advances opened up the prospect of almost limitless possibilities in the use of fissionable material," and he put in a

[38] Paul H. Nitze, colloquium presentation, 26 September 1979, Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.

[39] James S. Lay, Jr., "Memorandum for the President," 2 October 1950, President's Secretary's File-Subject File: NSC: NSC Atomic: NSC Meetings, Folder, "Atomic energy-Expansion of the atomic energy program," HSTL; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 522–29.

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special word for tactical weapons as well. Secretary Acheson strongly endorsed Lovett's position. Gordon Dean, chairman of the AEC, countered with the argument that his organization was not opposed to another expansion per se, but that it believed a thorough consideration of all the relevant issues by the NSC should precede it. Truman, without explanation of his views, evidently found Lovett's position more persuasive and ordered the expansion. The American atomic weapons program was now so large that in the fall of 1952 the hitherto insatiable Military Liaison Committee reported that it found no reason for further expansion.[40]

With regard to the balance of strength among the armed services, Robert Lovett emerged as the most formidable champion in the executive branch of the broad nuclear arsenal. He also took a series of manpower decisions that granted clear priority within the rearmament drive to the air force and the Strategic Air Command. When the administration's intention to continue rearmament became obvious the preceding spring, the services developed new force goals for fiscal year 1954. Each service requested increases, but the air force proposals dwarfed those of the other two branches. The army, for example, asked for an increase from twenty-one to twenty-seven active divisions, while the air force requested an increase from 87 to 140 combat wings. An intense debate followed among the Joint Chiefs about the need for such a precipitous increase. Lovett approved the position of the air force, and the force goals finally approved by the Joint Chiefs in September 1951 reflected his decision. They gave token increases to the army and navy, and a massive increase to the air force. Thus the Truman administration established a pattern in force structure that gave the air force unmistakable primacy over its rival services. The New Look refined this pattern, but did not change it.[41]

Conclusion

Massive retaliation is one of those odd phrases in the lexicon of strategic discourse that is more symbol than reality. Prominent spokesmen of the Eisenhower administration used it as the rhetorical catchphrase to exploit a series of developments in American atomic capabilities and force structures that were well under way before they took office. Eisenhower and his associates did interpet the meaning and potential utility of these capabilities differently from their counterparts in the Truman administration. For example, the Republican leaders concluded that since the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be deterred by existing American nuclear forces and those under

[40] Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 4, *1950–1952* (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), pp. 146–49; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 547–49, 556–63, 565–68, 572, 576–78; "Memorandum for the President" (summary of discussion at meeting of NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 16 January 1952), 17 January 1952, Papers of HST-PSF-Subject File: NSC Atomic, Folder: "Atomic energy-Expansion of the atomic energy program," HSTL.

[41] Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, pp. 94–101.

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development as a result of the Korean War buildup, they could resist any pressures for further expansion. In fact, once the Republicans were firmly in control after a year in office, Eisenhower achieved genuine cutbacks. They believed that the international situation was sufficiently calm to increase reliance on nuclear weapons as America's principal line of defense as early as 1953, whereas Truman planners did not anticipate taking that step until 1956 at the earliest. Finally, Republican leaders were willing to invoke the threat of nuclear weapons to bring an end to the war in Korea while their predecessors were not. Yet these changes do not diminish the fact that the Eisenhower administration inherited from the Democrats the nuclear weapons and the strategic strikeforce on which its rhetoric was based.

Thus massive retaliation should not be viewed as a fundamental strategic innovation. Within the national security world, it was what advertising specialists would call an "image phrase." But far from being without value for the administration, massive retaliation did serve two basic purposes. First, it gave the public and the pundits a distinctive new label for what the Republican administration was doing in foreign affairs, and it asserted a basic policy departure from the record of the previous administration. Second, massive retaliation gave the new administration and especially Admiral Radford an instrument to use in wringing reductions in force goals and defense spending from a most reluctant military establishment. In this sense, massive retaliation provided the rhetorical clout with which the administration could achieve its most cherished policy objective in national security affairs.

Massive retaliation gave a useful Republican label to a product researched and developed by the opposition party. It served important political and persuasive ends before being discarded by the Kennedy administration. When the Democrats took over the executive branch in 1961, they returned the favor that Eisenhower had done the Democrats eight years before. Suddenly the new concept was "Flexible Response," which not surprisingly was the Kennedy administration's catchphrase for implementing a range of balanced forces that its predecessor had in fact begun to develop.*

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Changes in American Voter Turnout, 1964–1976

THOMAS E. CAVANAGH

The ongoing decline in voter participation has disturbed many observers of American politics. Journalists and other commentators are fond of employing the national level of turnout as a kind of barometer of the health of the political system. At the very least, this measure serves to gauge the proportion of the population to which elected officials are accountable at the polls. Yet the *size* of the electoral universe has less impact on the policy process than does the *identity* of those who compose it. In the current debate over the causes and consequences of nonvoting, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the shifting demography of voter participation. To appreciate fully how the increase in nonvoting potentially affects the allocation of power in the United States, it is necessary to disaggregate the national trend into its component parts.

In its broad contours, the scope of the phenomenon is clear enough. The proportion of the voting-age population casting ballots in presidential elections has fallen from a postwar peak of 62.8 percent in 1960 to a trough of approximately 53.9 percent in 1980, the lowest level since 1948. In a number of respects, the decline appears baffling. It has long been known that the affluent are the most likely to vote. During the last quarter-century, educational attainment and living standards have risen dramatically for the population as a whole, while great strides have been made toward reducing the size of the impoverished underclass. Moreover, many of the legal barriers that long impeded registration and voting, particularly in the South, have recently been swept away. One would therefore expect the contemporary period to have been marked by increasing voter participation. Indeed, the increase in educational levels, independent of other fac-

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tors, should have been sufficient to increase turnout by approximately 6.5 percent since 1964.[1] The forces in the political environment peculiar to this period must therefore have acted as a powerful disincentive to the use of the franchise.

The aggregate decline encompasses some distinctive trends and countertrends. Most striking is the phenomenon of the "dropout," the one-time voter who no longer votes. The decline in habitual voting is concentrated among the more marginal groups of the population. The steepest drops in turnout have been recorded among the young, the poor, and the least educated. According to one observer, "We might envision the electorate as a strip of elastic tacked to a wall at one end, and the other pulled downward; the gap between those on the bottom and those on the top increases, with those at the top moving downward . . . less than those at the bottom."[2] If the gap in participation between those at the top and those at the bottom of American society is increasing, one can infer that the difference in political clout is increasing as well.

There have been exceptions to this general rule. The South has been an anomaly: The substantial gains in participation registered there during the 1960s have been only partially eroded in the last few elections. The long-standing turnout gap between men and women, moreover, has virtually disappeared, as the older cohorts of women socialized into apoliticism continue to pass out of the electorate. And the residential mobility of the affluent is diminishing the traditionally high participation of college-educated adults.

An unusually rich data source can be employed to examine these changes in detail. Since 1964, the Census Bureau has conducted biennial postelection studies on voter participation as part of its monthly series of Current Population Surveys. The sample is designed to reach approximately 1 of every 2,000 households, permitting exceptionally precise estimates not only of percentages within a given population universe, but of the actual numerical size of that universe as well. The typical sample generated by such procedures in recent years has yielded information on about 100,000 respondents in about 45,000 households.[3]

Some elegant research designs using this data source have assessed the impact of various demographic and structural factors on turnout.[4] Rather than focusing on the determinants of turnout at one point in time, this analysis will ex-

[1] For an explanation of how this estimate was derived, see the Methodological Appendix at the end of this article.

[2] Howard L. Reiter, "The Trend Toward Presidential Non-Voting: Causes, Effects, and Significance" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1-4 September 1977). A revised version of this paper, minus (alas) the quote, was published as "Why Is Turnout Down?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43 (Fall 1979): 297-311.

[3] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Current Population Survey: Design and Methodology*, Technical Paper no. 40 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 15, 41. One case in the sample of the Current Population Survey represents a population base of about 1,500 in the sample universe.

[4] A comprehensive analysis can be found in Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980).

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TABLE 1
Reported Voter Registration and Participation, 1968-1976

	1968	*1970*	*1972*	*1974*	*1976*
Registered	74.3%	68.1%	72.3%	62.2%	66.7%
Voted	67.8	54.6	63.0	44.7	59.2
Did not Vote	6.5	13.5	9.3	17.5	7.5
Not Registered	25.7	31.9	27.7	37.8	33.3
Total (in millions)*	(116.5)	(120.7)	(136.2)	(141.3)	(146.5)

* Base represents civilian noninstitutional population of voting age.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), no. 192 (1969), Table 1; no. 228 (1971), Table 1; no. 253 (1973), Table 1; no. 293 (1976), Table 1; and no. 322 (1978), Table 1.

amine changes in the composition of the electorate across time, albeit in purely descriptive fashion. A detailed look at the dependent variable of turnout decline will suggest hypotheses that can be pursued by future researchers employing attitudinal data.

Turnout is of course defined as a proportion. The Current Population Survey estimates take as their numerator the respondents in their weighted sample who report having voted in a given presidential or midterm congressional election. The denominator is the entire weighted sample, the universe for which is the civilian noninstitutional population of voting age (VACNP). The level of overreporting in the Current Population Surveys has ranged from 3.6 to 5.9 percent in presidential election years and from 7.6 to 9.7 percent in midterm years. Thus, these estimates are substantially superior to those of the Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS) with regard to measurement error as well as sample size.[5] Unless otherwise indicated, the Bureau of the Census surveys are the source of all turnout figures presented in the remainder of this article.

The Broad Contours of Electoral Change

An examination of registration levels indicates that the proportion of the VACNP registered to vote declined from 74.3 percent in 1968 to 66.7 percent in 1976 (Table 1). A recalculation reveals that turnout among those registered to vote in presidential years stayed within a high, narrow range (from 87.1 to 91.3 percent) throughout the period. Thus, the level of registration is clearly a critical factor in determining turnout fluctuations in presidential elections.

It is seldom noted, however, that the relationship between registration and voting in other contests is considerably more variable than in presidential years.[6] Of the 68.1 percent of the VACNP registered to vote in the midterm year

[5] A more complete discussion of survey overreporting is offered in the Methodological Appendix.

[6] Two notable exceptions are Albert B. Karnig and B. Oliver Walter, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things Second," *Social Science Quarterly* 55 (June 1974): 159-66; and Austin Ranney, *Participation in American Presidential Nominations, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1977).

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TABLE 2

Most Recent Vote Cast as of 1976, by Age (millions of people)

Most Recent Vote Cast	*18–24 Years*	*25–34 Years*	*35–44 Years*	*45–64 Years*	*65+ Years*	*Total**
Voted in 1976	11.4	17.5	14.4	29.8	13.7	86.7
Last voted in 1974–75	1.2	1.7	1.2	2.4	1.5	7.9
Last voted in 1972–73	1.1	2.8	1.7	2.7	1.7	10.0
Last voted before 1972	.1	1.2	1.7	3.9	3.0	9.9
Never voted (citizens)	12.3	7.1	2.9	3.5	1.7	27.6
Never voted (noncitizens)	.9	1.3	.9	1.0	.4	4.5
Total	27.0	31.5	22.8	43.3	22.0	146.5

* Cell entries do not sum to totals due to rounding error.

Source: Prorated estimates from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 322 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), Tables 1, 2, 19, and 21.

of 1970, fully 80.2 percent voted on Election Day. In 1974, only 62.2 percent were registered, and of these people, only 71.9 percent made their way to the polls. Thus, the sharp turnout drop in 1974 was due to a twofold effect: fewer people registered than usual, and fewer of those registered bothered to vote.

The year 1974 looms large in the phenomenon of the dropout—the former voter who has left the active electorate. In Table 2, the 1976 VACNP has been partitioned into three major categories: 86.7 million voters; 27.8 million former voters who did not vote; and 32.1 million people who have never voted. Since 1972, an astonishing 18 million people have simply stopped voting, without returning to the active electorate.

One could object that the granting of the eighteen-year-old vote in 1972 created a marginal constituency that has been drifting in and out of the electorate ever since. The age controls in Table 2, however, belie this possibility. Of the 17.9 million dropouts after 1972, only 2.3 million came of age after 1970. A full 8 million were between thirty and sixty years old in 1972, which is ordinarily the period of greatest voting participation. It takes a powerful stimulus to alter previously established behavior, so the cessation of voting among the middle-aged electorate must be considered a particularly striking change in the American political environment.

The dropouts are only half of the picture, however. If their departure from the active electorate were offset by the entrance of former nonvoters, the net impact on turnout would be nil. To pursue this analysis, it is instructive to ignore, for the moment, both the cohort coming of age at any given election and mortality among voters and nonvoters between elections, focusing instead on the VACNP at the time of a given election (time 1 [t_1]) and investigating its behavior at the time of the next election (time 2 [t_2]). This universe can then be decomposed by means of the following fourfold typology:

—*Core voters*, who voted at t_1 and t_2
—*Dropouts*, who voted at t_1 but not at t_2

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TABLE 3
*Voter Participation among People of Voting Age in Two Consecutive Presidential Elections, 1968–1976**

	Voted in 1964	*Did not Vote in 1964*
Voted in 1968	62.4%	6.9%
Did not Vote in 1968	11.2%	19.5%

* Base: 104,933,000 (civilian noninstitutional population aged twenty-five years and over in 1968).
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 192 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), Table 9.

	Voted in 1968	*Did not Vote in 1968*
Voted in 1972	59.3%	6.6%
Did not Vote in 1972	11.1%	23.0%

* Base: 111,591,000 (civilian noninstitutional population aged twenty-five years and over in 1972).
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 253 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), Table 28.

	Voted in 1972	*Did not Vote in 1972*
Voted in 1976	53.1%	8.5%
Did not Vote in 1976	8.8%	29.6%

* Base: 130,578,000 (civilian noninstitutional population aged twenty-two years and over in 1976).
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 192 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), Table 19.

—*Mobilized voters*, who voted at t_2 but not at t_1
—*Core nonvoters*, who did not vote at either t_1 or t_2

Table 3 tallies the flow of potential voters into and out of these categories over the course of the last three presidential elections. During this period, the core electorate (as a proportion of this specially defined universe) shrank by 9.3 percent, while the core nonelectorate expanded by 10.1 percent. The source of this apparent hemorrhage is easily located: dropouts exceeded mobilized voters by 4.3 percent in 1968 and by 4.5 percent in 1972. At first glance, this process of attrition appears to have stabilized in 1976, when only .3 percent separated the two transitional categories.[7] It should be recalled, however, that the electoral universe presented in Table 3 excludes the cohort newly come of age. When the enfranchisement of young adults is taken into account, a somewhat different picture emerges.

In the period from 1964 to 1972, 51 percent of each entering cohort of those aged twenty-one to twenty-four turned out to vote. In 1976, however, only 46 percent of this age group voted; and the participation of those between eighteen and twenty years old dropped sharply below its 1972 level, from 48 to 38 per-

[7] The 1976 data in Table 3 require certain adjustments to insure comparability with previous years; see the Methodological Appendix for a discussion.

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cent. Although the exodus of the dropouts slowed somewhat in 1976, turnout continued to decline anyway because of the increasing reluctance of the young to enter the polling booth. If mortality among older cohorts of voters is not offset by the participation of younger adults, then the level of turnout will necessarily continue to decline for a number of years to come.

The adoption of the eighteen-year-old vote occasioned a good deal of speculation as to its possible effects. Thus far, its impact on the aggregate level of turnout has not been dramatic. If the eighteen-to-twenty-year-old cohort is deleted from both the numerator and the denominator of the turnout fraction in 1972, the voting rate increases from 63 to 64.3 percent among the remaining universe. This calculation increases the participation rate from 44.7 to 46.8 percent in 1974 and from 59.2 to 61.1 percent in 1976. The net effect of the Twenty-sixth Amendment on turnout has therefore been slight, although it may increase marginally over time if turnout among younger voters continues to decline.

A more subtle cause of the turnout decline can be detected by comparing the base population figures for the various cohorts. First, the "baby boom" has vastly swelled the ranks of young adults. Whereas 31 million potential voters were between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-four in 1964, fully 46.4 million fell in this age bracket by 1976. In addition, the increase in life expectancy has swelled the ranks of the elderly, another group noted for low turnout. There were 17.3 million potential voters aged sixty-five or older in 1964; this group had expanded to 22 million by 1976.

This growth at both ends of the age scale had the effect of depressing aggregate turnout in 1976 by about 1 percent below the 1964 level.[8] When combined with the enfranchisement of those aged eighteen to twenty, it becomes apparent that only about one-third of the 10 percent decline in turnout since 1964 can be traced to changes in the age composition of the electorate. One must look elsewhere to explain the bulk of the drop in participation rates.

The Growing Class Bias in Participation

The aggregate decline in turnout has been far from neutral in terms of class. It has tended to exaggerate the already pronounced class bias in participation patterns. Given the mobilization of the southern electorate, with its traditionally low levels of income and educational attainment, this trend is all the more impressive.

In the American context, race has traditionally been a key determinant of social status. The federal government's attempts to eliminate discrimination against black voting in the South reflect its political importance. Thus, it is interesting to note the rise in participation of both races in the South during the 1960s, which peaked at 62 percent for whites and 52 percent for blacks in 1968. Indeed, John L. Hammond has argued that the salience of racial issues, and the entry of blacks into the electorate, spurred a countermobilization of southern

[8] For an explanation of how this estimate was derived, see the Methodological Appendix.

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FIGURE 1

Reported Voter Participation by Family Income, 1976



Source: Prorated estimates from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 322 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), Tables 13 and 26.

white voters with the intent of limiting potential gains by blacks at the polls.[9] Despite a subsequent mild decline, the region's 1976 turnout rates (57 percent for whites and 46 percent for blacks) remain very close to their 1964 levels.

The North and West show a much different pattern: one of uninterrupted decline. The turnout drop from 1964 to 1976 was almost twice as pronounced among blacks (from 72 to 52 percent) as among whites (from 75 to 63 percent). This is particularly striking in light of the 1964 experience, when black and white participation rates outside the South were virtually identical for all age groups. Turnout among nonsouthern blacks dropped by 7 percent in 1968, well before any shift of similar magnitude was apparent among whites. The participation decline was steepest among the young, another cause for concern. In 1976, only 25 percent of nonsouthern blacks under age twenty-one turned out to vote, as opposed to 43 percent of their white counterparts. If this gap separating the two entering cohorts is maintained, the impact of the black vote will be considerably reduced in future elections.

Blacks were by no means the only low-status group registering a turnout decline in recent years. Since 1964, there has been a general widening of the participation gap separating the most and least advantaged. This is because turnout has been declining most rapidly at the lower levels of socioeconomic status. The pattern brings to mind the metaphor of the stretching elastic tape, which received most of its stretching in the 1968 and 1972 elections. The net turnout decline since 1964 has been concentrated most heavily among lower-income voters (Figure 1). The same linear relationship can be seen in the statistics for education and occupation. In tandem with the findings on black participation, these results suggest that the "have-nots" are a less important factor in the contem-

[9] John L. Hammond, "Race and Electoral Mobilization: White Southerners, 1952-1968," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 41 (Spring 1977): 13-27.

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TABLE 4

SRC/CPS Data on Reported Voter Participation by Family Income, 1952–1976

Family Income	*1952*	*1956*	*1960*	*1964*	*1968*	*1972*	*1976*
Highest third	86%	84%	87%	86%	88%	87%	82%
Middle third	76	76	81	79	79	70	71
Lowest third	61	59	68	68	63	61	60
Class bias	1.41	1.42	1.28	1.26	1.40	1.43	1.37

Source: Recalculated from Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–1978* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 317.

porary electoral environment than they were during the heyday of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society."

It is important, however, to recognize that the current level of class bias in participation patterns does not appear to be unrepresentative of the norm during the postwar period. Because the Bureau of the Census surveys have only been conducted since 1964, it is necessary to employ SRC/CPS data to illustrate this point. Some time series figures on turnout by family income are presented in Table 4. The respondents in each year's sample were regrouped into income categories of approximately equal size. An index of class bias was then calculated by taking the ratio of the turnout percentage of the upper-income respondents to that of the lower-income respondents. The evidence suggests that the 1960–1964 period was atypical in its relatively lower levels of class bias in turnout. Whether fluctuations in this pattern portend changes in political influence will be discussed at the conclusion of this article.

Some Countervailing Tendencies

Although there has been a recent trend toward the exaggeration of the existing class bias in voter participation, it is necessary to consider some important countertrends. One of these is the mobility of the population, which is acting as a brake upon the status imbalance in turnout.

Residential mobility is associated with high status in contemporary America. In 1974, whereas 60 percent of adults with a grade-school education had lived at their current address for six years or more, the proportion among those with a postgraduate degree was only 37 percent. The interaction of residential mobility with turnout produces some intriguing effects. Mobility restrains participation while status increases it; yet mobility and status are positively related to one another. For example, the 1974 turnout rate among grade-school alumni with under one year of residence was only 14 percent, while it reached a peak of 44 percent among elementary-school graduates with over six years of residence at their current address. Among college graduates, voter participation ranged

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FIGURE 2

*Reported Voter Participation by Sex, Controlling for Occupation, 1964–1976**



* Bars and numbers represent base population, in millions. Percentages represent voter participation.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), no. 143 (1965), Tables 4 and 5; no. 322 (1978), Tables 11 and 12.

from 38 percent for the most mobile to 78 percent for the least mobile.[10] The emergence of the highly educated nonvoter is a complex phenomenon. The evidence suggests that it can be partially explained by the concentration of the college educated among the younger age brackets and by the impact of residential mobility upon upper-status segments of the population that are otherwise most likely to register and vote.

The evolution of sexual identities is another crosscurrent worthy of mention. Gender was once a potent determinant of turnout, but its impact has all but vanished with the passage of time. The sex differential stood at 4.9 percent in the 1964 Census Bureau survey on turnout; by 1976, it was a negligible .8 percent.

As Kristi Andersen has noted, the entry of women into the labor force has increased their awareness of political issues and has stimulated participation.[11] Men and women within a given occupational category display very similar turnout rates (Figure 2). This was just as true in 1964 as in 1976. The key change between these years was the doubling of the number of women in white-collar occupations. By increasing the pool of women in the highest turnout category, this factor has partially restrained the aggregate decline in turnout. In other words, were it not for the changing role orientation of women, voter participation would have declined even more sharply than it actually has since 1964.

[10] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 293 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), Table 22.

[11] Kristi Andersen, "Working Women and Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (August 1975): 439–53.

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Conclusion

The preceding discussion outlines a significant shift in the patterns of American voter turnout since 1964. Women are entering the electoral mainstream. The young are becoming less likely to begin voting, while the middle-aged are becoming more likely to stop. Most important, the discrepancy in electoral power between the haves and have-nots has substantially increased. If the notion of electoral accountability has any validity, the consequence should be a heightened political sensitivity to the interests of upper-status voters. In a democracy, there is always a potential (in theory) for the equality of the ballot box to serve as a counterweight to the inequality of the social structure. This potential was briefly realized during the early 1960s. The end of the Great Society also marked the end of an unusual pattern of electoral mobilization. The coincidence suggests that the disadvantaged responded to a less favorable political environment by withdrawing from it altogether.

In discussions of turnout, too little attention is usually paid to the issue of whether nonvoting makes any difference in terms of political outcomes. Demographic data of the type presented here are not really adequate to resolve the question. Beyond the very broad tendencies sketched out above, the net impact on the political process can only be assessed in a loose and inferential way. Nonetheless, the concurrence of the participation decline and certain other phenomena gives rise to several interesting hypotheses.

A number of prominent theorists have asserted that the failure to achieve full democratic participation is a guarantor of political stability.[12] The turnout declines of 1972 and 1974, however, were both coincident with landslides of nearly unprecedented proportions—in opposite directions! One may surmise that a surge of previously marginal voters is not the only source of a dramatic change in election outcomes; the loss of certain elements of the core electorate may effect this result as well. In the latter case, the perceived legitimacy of the political system is apt to suffer, despite the illusion of an electoral mandate having been granted. The hollowness of the 1972 Nixon victory, and the short-lived reformist impulses of the congressional class of 1974, may reflect the uncertainty engendered by such a tentative vote of public confidence. The record high levels of alienation during these years added little gloss to these putative triumphs.

The volatility of the current environment was amply demonstrated in the 1978 congressional races. The shrinking size of the electoral universe magnified the destabilizing impact of well-organized interest groups. As a result, even the most reputable pollsters were embarrassed by the discrepancies between their samples and the final senatorial tallies in such states as Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. As a *Newsweek* analyst explains:

> The largest source of error in polling is inaccurate estimation of the actual turnout. Methods normally used to pick out likely voters—questions about past voting, current

[12] The classic statements are Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943); and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1960).

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> intentions and general knowledge about the election—are particularly weak where high-intensity single issues are involved. "The single-issue types tend to vote more," [pollster Patrick] Caddell says. "With lower turnouts generally, they can really skew the vote."[13]

The departure of a sizable mass of less intensely committed voters may allow increments of power to pass by default to less representative core groups of activists. The increasing electoral necessity to appear responsive to such groups is probably contributing to the spirit of intransigence in contemporary American politics and to the resultant institutional paralysis.

To pursue another line of speculation, one can point to an eerie correspondence between the growing status imbalance in participation and the changing tenor of policy debate. Blacks and organized labor complained of being ignored throughout President Carter's nominally Democratic administration. Campaign promises to support tax and welfare reforms, full employment, and national health insurance were abandoned in the face of the "grass roots" movement to limit taxation and balance the federal budget. The current rightward drift in policy initiatives may owe its source to the contemporaneous class shift in participation patterns. If those at the lower end of the status ladder do not protect their interests at the polls, there is little incentive for their elected officials to protect their interests in Washington. And the common use of campaign surveys must give candidates an all-too-accurate appraisal of the shifting preferences of the electoral universe, even if the changing composition of that universe has escaped conscious detection. Unless current trends are reversed, the disadvantaged members of American society are likely to find themselves playing an increasingly marginal role in the American political system.

What the future holds is difficult to ascertain. The decline in turnout slowed considerably in 1976 and 1978. Thus, rates of participation may be approaching a minimum of sorts. The 1976 drop in voting among young adults, however, raises the possibility that this floor level is only temporary and that part of an entire generation now reaching maturity will go through the life cycle participating at an atypically low level. Of course, because young people are the most sensitive to short-term political stimuli, there is the alternative scenario of a particularly exciting presidential contest in 1984 mobilizing this pool of voters, much as occurred during the New Deal era.[14] It is still too early to reach a definitive judgment. With the parties descending into obscurity, however, the emergence of an appealing leader at the presidential level may well be the only force sufficiently potent to stem the growth of the nonelectorate.*

[13] David M. Alpern et al., "1978's Wobbly Polls," *Newsweek*, 27 November 1978, p. 32.

[14] Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., 19–21 April 1979, and the National Science Foundation Conference on Voter Turnout, San Diego, Calif., 16–19 May 1979. This research has been funded by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate.

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Methodological Appendix

The data for this study were taken from the biennial studies of voter turnout conducted by the Bureau of the Census as part of its monthly series of Current Population Surveys. The results of these surveys can be found in the following publications: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), no. 143 (1965), no. 174 (1968), no. 192 (1969), no. 228 (1971), no. 253 (1973), no. 293 (1976), and no. 322 (1978).

The estimate that the rise in educational levels should have increased turnout by 6.5 percent between 1964 and 1976 was derived in the following manner. The universe for each year was first partitioned into three age brackets (twenty-five to forty-four years, forty-five to sixty-four years, and sixty-five years and over) and cross-tabulated by three educational categories (elementary, high school, and college). The raw data were taken from *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 143, Table 3, and no. 322, Table 10. Age controls were applied because educational attainment is much higher among the young cohorts. Without such controls, this generational effect depresses the observed turnout among the higher educational categories, thereby blurring the status relationship under investigation. For each age-by-education category, the 1964 turnout percentage was multiplied by the 1976 population base. The product was considered an estimate of the "expected" number of 1976 voters, given the assumption that any change in turnout between the two years was due solely to changes in the educational composition of the population. The "expected" voter totals for each category were then summed, and this total was divided by the total 1976 universe, yielding an "expected" 1976 aggregate turnout of 75.8 percent. Because the "observed" 1964 turnout was 69.3 percent, one can conclude that, all other things being equal, educational advancement should have increased turnout by 6.5 percent between 1964 and 1976.

The effect of survey overreporting was estimated in the following manner. First, the voting-age civilian noninstitutional population (VACNP) was held constant as the denominator. The number of votes actually cast for president or congressman was considered the "true" numerator (Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977], p. 508). The number of voters reported was derived from the Current Population Survey estimates. The difference between the resultant turnout fractions was taken to represent the level of overreporting. By a similar method, the SRC/CPS level of overreporting ranges from 13.4 to 15.9 percent for the years under study.

In this article, I have followed the Census Bureau's practice of counting those "not reported" on voter participation as nonvoters. It should also be noted that the VACNP is a slightly smaller population base than the voting-age population, which is employed in the frequently cited "official" Census Bureau estimates of turnout. The number of votes cast, divided by this base, yields the most familiar series of turnout estimates: 61.9 percent in 1964; 45.4 percent in 1966; 60.9 percent in 1968; 43.5 percent in 1970; 55.5 percent in 1972; 36.1 percent in 1974; and 54.4 percent in 1976.

The 1976 figures in Table 3 were prorated to adjust for the exclusion of noncitizens in the published data for that year. The inclusion of twenty-two to twenty-four year olds in the 1976 universe depresses the turnout rate somewhat. If the universe is restricted to the VACNP aged twenty-five years and over, as in the data for the other years, the 1976 universe can be partitioned as follows: 55.4 percent core voters, 8.7 percent dropouts, 7.6 percent mobilized voters, and 28.3 percent core nonvoters, with a base of 119,595,000.

To determine the effect of the changing age distribution on the turnout decline, the

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1976 VACNP aged twenty-one years and over was taken as the universe. Then the 1964 turnout rate for each age bracket was multiplied by this bracket's 1976 population base. The data were taken from *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 143, Table 1, and no. 322, Table 2. This produced an estimate of "expected" 1976 voters. These estimates were summed, and the total "expected" voters divided by the universe yielded an "expected" 1976 turnout of 68.4 percent. Because the "observed" 1964 turnout was 69.3 percent, one can conclude that the effect of the changing age composition of the population aged twenty-one and over was to decrease turnout by .9 percent, all other things being equal. See also, Stephen D. Shaffer, "A Multivariate Explanation of Decreasing Turnout in Presidential Elections, 1960–1976" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tenn., 1-3 November 1979); and Richard W. Boyd, "Structural Explanations of Turnout in the United States," *American Politics Quarterly* (in press).

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The Centralizing Effects of Austerity on the Intergovernmental System

CHARLES H. LEVINE
PAUL L. POSNER

Even though the attractiveness of devolving public decision making and policy implementation to state and local governments is widely acknowledged, changes are occurring in the U.S. system of intergovernmental relations that are eroding local autonomy and centralizing authority. This is not a new observation. In recent years, observers of intergovernmental relations have noted that the discretionary portion of local government budgets has been declining in proportion to the growing presence of federal funding. But now the processes of erosion of state and local autonomy and centralization of authority appear to be accelerating as resource scarcity and the structure of federal grants, *in combination*, are causing subtle, yet fundamental, changes in the scope and role of state and local governments.[1]

[1] For a recent discussion of the importance and methods of democratic decentralization, see Samuel H. Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968): 9-21; for a discussion of the debates of the Founders on federalism, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers," in *Area and Power*, ed. Arthur Maass (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959). For a discussion of centralizing trends in the intergovernmental system, see David B. Walker, "The New System of Intergovernmental Assistance: Some Initial Notes," *Publius* 5 (Summer 1975): 131-45, and idem., "A New Intergovernmental System in 1977," *Publius* 8 (Winter 1978); for a discussion of the erosion of state and local discretion, see Paul L. Posner and Stephen M. Sorett, "A Crisis in the Fiscal Commons: The Impact of Federal Expenditures on State and Local Governments," *Public Contract Law Journal* 10 (December 1978): 341-79.

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At the core of the issue are displacement effects that occur when local priorities are skewed and distorted by the need to generate and commit local funds to match federal categorical grants in program areas such as criminal justice and law enforcement, water pollution control, transportation, health, and education rather than using local funds for some other purposes that may have greater local priority. These displacement effects threaten to undermine the advantages of decentralized government: its greater responsiveness to local needs and priorities, its greater accountability and access for citizens wishing to influence policy, and its greater variety of services for citizens and businesses making location decisions. Increased centralization promises to produce instead a homogenized package of services formulated in Washington by obscure bargains among nearly anonymous interest-group representatives, bureaucrats, and congressional committee staffs.[2]

Now that many state and local governments are entering a period of austerity, they are attempting to stretch locally generated resources as far as possible. One obvious means is to use local dollars to match federal grants. But this practice has a major pitfall: even though local governments may have increased their revenues through these grants, they have also increased their dependency on external resources, thereby accelerating the erosion of their discretion over policy, program, and service decisions. As a result, local budgets have increasingly come to resemble the structure of the federal government's domestic program, and local decisions are being shaped by federal constraints and directives at an accelerating rate. In short, the joint impact of displacement effects and resource scarcity is creating a serious structural problem for local government autonomy and for the functioning of American federalism. The growing severity of this problem poses a number of political and administrative dilemmas that evidence the appropriateness of reform in both the intergovernmental grants system and the revenue-raising mechanisms of state and local governments. In a uniquely American fashion, the United States may be on the way to "buying" a unitary style of national government through the grants system by enticing states and localities to adopt the growing federal agenda of priorities and policies.

This article summarizes the forces leading toward centralization within the federal system and the erosion of local autonomy by the federal grants system and explains how resource scarcity accelerates the erosion of local discretion. Some administrative and policy dilemmas posed by the impact of resource scarcity on the federal system are discussed in the conclusion.

The Fiscal Impact of Federal Grants

The effects of federal grants on state and local budgets and priorities have become more pronounced over the past twenty-five years due to the growing

[2] See Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," pp. 17–20; also idem., "The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing: A Case Study in Public Sector Politics," *Public Policy* 24 (Spring 1976): 127–95.

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dependence on federal funds. By virtue of general revenue sharing, federal assistance has been extended to nearly every state and local government in the nation. Furthermore, through the growth of block and categorical grant programs during the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government has become involved in the funding of services traditionally dominated by state or local governments. This growth in the scope of federal assistance led the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to comment that by 1976 it had become difficult to identify "a single major state and local function in which the Federal Government was not involved."[3] Thus, the impact of federal expenditures has been felt by states and localities in an ever-growing number of program areas.

This growing range of federal assistance has been provided primarily through categorical grants, each serving a narrow purpose allowing the grantee only minimal discretion. Since 1962, the ACIR has recorded a 300 percent increase in the number of categorical federal grant programs available to state and local governments, placing at 492 the number of federal categorical grant programs available to state and local governments in January 1978. In budgetary terms even after the advent of the five block grant programs and general revenue sharing, categorical grants still constitute over 75 percent of total federal grant outlays to state and local governments.[4]

By 1980 federal grant outlays constituted 25 percent of state and local spending, capping a twenty-five year period of relatively steady growth. While federal grants of $2 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1950 constituted only 10.4 percent of state and local expenditures, FY 1980 federal grant outlays are estimated to be $88.9 billion, constituting 25.3 percent of total state and local expenditures.[5] Major cities are even more dependent on federal funds for support than the aggregate figures suggest. In 1957, forty-seven of the nation's forty-eight largest cities received only 2.6 cents from the federal government for every dollar raised locally. In 1978, these cities received 50 cents in federal funds for every locally raised dollar.[6] A recent Treasury Department study calculates that the nation's ten most distressed cities would have to raise property tax rates by an average of 65 cents per $100 of assessed valuation if federal funds were withdrawn.[7]

Federal mandates and grant requirements, such as match and maintenance of effort, have effectively extended the federal fiscal presence to a larger share of state and local budgets. Even though compliance with grant requirements may be questionable, nevertheless, state and local funds needed to satisfy these requirements can be substantial. According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) figures, states and localities will spend an additional one dollar from

[3] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design* (A-52) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 39.

[4] U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Special Analysis of the Budget, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 254.

[5] Ibid.

[6] See Rochelle Stanfield, "Federal Aid for Cities: Is It a Mixed Blessing?" *National Journal Reports* 10 (1978): 869.

[7] Ibid.

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their own funds in FY 1979 to match these dollars in federal grant money. Matching requirements effectively extend the influence of federal grants to 36 percent of aggregate state and local expenditures. Minimum nonfederal match is also growing as a percentage of state and local expenditures. Between FY 1971 and FY 1980, minimum match required for all federal grants increased from 8 to 12 percent of state and local expenditures. In some states, the federal influence is more pronounced. For example, at least 45 percent of Michigan's budget is tied to federal funds; 25 percent in direct federal funds and 20 percent in matching funds.

Stimulative Effects

The federal grants system, by design, is a powerful mechanism for stimulating spending at all three levels of government. Grants stimulate spending in three ways. First, categorical grants are premised on the notion that state and local sectors are not spending enough for services with high external or national benefit. The system intentionally seeks to broaden the public-policy agenda of state and local grant recipients through price incentives and, thus, to add to expenditure pressures. Grants also stimulate expenditures because grants structures provide only weak incentives to economize; and by dividing financial management responsibilities among several layers of government, federal grants tend to short-circuit the normal management constraints on expenditures. Third, the grant system, through mandates, matching, and maintenance of effort requirements stimulates additional state and local expenditures as a condition for receiving federal assistance, while discouraging spending reductions in federally funded areas by penalizing reduced fiscal effort with the loss of federal funds.

In large part, the grants system is predicated on the need to induce state and local government participation in the service of national programs and priorities. In this way, the federal government can act on an expanding agenda of national concerns without bearing the full fiscal impact or political risks associated with implementing controversial national policies in a complex, heterogeneous society.

Federal grants entice state and local government participation and increase their expenditures for both economic and political reasons. In economic terms, a grant lowers the cost to the states and localities of performing the aided activity. A grant thus reduces the price that the recipient must pay for the service and hence increases the attractiveness of the funded activity. According to the theory of grants, state and local governments are encouraged to fund activities with high external benefits they otherwise would not fund.[8]

The response of the state and local governments to these price incentives is further influenced by the political process. The presence of federal grant funds

[8] See Wallace Oates, *Fiscal Federalism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), esp. chap. 3.

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encourages or stimulates the development of strong political constituencies at the state and local level, which often use the federal fiscal presence as a way to press for increased and long-term involvement of the state or local jurisdiction in the aided program. Federal funds flow to most grantees in a somewhat automatic fashion, presenting a grantee who chooses not to participate with the unenviable task of returning available federal money that could have been used to benefit local residents. State elected officials seeking to control their public-policy agendas in the face of the onslaught of federal grant funds are thus in a bind. As one state legislator perceptively noted, he would rather spend federal funds on nonessential projects in his state than have them reallocated to a neighboring state.[9]

Traditional management constraints on spending at the state and local level are typically not operative within federal grant programs. Grant programs produce a functional disjuncture in the tax and spending structure of local governments that removes a potential brake on expenditure growth. Both federal and local officials are largely spared dealing with the potential conflict between groups concerned with *how much* money is collected (revenue providers) and those groups concerned with how money is *spent* (service consumers). As Edward K. Hamilton has noted, the public sector does not know how to control expenditures in an era when so much public spending is dominated by banker transactions from higher to lower levels of government. He has argued forcefully that "we do not know what disciplinary forces can resist impulses to excessive spending when the spender bears no responsibility for raising the revenue being allocated."[10]

A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study joined in this observation by noting that grantees have little or no incentive to improve productivity in federally funded programs, because dollar savings achieved through expenditure controls in federal grant programs largely accrue to the federal government. The study further noted that most nonfederal matching requirements are too low or too weak to stimulate state and local management interest and oversight for grant programs. As a result, for example, Wisconsin recently excluded federal programs from the purview of its productivity-improvement program. Similarly, a 1979 survey showed that state legislative fiscal officers in two-thirds of the states indicate that their oversight of federally funded programs is typically less intensive than their oversight of state funded programs.[11] Clearly, when the responsibilities for management and finance in a program are separated, the process of management and control tend to wither away.[12]

[9] See Comptroller General of the United States, *The Federal Grant Process Should Be Changed to Permit Greater State Legislative Involvement* (GGD-81-3) (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1980).

[10] Edward K. Hamilton, "On Non-constitutional Management of a Constitutional Problem," *Daedalus* 107 (Winter 1978): 111-28.

[11] Unpublished data from the National Conference of State Legislatures based on responses from forty-eight states, Denver, Colorado.

[12] See Comptroller General of the United States, *State and Local Government Productivity Im-*

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Federal grant programs also weaken the analytic controls normally exercised by state and local officials in deciding on alternative program strategies and levels of spending. State and local attempts to compare the costs and benefits of federally funded projects with nonfederally funded alternatives can be futile because of the fundamental economic incentives in grant programs. Federal grants dramatically reduce the costs of federally eligible alternatives without affecting the benefits. While the benefits of most grant programs are concentrated in the local recipient area itself, the costs are typically spread throughout the nation. For example, a study of the process leading to New York City's decision to rebuild its West Side Highway concluded that the federal funding formula strictly constrained the range of feasible alternatives considered. In this case, the mayor argued that mass transit alternatives to a new highway could not be considered because of federal funding rules that gave the city more federal funds for highways. The author of the study concluded that while the project selected had substantial environmental and economic disadvantages compared with other alternatives, federal grant funds made the outcome inevitable: "From the city's perspective the funds are costless. From the state's perspective, the money is pretty close to costless [nine to one federal match]."[13]

Categorical grant programs often increase state and local spending over and above the amount of the federal grant. A 1977 nationwide survey of local officials indicated that over two-thirds of these officials believed that the spending of local funds over and above required match was stimulated by federal funds.[14] Much of the expenditure impact can be explained by the political processes of state and local governments. By arousing new expectations and dormant constituency groups, federal grants can induce state and local governments to spend more than required for programs. But even more of the expenditure impact can be attributed to provisions of the grants themselves or to the "strings" that require additional spending as a condition for receiving grants. The impact of three types of provisions—mandates, matching requirements, and maintenance of effort requirements—require detailed examination.

Restrictive Mandates

The disjuncture between the functions of developing policy and raising revenues has also contributed to the rapid growth of federal mandates imposed on states and localities. The process of developing new mandates at the federal level does not often benefit from the discipline of having to raise revenues to cover the

provement: What Is the Federal Role? (GGD-78-104) (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1978).

[13] Regina Herzlinger, "Costs, Benefits, and the West Side Highway," *Public Interest* 55 (Spring 1979): 94.

[14] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Intergovernmental Grant System as Seen by Local, State and Federal Officials* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 19.

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costs of these mandates. Again, benefit-cost analysis is impractical in cases where one level of government realizes the benefits without considering the costs.

A wide range of federal assistance programs impose burdensome and costly federal regulations as conditions for participation. While state and local governments are not directly required to comply, the potential loss of federal assistance is usually punishing enough to force compliance. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires all local building codes in flood-prone areas to incorporate federal flood-control standards. If local governments fail to comply, the entire local area loses its eligibility for any federal subsidy for construction or acquisition of property. A similar program requiring local implementation of building energy conservation standards certified by HUD is currently being phased in, pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. The codes must be statewide, uprooting long traditions of local control over building codes in many states.

In 1977, Congress extended coverage of regular unemployment compensation to all state and local employees, requiring state and local governments to fund the necessary payroll costs. Instead of using directly the commerce clause in the United States Constitution to require state and local coverage, the Congress chose to use the grants system to enforce state and local compliance. States that refuse to cover public employees will lose federal certification of their entire unemployment compensation programs, resulting in direct federal administration and significantly higher payroll costs for private-sector employers within the state.

Similarly, the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 requires, as a condition for state receipt of federal handicapped grant funds, that local school districts integrate all physically and mentally handicapped children, including those with learning disabilities, into the public-school system. Besides the basic expense imposed, the act requires each district to prepare an individual education plan for each child, to consult regularly with parents, and to identify millions of children with hidden learning disabilities. The federally mandated costs involved in achieving this worthwhile objective are substantial, but federal grant funds are not expected to cover more than 12 percent of the anticipated costs, according to the Office of Management and Budget.[15] More generally, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires grantees to provide access by the handicapped to all facilities built with federal grant funds. A recent Congressional Budget Office study found that $6.8 billion would have to be spent by transit systems alone to comply with this mandate, even though relatively few handicapped persons would actually benefit.[16]

Other examples of the extension of federal regulatory control over state ac-

[15] U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Appendix, Fiscal Year 1981 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 365.

[16] U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *Urban Transportation for Handicapped Persons: Alternative Federal Approaches* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).

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tivity through grant strings abound. As a condition for receiving energy-planning money from the Department of Energy, states are required to make significant changes in their laws to conform with federal standards. The Federal Highway Administration forces states to control outdoor advertising by reducing the federal match by 10 percent for states that do not adopt appropriate regulation of billboards pursuant to federal law. As a condition for receiving federal juvenile justice grants, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requires that states develop programs to deinstitutionalize juvenile "status" offenders, resulting in major legal changes and new fiscal outlays by the states.

Most major federal grant programs also incorporate a number of non-programmatic guidelines for implementing national policy objectives. ACIR has estimated that thirty-seven conditions exist that are applied by most grant programs. In order to qualify for federal assistance, state and local governments must achieve a broad range of national social objectives in addition to specific grant program requirements.[17] Some of these include mandates to provide equal access to the handicapped and disadvantaged to services; to protect environmental quality; to ensure prevailing wages for construction workers under contract; and to implement civil-service systems based on merit.

These mandates are often formulated with little or no attention to the costs imposed on state and local governments. Costs of compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policy Act of 1970, and the National Environment Policy Act of 1969, for example, have resulted in increased costs as well as nonparticipation in federal grant programs. In one instance, delays due to excessive federal monitoring of environmental impact increased the costs of local highway-improvement projects for Ogden, Utah, from $740,000 to $1,950,000.[18]

A recent comprehensive study found that 1,036 federal mandates exist in laws and regulations as conditions for the receipt of federal grant funds. The costs of implementing these mandates attached to federal grant programs were paid from local revenues in over 45 percent of the cases. The study found that over 900 of the mandates were enacted during the 1970s.[19]

Matching and Maintenance of Effort Requirements

Over 60 percent of federal grant programs require some kind of nonfederal financial share as a condition for participating in federal grant programs. OMB

[17] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design*, p. 297.

[18] Commission on Federal Paperwork, *Federal/State/Local Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

[19] *Federal and State Mandating on Local Governments: An Exploration of Issues and Impacts; Final Report to the National Science Foundation* (Riverside: University of California, Graduate School of Administration, 1979).

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estimates that in FY 1979 fully 10 percent of aggregate state and local expenditures were earmarked to match federal grant programs.[20]

Matching requirements stimulate both federal and nonfederal expenditures and enable the federal government to initiate complex new programs without bearing their full costs. They also encourage state and local governments to devote portions of their budgets to programs they might not have initiated on their own in order to draw available federal dollars. Because of the large number of federal programs with relatively low matching requirements, state and local budgets can become crowded with obligations of low local priority. The econometrics literature provides considerable evidence to indicate that grants with matching requirements stimulate state and local expenditures. In one widely cited summary of the literature, Edward Gramlich found that in the aggregate, categorical grants with matching requirements stimulated $1.12 of state and local spending for every dollar of federal grant funds.[21]

Maintenance of effort provisions exist to ensure that state and local governments do not substitute federal funds for locally generated revenues. To prevent substitution, many federal programs institute maintenance of effort provisions that require that the grantee maintain a fixed level of prior spending. Some programs include a "nonsupplant provision" that prevents grantees from using federal funds to supplant funds that they otherwise would have spent for the program in the absence of federal funds. According to GAO, thirty-seven of the fifty-two largest federal grant programs are covered by maintenance of effort requirements.[22]

Federal requirements vary considerably. For example, the Urban Mass Transit Operating Assistance (UMTA) program requires state and local governments to continue their prior two-years average level of funding for transit as a condition for federal operating subsidies. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) requires that federal funds be used to *supplement*, not supplant, local funds and services that would otherwise be available in the absence of federal funds.

Maintenance of effort provisions, if effective, can prevent fungibility and ensure that the federal grant is used by the grantees for the specific purpose intended, not as general fiscal relief. But effective implementation of maintenance of effort provisions is problematic. For example, early studies of public-service employment programs indicate substantial substitution of federal grant funds for state and local funds.[23] More recently, however, this substitution behavior seems to be ebbing. Two major studies by the Brookings Institution of the experience with two major block grant programs—CETA and the Community

[20] OMB, *Special Analysis of the Budget, Fiscal Year 1981.*

[21] Edward Gramlich, "State and Local Governments and Their Budget Constraint," *International Economic Review* 10 (June 1969): 163–82.

[22] See Comptroller General of the United States, *Will Federal Assistance to California Be Affected by Proposition 13?* (GGD-78-101) (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1978).

[23] See George Johnson and James Tomola, "The Fiscal Substitution Effect of Alternative Approaches to Public Employment Policy, *Journal of Human Resources* 12 (Winter 1977): 3–26.

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Development Block Grant program (CDBG)—found surprisingly low levels of fiscal substitution. Indeed, one study found that 94 percent of CDBG funds provided to the sample jurisdictions were allocated for new spending.[24]

Effective maintenance of effort provisions have the potential to cause serious fiscal and policy problems for state and local governments. One problem is the requirement that a grantee maintain expenditures to reduce spending even after productivity gains have been achieved or the demand for a service has been reduced. The UMTA subsidy requirement that a state maintain its prior year's subsidy or risk losing the entire federal grant, for example, could discourage a state from raising its public-transit fare and decreasing its budgeted operating subsidy.

Maintenance of effort and nonsupplant provisions may result in higher levels of public services than are deemed necessary by state and local officials. State and local budgetary decisions may be distorted far in excess of the required match. State and local officials have reported desires to reduce their own effort in public services only to have HUD officials inform them that they would be in possible violation of Community Development Block Grant maintenance of effort requirements. In the case of CETA, state and local budgetary flexibility is even more severely inhibited due to the program's stringent nonsupplant requirements and protections for regular public employees incorporated in the program since 1978.

The erosion of state and local budgetary flexibility, as a result of maintenance of effort, can best be appreciated in the aggregate. A larger local government is required to maintain spending levels of the prior year as a condition for receiving federal assistance in the following areas, among others: law enforcement to qualify for LEAA funds; mass transit for UMTA operating subsidies; services to meet the needs of the poor for community action funds; pre-grant community health expenditures for community mental health staffing grants; general education for a host of federal education programs; child nutrition for several child nutrition programs; and local public services for the Community Development Block Grant program.

During the explosion of state and local government expenditures over the past twenty-five years, maintaining the expenditures of previous years rarely was burdensome. As the pace of growth in the state and local sector declines, however, and as tax and expenditure limitations force absolute budget reductions, local governments may increasingly be hard pressed to meet maintenance of effort requirements. In addition, by continuing to maintain local effort in federally favored issue areas, local officials may not be able to fund locally favored programs at desired levels. Furthermore, the prospects for state and local budget flexibility can become even more imperiled if maintenance of effort

[24] See Richard P. Nathan, "The Brookings Monitoring Research Methodology for Studying the Effects of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs" (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August 1979).

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requirements rigorous enough to prevent grantee fiscal substitution were spread to incorporate each of the 492 federal grant programs for state and local governments.

Generating New Clienteles

In addition to stimulating short-term spending, federal grants drive up future spending as well. Federal grants that start new services create a clientele that continues to be dependent on the service regardless of the availability of federal funds. When federal funds do expire, local officials face the painful dilemma of either increasing the budget to accommodate the new service or alienating a public that has grown accustomed to the service. A recent GAO report identified a number of federal programs whose avowed purpose is to stimulate new projects initially with federal funds and then to withdraw funds after a prescribed period of time. Evidence gathered by GAO indicates that many state and local governments are absorbing these federally inspired projects once grant funds terminate. For example, this has been the case in over 60 percent of LEAA-funded projects that are now terminated.[25]

A report of the South Carolina General Assembly points to a number of cases where federal grant projects, started without the knowledge or approval of the state legislature, became a permanent part of state government when federal funds expired. The report quotes one state agency boasting that it had never lost one employee initially funded through a federal demonstration grant: "Specifically this means that in the last five years over 400 highly trained staff members have been assimilated and absorbed by regular state appropriations."[26]

Finally, state and local governments must pay off the long-term operating costs of capital construction projects funded with federal grants. In the case of interstate highways and sewage treatment plants, for example, federal matching funds stimulate the construction of new facilities. However, while it is apparently in the national interest to build these new projects, Congress has not yet determined it to be in the national interest to fund the long-term operating and maintenance costs of these facilities. The costs to a locality can be substantial. The city of Wilmington, Delaware, for instance, recently rebuilt its sewage treatment plant with heavy federal funding to meet Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) water quality standards. To operate the new, sophisticated plant, however, Wilmington has had to increase its work force threefold, from twenty to sixty-two people, and has increased its locally funded payroll costs proportionately.

[25] See Comptroller General of the United States, *Federal Seed Money: More Careful Selection and Application Needed* (GGD-78-78) (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1979).

[26] South Carolina General Assembly Legislative Audit Council, *A Study of the Impact of Federal and Other Funding on Legislative Oversight* (Columbia: South Carolina General Assembly Legislative Audit Council, 1977), p. 35.

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Federal Grant Policies and Resource Scarcity

The impact of these federally driven expenditure increases on state and local budgets is a combination of two effects: those that stimulate overall expenditures; and those that distort priorities. These effects are accelerated by fiscal stress. In a time of abundance, it is possible to finance federally induced costs from the growth increment of new locally generated revenues without having to reduce nonfederally funded services correspondingly. During a period of austerity, however, programs are forced into zero-sum competition with one another. Financing the costs of existing or new federally funded programs means sacrificing local programs not eligible for federal assistance.

There is evidence to indicate that local governments experiencing budget cuts will tend to protect federally funded programs at the expense of their own locally funded programs. There is a considerable economic reason for this—budget cuts are needed to reduce expenditures based on insufficient locally derived revenues. In order to live within a contracting local resource base, it is not nearly as productive to cut a program funded mostly from external resources, that is, federal grants. In a 75 percent federally funded program, for example, a cut that saves only 25 percent in local revenue would nevertheless have the consequence of reducing the program by a ratio of 4 to 1—for every dollar of local funds, four dollars of total program funds would be reduced. When a program is funded entirely from local revenues, however, a one dollar cut is less devastating in programmatic terms.

Thus it is likely that the tendency to protect federal grant programs in a time of budget cuts will extend the distortion of local priorities. A GAO study of the impact of federal matching provisions found that seventeen of the twenty-three state and local governments reviewed had to cut disproportionately nonfederally funded services to avoid losing federal grant funds in time of budget cuts; in some cases, the reduced services were basic services such as fire, sanitation, and street cleaning that were not eligible for federal funds.[27] A recent report on New York City provides some interesting support for this proposition as well. In New York, a marked shift was found in city spending, away from basic services such as police, fire, and sanitation toward social services and health areas with heavy federal funding. The study shows the following trend for city expenditures.[28]

The report shows that during periods of growth, the city decided to invest new revenues among competing functions based in part on the federal dollar return. Similarly, the city's budget-cutting experience in 1975 and 1976 indicates that major budget cuts occurred primarily in locally funded services not eligible for federal funds, for example, police, fire, and sanitation. The report concludes that the disproportionate reduction in the basic services and the shift toward

[27] Comptroller General of the United States, *Proposed Changes in the Federal Matching and Maintenance of Effort Requirements for State and Local Governments* (GGD-81-7) (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1980).

[28] Temporary Commission on City Finances (TCCF), *An Historical and Comparative Analysis of Expenditures in the City of New York* (New York: TCCF, 1976).

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Function	FY 1961	FY 1976	Percentage Increase or Decrease
Welfare (including social services)	12.3%	22.6%	+ 10.3%
Hospitals	8.2%	9.7%	+ 1.5%
Higher Education	1.9%	4.5%	+ 2.6%
Subtotals	22.4%	36.8%	+ 14.4%
Police	9.5%	6.4%	− 3.1%
Fire	4.9%	2.8%	− 2.1%
Sanitation	5.4%	2.7%	− 2.7%
Education	25.6%	18.4%	− 7.2%
Subtotals	45.5%	30.3%	− 15.1%

federally funded services was a product of the federal categorical grant system and was counterproductive to New York City's long-term fiscal, administrative, and social well-being because services that attracted dependent groups to the city continued to be funded while basic "housekeeping" services that benefit the entire city were cut.

The phenomenon is not limited to New York. The recent budgetary experience of California local governments in dealing with the impact of property-tax reductions mandated by passage of Proposition 13 tends to confirm this hypothesis. In planning for the potentially large reductions, local governments proposed greater retrenchments in locally supported basic services than in social-service programs that receive higher federal and state funding but are low in voter approval.[29]

In short, the strictures and structures of the federal grant system cause problems for local governments experiencing resource scarcity. Resource scarcity, however, also poses problems for the federal government. Resource scarcity could lead some state and local governments to preserve local priorities and sacrifice federal funds that involve matching requirements, maintenance of effort, or mandates. This practice would, however, tend to distort the distribution of federal funds away from those areas that may need them most. Thus, the fundamental purposes of many grant programs—to promote equity and to encourage uniform minimum levels of services throughout the country—may not be achieved. Resource scarcity therefore can lead to zero-sum conflict between federal and nonfederal interests. If federal programs are retained during a cutback period, state and local interests suffer; if state and local programs are retained, the federal interest suffers.

In sum, the entire intergovernmental system is distorted at all levels by the confrontation of grant requirements premised on growth with the political and

[29] Comptroller General of the United States, *Proposition 13—How California Governments Coped with a $6 Billion Revenue Loss* (GGD-79-88) (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1979). See also, L. Cannon, "California Finds That Repealing the New Deal Is Not Easy," *Washington Post*, 5 June 1978.

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administrative realities of resource scarcity. The theoretical and public-policy issues raised by this confrontation cannot be easily ignored.

Jurisdictional Conflicts

By design, the American system of intergovernmental relations contains cleavages, both among levels and within jurisdictions, that are made more apparent by resource scarcity and fiscal retrenchment. Essentially, resource scarcity diminishes the control by each level of government over its own boundaries. State and local governments lose discretion over their budgets and policy agendas in proportion to their dependence on federal aid. The federal government comes to rely more on other sectors of the economy—including states and localities—to implement national policies that are too expensive to be done by the federal government alone. The political accountability of each government for policies and programs becomes muddled as a consequence of this intensified interdependence.

Yet, the blurring of institutional boundaries and "policy space" sows its own antithesis—the redefinition of core interests intrinsic to each level of government and a consequent sorting out of priorities. Conflict among and within all levels of government intensifies as a result. In fact, it can be argued that intergovernmental cooperation is predicated on abundance as well as on the nature of the grant mechanism itself. When the responsibility for the costs and benefits of public programs are institutionally separated among levels of government, a critical incentive to discipline the size of public programs may be removed. The rather undisciplined proliferation of the imposing costs of federal mandates and the rather unselective acceptance of new federally funded programs by state and local governments offer further support for this proposition. Resource scarcity accentuates the realization of costs at all levels of government, however, and can induce the kind of critical evaluation and oversight at state and local levels that naturally occurs when benefits and costs become institutionally joined.

The institutional ambiguity in intergovernmental relations that tends to obscure the dominance of the federal government could be a luxury during a time when state and local governments are seeking to redefine their mission to accord with reduced resources. Under conditions of austerity, states and localities typically attempt to sort out and to rank programs and priorities so that dwindling resources can be used in the most essential areas.[30] Because state and local budgets are heavily dependent on federal funds, these cutback strategies affect and are affected by the federal grants system, triggering two kinds of conflicts that may ultimately weaken and undermine the intergovern-

[30] For a more in-depth discussion of this process, see Charles H. Levine, "Organizational Decline and Cutback Management," *Public Administration Review* 38 (July-August 1978): 315-25; and idem., "More on Cutback Management: Hard Questions for Hard Times," *Public Administration Review* 39 (March-April 1979): 179-83.

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mental system: conflict among levels of government; and conflict within jurisdictions.

Under conditions of resource scarcity, state and local policymakers seek new ways to relieve their financial burdens, including the use of federal funds to supplant state and local funds and support services previously supported by state or local revenues. This process can conflict with the federal grant system itself, which seeks to provide funding for new programs of national interest that state and local governments would not otherwise fund on their own. Indeed, the rationale for the existence of mandates as well as maintenance of effort requirements is that state and local governments cannot be left to implement national policies without some kind of federal intervention. Operationally, this means that state or local projects should qualify for federal funding only if their local priority is low enough that they would not have been funded with nonfederal funds. Fiscally well-off jurisdictions can tolerate peaceful coexistence between federally supported projects of low local priority and locally supported projects. If jurisdictions undergoing fiscal stress are to continue to receive federal grant funds and continue to comply with the structures of these programs, however, they would be forced to witness an erosion in the levels and quality of their traditional locally funded services while maintaining federally funded services of relatively low local priority.

For example, during the period of severe budgetary retrenchment, New York City argued that LEAA regulations, including maintenance of effort, required the city to use LEAA funds for new, innovative projects to improve the criminal justice system at the same time that the criminal justice system itself was experiencing large cutbacks and employee layoffs. The city felt that it should have been allowed to use these LEAA funds to restore the basic infrastructure of the system before launching innovative projects to improve it.[31]

It becomes a matter of vital self-interest for local governments to avoid cuts in locally funded services by shifting federal funds away from projects perceived to be nonessential by local officials but which may, nevertheless, be part of a major federal program. Maintenance of effort provisions, however, can prevent this by requiring that the brunt of cuts fall on those locally funded services with no federal fiscal involvement. Thus, if federal grant purposes are to be achieved, a priority inversion must occur, as local governments may be forced to harbor federal programs and mandates with low local priority and cut programs and services with high local priority. In addition, when abundant state and local resources are no longer available to cushion the impact of displacement effects, federal agencies themselves may be faced with a new conflict: whether to withdraw funding from state and local governments to satisfy federal requirements and priorities or to tolerate a significant amount of noncompliance and in doing so to sacrifice the federal interest.

[31] See statement submitted by Mayor Beame, New York City, in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, *Debt Financing Problems of State and Local Governments*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 898–902.

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Resource scarcity at the federal level can also intensify conflict with state and local objectives in a different way. In an era of tightened budget constraints, the federal government may be more tempted to implement national policies without paying for the costs through mandates and direct regulation. Of course, these federal attempts to shift costs to other levels of government are bound to meet resistance in direct proportion to the budgetary constraints faced by state and local governments.

Conflict within a jurisdiction is also stimulated during cutback periods as bureaucracies and interest groups compete for a share of a shrinking economic pie. As this occurs, policymakers soon realize that the percentage of their budget under their discretionary control is decreased drastically.

During times of resource abundance, central state and local managers can more easily tolerate program expansion by agencies heavily funded by federal programs since other agencies funded mostly by state and local revenues are likely to be growing also. The greater autonomy of administrators of federally funded programs is not so obvious when compared with administrators of state and locally funded programs. Under conditions of fiscal stress and retrenchment, however, conflict is stimulated between constituencies and bureaucracies dependent on federal funds and state and locally elected officials responsible for controlling the size of the public sector and ultimately financing the second-order cost impacts of federal grants.

State legislatures, for example, have moved in recent years to assert stronger control over federal grant funds received by states. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), legislatures in twenty-six states attempted to increase their control over federal funds in the past two years by appropriating federal grant funds or reviewing state grant applications prior to submission to federal funding agencies. In a recent report, the NCSL concludes that this recent development has been prompted by tax and spending limitations which have provoked legislative concerns over the following impacts of federal grants for state budgets: predominance of federal priorities; ability to comply with match and maintenance of effort requirements; stimulative effects of federal seed money grants on state budgets; and inadequate federal funding to implement fully federal mandates and programs.[32]

Theoretical Implications and Policy Dilemmas

Even though these conflicts between levels and within jurisdictions may be ultimately muted through traditional means of intergovernmental lobbying and bargaining, it is difficult to account for them within frameworks of intergovernmental relations that emphasize cooperative federalism. These theories tend to emphasize the collaborative aspects of federalism and downplay the sources and

[32] See Winnifred M. Austermann, *A Legislator's Guide to Oversight of Federal Funds* (Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1980).

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significance of conflict between and within levels of the federal system.[33] It is imperative to ask: cooperation among whom for what purpose, and under what conditions?

If the diminution and distortion of state and local discretion and priorities become as severe as expected, then a reformulation of these explanations of intergovernmental relations is clearly appropriate. Resurrecting traditional theories of federalism and reviving time-worn discussions of the attributes of sovereignty, albeit under new conditions of intense interdependence and extensive externalities, may be needed. It is important during a time of heightened intergovernmental conflict to understand not only how conflicts are resolved, but also *how they arise*. Under conditions of resource scarcity, it is important to understand better how each level of the system *redefines* its own interests, priorities, and institutional boundaries.

Another missing element of cooperative bargaining models of intergovernmental relations revealed by resource scarcity is the limited influence of the state and local political officials most responsible for dealing with these aggregate impacts. Mayors, city managers, budget directors, and legislative officials are not full partners in the implementation of the variety of ongoing federal grant programs. Rather, the dominant actors are the functional specialists who control the vertical links of the intergovernmental picket fence. As a result, the officials most sensitive to defining and preserving the boundaries of state and local government autonomy are overshadowed by officials more concerned with protecting narrow programmatic boundaries than with enhancing the systemwide problem-solving capacity.

It is therefore quite possible that the mutual bargaining relationships thought to characterize the implementation of intergovernmental programs by some prominent students of intergovernmental relations theory may not, in fact, adequately describe the political problems of dealing with the residual effects of that system under conditions of scarce resources. These displacement effects are not a function of direct transactions within the intergovernmental system, but rather represent aggregate residual effects of the system as a whole. In its present form, cooperative bargaining models of intergovernmental relations theory do not and cannot adequately account for the aggregate impacts of the intergovernmental grants system functioning in its entirety. Indeed, residual or second-order consequences of that system are not recognized as *inter*governmental problems at all, but rather are dealt with in theory and practice as *intra*governmental issues. For example, waivers of federal mandates and grant requirements for fiscally distressed jurisdictions are not widely available in federal

[33] See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, *The American Partnership* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation through Bargaining: The Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid," *Public Policy* 25 (Fall 1977): 499–526; Deil Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978); and Catherine Lovell, "Where We Are in Intergovernmental Relations and Some of the Implications," *Southern Review of Public Administration* (June 1979): 6–20.

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programs; and these waivers have not been widely lobbied for either.[34] Instead, state and local governments, no matter how fiscally strong or weak, have been left to their own devices in order to meet compliance requirements. Rather than considering this a problem in the grants structure, the displacement effects of federal programs are often celebrated as a *positive* consequence of the design of intergovernmental programs.

Ironically, the period that spawned the explosion of fiscally destabilizing categorical grants has also been marked by the emergence of a series of countervailing federal policies that seek to give fiscal relief to state and local governments. It could be argued that the distortion effects of categorical programs are somewhat muted by these countervailing policies, such as general revenue sharing, which provides discretionary "no-string" federal funds to states and localities. These strategies, however, are a very roundabout and indirect way for the federal government to deal with the displacement problem.

If the phenomenon of resource scarcity becomes a permanent feature of the public sector, the federal assistance system will face several significant policy dilemmas. Should the federal government, for example, continue to reward increases in the size of the state and local sector? Or, alternatively, should it remain neutral or actually encourage decreases? If expenditure reductions are encouraged through the federal grants system, is there a risk that federal funding will merely displace state and local funding, thus encouraging greater dependency on federal funds and less local autonomy? Can the federal government moreover tolerate decreased participation in grant programs developed to meet nationwide needs by state and local governments undergoing fiscal retrenchment? Is the resultant distribution of federal funds skewed away from areas or groups especially in need of federally funded services?

If this skewed distribution is to be rectified, should the federal government adjust grant requirements through waivers and other variances for all governments in fiscal distress? Or should policy distinctions be made between fiscal distress caused by secular economic decline and fiscal crisis brought about through the voluntary actions of wealthier communities? How should these distinctions be operationally determined?

If participation in grant programs begins to fall off, should the federal government itself directly provide for areas in need that cannot or will not participate in federal programs? What impact might this have on a federal budget which is also feeling the force of the taxpayer revolt? And how can emerging federal policies to shore up the fiscal and economic vitality of state and local governments through such efforts as general revenue sharing, countercyclical assistance, and emergency public-works assistance be reconciled with federal grant requirements such as matching and mandated costs that exacerbate state and local fiscal pressures?

Paralleling these dilemmas facing the federal government are numerous

[34] The GAO found that most grant programs with these requirements do not provide for waivers. See Comptroller General of the United States, *Matching and Maintenance of Effort Requirements.*

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policy dilemmas confronting state and local governments that are rooted in the federal grants structure and resource scarcity. One of these dilemmas is especially noteworthy: By trying to reduce local government expenditures, voters supporting tax limitation initiatives may have inadvertently helped to increase the cost of government by pushing decision making to higher levels of government. This could add to the alienation that contributed to the tax limitation movement at the outset. At higher levels government feedback on local problems is weak, inaccurate, and sluggish, making control and implementation more difficult and cumbersome. Furthermore, by forcing policymaking upward, the danger of overloading state and national policymaking bodies with problems that used to be the exclusive concern of governors, mayors, state legislators, and city councilmen is increased. This leaves the central question of intergovernmental administration: Is it possible to transfer responsibility for funding services upward in the political system—and thus remove the link between revenue-raising levels of government and levels which expend and implement—without eroding traditional constraints on spending and the traditional responsiveness of local government?

Finally, the federal grant system and resource scarcity present a dilemma for the design and administration of the intergovernmental system considered as a whole: By increasing state and local reliance on federal grant programs, the state and local policy agendas are likely to become "cluttered" by programs of national but not necessarily local priority. During times of cutbacks, the national priority programs tend to be protected while locally funded programs suffer the brunt of cuts. From the local viewpoint, it can be argued that protected federal programs are wasteful because they support innovations and program initiatives that local citizens and public officials consider frivolous—especially when the basic service infrastructure of local government is being retrenched. Thus a basic question for democratic theory and practice remains: Will sheltering federally funded programs while locally funded programs wither eclipse state and local political discretion? And, in so doing, will such a policy also promote cynicism, alienation, and the loss of efficacy among citizens who fund and are dependent on the services state and local governments deliver?*

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Boston's Kevin White: A Mayor Who Survives

MARTHA WAGNER WEINBERG

While the 1960s might be described as the years of expansive hopes for political leadership, the 1970s could be characterized as the years of despair. Opinion polls showed that in unprecedented numbers Americans began to express skepticism about the motives and talents of political leaders. Scholars have shared in this skepticism. The most thoughtful and provocative literature on elected chief executives during the early 1960s focused on analysis and definition of successful leadership strategies.[1] But as the decade of the 1960s approached a close, optimistic predictions about the possibility for enlightened leadership gave way to tough and bitter critiques of political leaders and the institutions that were supposed both to support them and to check them in their excesses. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and in the wake of Watergate, despair and increasing concern about whether government was "governable" began to characterize analyses of American politics.

Nowhere was this change more evident than in the literature on mayors and urban politics. The most widely read and important analyses of mayoral leadership written in the early and mid-1960s explained how Richard Daley of Chicago, Richard Lee of New Haven, and even John Reading of Oakland managed and directed their cities.[2] By the end of the 1960s, however, scholars

[1] See, for example, Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), and James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

[2] In *Political Influence* (New York: Free Press, 1961), Edward Banfield analyzed Mayor Daley

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described many of the big-city mayors who had risen to prominence in the mid-1960s as being at best unable to manage unmanageable jobs, at worst, as inept. John Lindsay, in many ways the symbol of the new mayors, served only two terms, at the end of which he was scorned by many who had once looked to him to champion the cause of the cities. Carl Stokes and Thomas D'Alesandro, battered by the demands of the job, chose not to run for reelection. Many mayors began to talk about the impossibility of their jobs.

A new body of scholarly literature reflected this pessimism about mayoral leadership of cities. One astute analyst of urban politics described cities as "ungovernable."[3] Another argued that the popular hope for mayors to be forceful crusading leaders was misplaced and that, at best, mayors could be umpires.[4] Others suggested that, with the demise of old-style political machines and their replacement with the "new machines" of professionalized administrative agencies, the power of the mayor would decline, leaving cities "well-run but ungoverned."[5] In one of the most incisive analyses of the problems facing big-city mayors, James Q. Wilson suggested in 1969 that at the root of their difficulties were problems of demography and authority. Wilson singled out several potential sources of these problems including the continuing influence of liberal voters who had moved outside the city without relinquishing their share in governance; the strength of devices such as civil-service and employee organizations that insulated urban bureaucracies from mayoral control; the decay of political parties; and the demands of the electorate that mayors deal with issues such as crime and racial conflict that they were unable to manage.[6]

But not all big-city mayors have fallen victim to the sad fate predicted by social scientists. On 7 January 1980, Keven White was sworn in for an unprecedented fourth four-year term as mayor of Boston, the sole survivor of the group of bright, young, charismatic 1960s mayors. By examining the causes and significance of White's survival, this article attempts to extend the analysis of the possibilities for and obstacles to mayoral leadership. Four questions are particularly relevant. First, how have White's own personality, style, and "statecraft" helped him achieve electoral success?[7] Second, how have environmental conditions affected White and his ability to be reelected? Third, which of the threats to White's survival are not unique to him or to Boston, but face all big-

and Chicago. Robert Dahl discussed Richard Lee in *Who Governs?*; Jeffrey Pressman compared Mayor Reading to his predecessor John Houlihan in "Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June 1972):511–24.

[3] Douglas Yates, *The Ungovernable City* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).

[4] Roger Starr, "Power and Powerlessness in a Regional City," *Public Interest* 16 (Summer 1969): 3–40.

[5] Theodore Lowi, "Gosnell's Chicago Revisited Via Lindsay's New York," foreword to the second edition of Harold Gosnell, *Machine Politics, Chicago Model* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

[6] James Q. Wilson, "The Mayors vs. the Cities," *Public Interest* 16 (Summer 1969): 33.

[7] The term statecraft is Young's, *Washington Community*.

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city mayors as they enter the 1980s? Finally, what are the costs of electoral survival both for mayors such as White and for the cities they govern?

The Strategy and Style of the Mayor

Though Kevin White was only thirty-seven years old when he was first elected mayor of Boston in 1967, he was not a newcomer to politics. The son and son-in-law of two prominent Boston politicians, White had run successfully on the Democratic ticket for Massachusetts secretary of state in 1960 and had been reelected in 1962, 1964, and 1966. In his first attempt to gain city-wide office, he was widely regarded as the moderate alternative to school committee member Louise Day Hicks, whose ominous "you know where I stand" statement in response to questions about her position on integration made her the target of a widespread coalition of liberals and racial moderates. White defeated Hicks by 12,000 votes, a margin that he widened to 60,000 votes when he ran against her once again in 1971. In 1975 he ran for a third term, defeating State Senator Joseph Timilty by 7,000 votes after a bitter campaign in which charges of corruption were leveled at White. In the 1979 election, White again defeated Timilty, extending his margin of victory to 14,000 votes and broadening his base of support to win in many sections of the city in which he had previously lost.

Though Kevin White has been elected to four terms and has brought to the job a certain set of personal traits and attributes that have allowed observers to generalize about his personality and style, it would be a mistake to talk about the job of mayor during the White administration as if White and his style of leadership had remained static. To understand White's tenure as mayor, one must look beyond the length of time he has held office and the vote totals he has amassed to the eras he has spanned and to the changes in his own political ambitions. As he announced his candidacy for reelection in 1979, the Boston press and many local observers suggested that the voters were faced with a "new" Kevin White, a man very different from the progressive moderate who had first been elected in 1967, a man obsessed with bringing old-style machine politics to Boston. Whether White himself has changed is an issue of debate among those who understand and care about Boston politics. But it is clear that White's political ambitions and fortunes have shifted since he was first elected and that it is important to understand how these changes have affected White's fortunes and strategy.

The "eras" of Kevin White have been shaped by his ambitions. From 1967 until 1970, White, while mayor, had one eye on the governor's office for which he announced his candidacy and received his party's nomination in 1970. In the 1970 election he was soundly defeated by Republican Francis Sargent. This loss was especially humiliating to White because he was defeated by Sargent in the city of Boston. But 1970 did not mark the end of White's ambitions for higher office. In 1972 George McGovern notified White that he was seriously considering asking him to be his running mate on the Democratic ticket. Though ultimately White was not named, the experience whetted his appetite for pursuing

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national office, and from 1972 through 1974 he devoted a great deal of energy to nurturing and fostering a national reputation. Though from 1967 through 1974 White by no means ignored his constituency, he spent a good deal of time preparing himself to run for higher office and maintaining a network of contacts with a national audience.[8]

By 1975 this era of Kevin White's ambitions had ended rather abruptly. Though White defeated Timilty in the 1975 election, he did so by a very narrow margin. During the course of the campaign, for the first time in his political career White had to face charges that he was personally corrupt. According to observers and to White himself, the shock and bitterness that White felt about the campaign left him a changed man, a man who did not want to have to depend on the judgment or good will of the press or of political mediators ever again. At the same time, White was faced with the job of implementing the 1974 federal court order mandating school busing in Boston, an order that threatened to divide the city. In a very short time, White had watched his reputation change from that of a rising national figure to an embattled mayor fighting for his political life. In 1975 Kevin White seemed to have settled for being mayor and to have begun to make every effort to strengthen and insulate himself in that position.

Yet despite the fact that White's ambitions and, consequently, his handling of the job of mayor have changed during his tenure in office, it is possible to trace the consistencies in White's administration and, in doing so, to identify a style, a strategy, and a brand of politics that have allowed him to survive. Thus, it is essential first to understand something about White himself, for the style and personal qualities of political leaders have a great deal to do with the success or failure of policies and with the tone of an entire administration.

Scholars often judge political leaders by assessing how well they fit the norms and characteristics of the climate in which they operate. They cannot simply lead by being distinctive individuals. They must also be recognizable products of the followings which they lead.[9] White's own style blends well with the dominant political ethos in Boston. Boston is both a traditional and a cosmopolitan city and White is a product of both cultures. His father, Joe White, was an influential Boston politician, and White grew up in a family that understood and respected the rules of Boston politics. Although he spent his youth in the midst of an Irish neighborhood, he has also been part of the world of cosmopolitan Boston. He was educated at a private preparatory school and at Williams College and has lived on Beacon Hill for twenty years.

White has benefited enormously from the fact that he is a political hybrid. His personal strengths mesh well with the traditions and style of the city. He enjoys and takes great pride in being able to talk easily with many groups of Boston's diverse population and in being able to put together unlikely coali-

[8] For a discussion of the difference between constituency and audience, see Wilson, "Mayors vs. Cities," p. 28.

[9] For an excellent discussion of this aspect of political leadership, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

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tions. One of his oldest associates describes the relish with which White undertakes this task: "Kevin's idea of a great time is to invite the Aga Khan, Johnny Powers [the former president of the Massachusetts Senate], the cardinal and a couple of professors over to the Parkman House for dinner, draw them into a discussion, and have the evening end with all of them agreeing that they have a great deal in common."[10]

This is not merely to say that White is a good politician. It is also to acknowledge a crucial personal skill that the mayor of Boston must possess to be able to govern and to be reelected, for Boston is a heterogeneous city, a city of neighborhoods and tightly knit ethnic groups. Political followings have historically been personal followings and have lasted only as long as individuals have been able to hold them together. Though a majority of voters registered in Boston are nominally Democrats, the Democratic party in Massachusetts is so badly fragmented that the party has meant little as a stimulus to organizing voters, especially in nonpartisan city elections. No single organized group or economic organization dominates Boston politics. The business community does not speak with a single voice on political issues.[11] Unions, though organized, have not been monolithic on political issues nor have they dominated the political landscape. In short, the politics of Boston has always been coalitional politics, but a coalitional politics whose stability has depended on the talents and skills of individual politicians rather than on the strength of ongoing loyalties or organizations.

Kevin White's political style and strategy as well as his personality have been suited to the particular demands of Boston politics. Boston is a "strong mayor" city, and White has used the formal authority of the mayor's office.[12] But he has also had to fashion and hold together a group of followers who have reelected him four times. Any mayor of Boston must appeal to a broad range of voters and must tailor a strategy that allows him to build a winning coalition. White has fashioned such a coalition and has held it together over time. It is well to look at how he has done this, for it tells us a great deal not only about the career of Kevin White but also about how elected officials must use strategies that are highly sensitive to the climate and characteristics of the environment in which they operate.

Coalitional Politics and Constituent Support

When he first ran for office in 1967, White garnered the support of liberals, blacks, and Italians, and it is these three important constituencies who have re-

[10] Interview with a former member of Kevin White's staff, 25 April 1979, Boston, Mass.

[11] Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson have found influence to be decentralized in the Boston business community. See Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 275.

[12] For a description of Boston's strong mayor government, see Philip Heymann and Martha Weinberg, "The Paradox of Power: Mayoral Leadership on Charter Reform in Boston," in *American Politics and Public Policy*, eds. Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Weinberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 292.

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mained at the heart of White's political coalition in all elections. In 1967, 1971, and 1975 White received 80 percent of the black vote, approximately 70 percent of the liberal vote, and approximately 60 percent of the Italian vote, a total which, when summed, equals 40 percent of Boston voters.[13] In addition, by 1975, White had begun to enjoy popularity among a fourth group, the elderly. In 1979, many black voters supported black mayoral candidate Mel King in the nonpartisan "preliminary" election, and there was widespread speculation that White would lose a substantial percentage of black votes in the final race against Timilty. But despite these predictions, White maintained his strong standing in the black community, winning 74 percent of the black vote while making substantial gains among the Irish in white, antibusing South Boston.[14]

The most interesting thing about this winning coalition is not that it ever existed but that it has remained stable over time. White's politics has been first and foremost a politics of coalition building among constituency groups. As he himself has summed it up: "I can't think of any group in Boston that says, 'If Kevin White is in, we're in.' On the other hand, nobody says 'we're out.' That's not my brand of Boston politics. I can't win that way."[15]

White has held his coalition together through use of both symbolic and material rewards. He came into office prepared to respond to the policy concerns of his constituencies, though he had not yet identified what manifestations these would take. But he did something else, equally if not more important, to win and hold the loyalty of his constituents—he opened city government to them, both by giving them jobs and by providing them with access to him and his administration. Until White became mayor, Boston City Hall was an almost entirely Irish, white male enclave. "The walls in Old City Hall were even painted green," recalled one observer of Boston politics in talking about the absence of non-Irish in the government. "And look at the airport," he continued. "There it was in the middle of Italian East Boston, and they name it and the tunnels connecting it to the city after Irishmen."[16]

Having become mayor of an ethnic city at a time when citizen groups were becoming an important voice in the political process, White strengthened his ties to his constituencies by careful use of one of the most important resources of his office, his appointment powers. His first cabinet included two blacks, three Italians, and many professionals with impeccable liberal credentials. One of his most important appointments, symbolically, was that of an Italian, Robert DeGrazia, to be commissioner of a police department that had always been dominated by the Irish, but which under White began to recruit Italians and blacks.

[13] Data presented by John Marttila, White's campaign organizer in 1971 and 1975, in an interview, 1 June 1979, Boston, Mass. See also "How Boston Votes: A Graphic Profile of the City's Electorate," Boston *Globe* Magazine, 4 November 1979.

[14] "Why White Won Black Vote," Boston *Globe*, 9 November 1979.

[15] Interview with Kevin White, 4 June 1979, Boston, Mass.

[16] Interview with Frederick Salvucci, 21 May 1979, Boston, Mass.

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The appointment of a heterogeneous group of officials to highly visible high-level jobs in the government was important in cementing White's constituencies to him. But just as important were the lower-level jobs that he opened up to his constituents. In 1967, at most 6 percent of city jobs were held by members of racial minorities. By 1979, minorities constituted 18 percent of the city's work force, and 18 percent of those earning $15,000 and above were members of racial minority groups.[17] Although employment data are not kept or broken down by ethnic groups, most observers feel that during White's terms in office Italians have entered the city work force in record numbers. At the same time, many young professionals, the favored employees of the liberals, became visible presences in city agencies and departments. One observer has commented: "Before Kevin White the only agency that had people with college degrees on the staff was the BRA [Boston Redevelopment Authority]. All that changed under White. The liberals knew that there was a new managerial class all throughout the government."[18]

White tied his constituencies to him by delivering not only a share of the symbolically important, high-level, visible jobs, but also by opening up large numbers of jobs at all levels of government that had previously been inaccessible. Although by doing this he slighted many of the old-line Irish who had predominated in City Hall, he added personnel at a time when local government was booming; therefore in most cases he did not add injury to insult by firing longtime civil servants and avoided creating an "us-against-them" climate.

Neighborhood Linkage and Community Advocacy

White did not rely on his hiring policy as his sole means of appealing to his constituents. Boston constituency politics is also neighborhood politics, and White concentrated on policies that would reinforce his ties to his constituents in their communities. Perhaps the most important step he took in linking the neighborhoods to City Hall was his establishment in 1968 of the "Little City Halls" program.

In his 1967 campaign White had pledged to bring government back to the people and had said that if he were elected, he would set up a mechanism to link City Hall with neighborhood concerns. "Neighborhood government" was a good issue in the late 1960s and perhaps no city was naturally more receptive to it than Boston with its well-established neighborhood base and its strong mayor government. No politicians could afford to be against neighborhood government, and by 1971, the Mayor's Office of Public Service had established four-

[17] These estimates were supplied by John Ahern of the Massachusetts Council Against Discrimination (MCAD). MCAD did not exist in 1967, nor were there records kept of minority employment. On the basis of Ahern's research, he suggests that 6 percent is the highest that the percentage of minorities working for the city of Boston could have been. By 1973, when MCAD began to keep accurate records, the minorities accounted for 9.3 percent.

[18] Interview with Frederick Salvucci.

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teen Little City Halls. Their staffs were charged with following up on local complaints and with expediting the delivery of city services. In addition to performing these functions, the Little City Hall managers became important links between the mayor's office and the neighborhoods, often performing as neighborhood and community advocates and achieving high visibility in the community.[19] In most cases, White was able to benefit from the Little City Halls as a political and organizational base for his administration without having to pay the cost of creating from scratch the whole series of social, religious, and community ties necessary to make such a neighborhood-based organization work.

The policies of White's administration have been tailored to the coalitional nature of his constituency and to the groups that make it up. Many of the policies for which he is best known, such as his challenges to the expansion of the airport in East Boston and his opposition to the extension of the interstate highway network through established Boston neighborhoods, have been direct responses to galvanized communities and have been fashioned by staff members who advocate sensitivity to community concerns. Other issues for which White has become well known include his attack on tax-exempt institutions and his efforts to stop revaluation of residential property, both issues of concern to taxpayers.

Though many of these policies have not been formulated as part of a grand plan and often have been responses to pressure from groups outside City Hall, there are some general themes of the administration's policy that have remained consistent over time. White and his staff have been both diligent and adroit at capitalizing on issues that involve answers to the question "who owns this city?" Much of the energy for taking on these issues has come from White and seems to be based on his genuine personal conviction that on some issues the rights of citizens of Boston should not be encroached upon by outsiders who stand to make money or gain political influence at the expense of the city. But, perhaps more important, focusing on these kinds of issues provides tremendous political capital for an astute mayor who knows that he must bring together a diverse coalition of groups around issues on which they can agree. Like Mayor Daley of Chicago and Mayor Lee of New Haven, White has a shrewd eye for the issues that will unite his constituencies or issues that at least will not pit one constituency against another.[20]

Analysts of cities have suggested that an overwhelming problem for mayors is the considerable influence wielded over urban affairs by those who do not live in the city but who remain a crucial "audience."[21] While White has always had to be aware of the attitudes and concerns of those who control state and federal

[19] For an excellent description and analysis of the Little City Hall program, see Eric Nordlinger, *Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972).

[20] See Banfield, *Political Influence*, and Dahl, *Who Governs?*

[21] Wilson, "Mayors vs. Cities."

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power, he has also often managed to use Boston's chauvinism and parochialism to his political advantage by uniting his diverse constituencies on issues that pit Bostonians against "outsiders." This has been true especially since 1975, when White abandoned his enthusiastic quest for higher office and eliminated the corresponding need to court the support and votes of a broad national audience.

Like all mayors, White has had to face what Douglas Yates has called "street fighting pluralism," the free-for-all conflict among diverse groups who live in cities and who look to City Hall for satisfaction of their demands.[22] In his attempts to avoid this kind of internal division of his coalition, White has benefited greatly from the fact that Boston is a decentralized city of often insular neighborhoods, a city in which many issues can be handled in neighborhoods without causing city-wide repercussions. White has capitalized on this geographic and historic feature of the city. In many instances, he has deliberately avoided using the city-wide media to make announcements of programs or policies that benefit certain sections of the city.[23] Instead he has made his policies known through neighborhood channels of communication like newspapers, Little City Halls, and city workers, thus reaping the benefits of having helped one group of constituents without having to face the demands of other groups in the city who want to know what White is going to do for them.

Subcultures of Political Participation

For White, as for any other chief executive, the battle to survive depends not only on making individual decisions about policy or personnel, but also on maintaining an ongoing group of supporters who are willing to be active and vigilant in his behalf. Unlike elected officials who deliberately segregate their electoral organizations from their staffs and from those who perform the ongoing functions of government, White has always considered members of his administration and of his electoral apparatus to be part of one organization. In so doing, he has avoided many of the problems and costs associated with maintaining two staffs that often compete and operate at cross-purposes. But he has had to deal with the problem of blending into one organization individuals with widely varying motives and with extremely diverse backgrounds, training, and skills.

There are at least three different subcultures of political participants in the White administration, and White has offered strong incentives to each to work in his organization. First, there are the "policy professionals," the members of the organization whose primary incentive for participating is a desire to influence policy. Second, there are the "meal-ticket" seekers, who support White in return for salaried jobs and other material rewards. Finally, there are the "team players," who consider the game of Boston politics a way of life and who

[22] Yates, *Ungovernable City*, p. 34.

[23] Both Frederick Salvucci and Gail Rotegard, two former members of the mayor's staff, made this point in interviews with the author.

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feel that they must be part of one organization or another to be able to play.[24] White has attracted members of each of these groups and, in return, counts on them to be active participants in his organization and to link his organization and City Hall with constituencies around the city.

Throughout his years as mayor, White has surrounded himself with a group of policy professionals—bright, usually young, usually mobile people who have been attracted to him because of his reputation as an intelligent and progressive mayor who cares about policy. Though individual policy professionals tend to stay with White for a relatively short period of time and though their numbers have decreased since the 1975 election, the White administration has been known around the country as a training ground for young public servants who want to pursue careers in government. White has attracted many of these individuals to his personal staff by offering them several attractive incentives. First, the mayor delegates considerable responsibility to them and, characteristically, has done so without second-guessing them. As one longtime staff member suggests: "Kevin was never one to review fire hydrant designs. He lets you do your job without interfering."[25] White also spends time educating the policy professionals about politics and helps provide them with a road map of the often unfamiliar terrain that will affect the outcome of the policy they make. Third, he acknowledges their professionalism by backing their decisions. Barney Frank, once a key aide and now a frequent critic of White, has suggested that White's greatest strength as a manager is that "he doesn't overrule people. He knows he's a delegator and understands that that implies letting people know you're not going to second-guess them."[26] Finally, White attracts many capable young public servants because he has demonstrated his willingness to respond to substantive policy concerns and, at times, to take risks. For many of the young liberal professionals who have worked for White, the most important remuneration for their efforts is their sense that they are part of a good cause. White's controversial opposition to the expansion of the airport and construction of the interstate highway network gave him a reputation as a politician who was willing to take a long, hard look at public policy—a reputation that survived much of the criticism leveled at him in his later terms in office as an opportunistic politician.

White has held the meal-ticket seekers in his organization by extensive use of material rewards and jobs. Unlike many other politicians with an interest in the substance of policy, White has never shied away from manipulation of jobs, favors, and contracts. Raymond Wolfinger has pointed out that machine-style politics often exists in cities where there is no political machine and that "the rewards of machine politics are essentially issue-free in that they flow regardless of what policies are followed."[27] White understands that he controls a series of

[24] These three categories of participants correspond to the three different kinds of incentives explained by James Q. Wilson in *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[25] Interview with James Young, 2 May 1979, Boston, Mass.

[26] Interview with Barney Frank, 27 April 1979, Boston, Mass.

[27] Raymond Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts," *Journal of Politics* 34 (1972): 377.

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desirable rewards and has always used material incentives. His patronage and personnel offices have kept close track of job placements in the White administration. He has appointed many members of boards, commissions, and authorities on "holdover" status, in effect making it clear that they serve at his pleasure. In addition, before each election in which White has run as an incumbent, the number of persons holding city jobs has increased dramatically. After each election there have been layoffs.[28] Many workers in his campaign organizations are also on the city payroll, and especially since 1975, have been rewarded for active participation in campaigns by increases in pay and by promotions.

The team players also receive support from White. Boston is a city that takes its politics seriously, and for many of the city's residents politics is a way of life. For these team players, politics is the basis for a network of friendships and other solidary rewards, such as access to City Hall, public recognition of their contributions, and acclamation that they are important links to their friends and neighbors.[29] White has always observed the traditions and the rules of the game of Boston politics. His father and his father-in-law were influential politicians, and many of the team players support him because he is a product of an old Boston political family. But, most important, White is the mayor, a demonstrated winner.

In return for these rewards, White commands a price. All members of White's organization are expected to work in his campaigns, and many are asked to contribute money. The campaign apparatus and the White administration are folded into one large organization, and members are expected to be loyal to the person who heads that organization. Employees understand that they work for White and that part of their job is to keep him in the mayor's office. Political organizations in Boston have traditionally been highly personalized. White has reinforced the loyalty of his personal following by his careful use of tangible and intangible rewards and punishments.

In 1963 Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson described the political sphere of Boston as decentralized, arguing that "the city is nonpartisan, and no politician or possible combination of politicians has enough prestige, or enough organization to dominate the city."[30] Though it is still true that Boston is not susceptible to any one politician's total domination of the political terrain, White, through careful use of the powers and resources of his office, has built a tight, personal organization geared toward building support for ongoing policy initiatives, turning out a substantial number of White voters in the primary, and providing a formidable electoral organization and base in the general election.

[28] After his 1975 election White laid off 1209 employees. Shortly after election to his fourth term in 1979, White's budget director predicted that White would soon lay off 1600 employees. See "1600 Face Hub Layoffs," Boston *Globe*, 27 November 1979.

[29] For an especially good description of the solidary rewards offered by political organizations, see Wilson, *Political Organizations*, p. 33.

[30] Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, p. 275.

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The Political Environment

Kevin White has enhanced his chances of being a mayoral survivor by capitalizing on those elements of his own personality, style, and political skill that mesh especially well with the political ethos and style of the city he governs. But for any mayor, skill and adroitness, even when carefully attuned to the style and demands of those he represents, are not enough to ensure survival or success. All chief executives depend on a favorable climate in which they can ply their trade.[31] Because scholars and political analysts seek categories that describe the behavior of many persons, they most often focus on those attributes that members of these categories share. Thus, many scholars have written about the problems and characteristics that mayors have in common. But in attempting to answer the question of why a mayor is able to survive, it is important to understand not only the particular qualities and talents he brings to the job, but also the particular characteristics of the political environment that he faces that are favorable to his survival.[32] It is well to ask, then, what structural and environmental conditions have been important to White's success, and what major, potentially catastrophic problems he has not had to face. Of these, three are especially significant: the absence of issues so intractable that no mayor could manage them; the lack of significant independent agencies or employee unions; and the absence of powerful challengers.

In the last ten years, there have been two major issues that have had the potential to fly out of control in Boston, and, in the process, to destroy White: the racial problems that erupted with court-ordered busing, and the city's financial problems during the mid-1970s. Though dealing with each strained both White's capacity and luck, neither made him unelectable.

In 1974, a federal district court judge handed down an edict ordering the integration of the Boston schools by means of busing. Many observers felt that the widely unpopular plan would split the city, heighten racial confrontation, bring violence to the city, and cause the defeat of all politicians who had to deal with it.[33] Though the years following the busing order were not easy ones for Boston or for White, the issue did not terminate his career. There are at least three explanations for this. First, though White was mayor, he was not legally responsible for the schools. Boston has an independently elected School Committee, and much of the citizen disenchantment with and anger at busing was directed at School Committee members. Second, because the order had been handed down by a federal judge, there was a widespread feeling that no single

[31] James Sterling Young has made this point very well in his analysis of post-Jeffersonian Washington. See Young, *Washington Community*, p. 206.

[32] It is unfortunate that so little scholarly attention has been devoted to analyzing how context affects policymaking. Two exceptional studies that raise the issue of context are Richard De Neufville, *Airport Systems Planning* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), and James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (New York: Atheneum, 1972).

[33] For an excellent account of busing and White's involvement in it, see Alan Lupo, *Liberty's Chosen Home* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1977).

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person within the city could control the issue. Finally, and perhaps most important, White focused his attention and his energies on the one issue in the controversy on which all could agree and over which he had jurisdiction—the safety of school children. Though there were violent incidents involving blacks and whites in the schools, they were sporadic and scattered around the city. By 1978 South Boston High School, the center of resistance to busing, had been removed from court receivership, many white students were attending private schools, and the potential for political disaster for White as a result of the busing issue seemed to have passed.

Racial tension in the city surfaced again immediately before the 1979 election when Daryl Williams, a black high-school football player, was shot during a football game in Charlestown, a white, Irish section of the city. Angry groups of white and black citizens held meetings and rallies, and the city seemed once again to be dominated by racial tension. White's popularity in the polls began to dip.[34] But White was lucky. Though the city remained tense, there were no major racial incidents in the week before the election and White swept to victory, avoiding mention of the issue that he and other astute observers knew could cost him the election were it to fly out of control.

Another issue that would almost certainly have caused White's downfall was the escalation of the city's fiscal crisis of 1976 to a full-scale collapse. This collapse was narrowly averted. In the 1976 fiscal year the city spent $70 million more than projected, with most of these unanticipated costs attributable to the costs of school desegregation and election-year budgeting designed to ensure no increase in property taxes. At the same time the city was in the midst of several capital-building efforts including the $108 million school-building program. With the collapse of credit markets in 1975, Boston, like most other major cities, faced a financial market access problem. As in other cities, elements of the banking and financial communities felt that the city should be allowed to go bankrupt.

Boston's finances did not collapse. Part of the explanation for this concerns the timing of the problem. The climate for borrowing changed at the crucial time for Boston. But part of the explanation concerns actions taken by the White administration. White had in place a small but extremely competent staff of fiscal advisers who saw the crisis coming. By the time the financial community began to exert pressure, White's fiscal staff had already begun to take action to shore up the city's reputation and to put the city back on a sound footing. By increasing taxes, decreasing expenditures, and bringing in Morgan Guaranty Trust Company to be chief underwriter of their bond issue and to increase confidence, they began to bring the city's finances back into line, narrowly averting a fiscal collapse and the political disaster for White that would have accompanied it.

Both Theodore Lowi and James Q. Wilson have suggested that independent city agencies and organized groups of city employees pose threats to mayoral

[34] "Why White Won Black Vote," Boston *Globe*, 9 November 1979.

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control of city governments.[35] But for White neither has threatened to cause him to lose his grip on the apparatus of government or on his job. Though public employees are well organized in Boston, they have never squared off for a major confrontation with White. There are several reasons for this. First, the climate in Boston has been favorable to organized labor. The city has traditionally had high taxes and a correspondingly high level of services. There has not been a fiscal crisis, nor have there been large numbers of layoffs. Moreover, union leaders have been able to negotiate successfully with the city. City employees' wages compare favorably with those of public employees in similar jobs around the country. Finally, there is a sense of mutual respect that has grown between the unions' leaders and the vice-mayor of Boston who is in charge of labor negotiations.[36] The climate of distrust and mutual hostility that has characterized the dealings between the unions and the city government in so many cities has never materialized in Boston. As a result, though the unions have not always gone out of their way to help White, they have never made him their target.

Independent, autonomous city agencies have also never posed a real threat to White. This is not to suggest that he has complete control over all policy made by the bureaucrats in agencies he nominally controls. There are several line agencies such as the Real Property Department, the Building Department, and the Assessing Department that White has avoided changing, either by ignoring them or, at the very least, by naming to key positions loyalists who have not forced White to think about reform. As one staff aide put it, "He's terrified of turning over the rock and finding all sorts of ugly creatures he'd have to deal with."[37] But there are few agency heads who have moved their organizations in a direction out of White's control, and these few, such as Commissioner Robert DeGrazia of the Police Department and Robert Kenney of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, have been dismissed with dispatch.

White has several important sources of control over agency activities. Perhaps the most important of these is the sheer number of appointments he has been able to make in his twelve years as mayor. He has kept a careful eye on the loyalty of all mayoral appointees, has converted many of the appointments to independent boards and authorities to holdover status, and has not hesitated to remove those who appear to be straying from the White fold. In addition, the budgetary powers of the mayor are considerable. Central control over agency budgets and purchasing is situated in White's office and gives him substantial

[35] Lowi, "Chicago Revisited"; and Wilson, "Mayors vs. Cities," p. 33.

[36] Much of this discussion is based on a 6 June 1979 interview with Abraham Siegel of MIT's Sloan School of Management who has for many years been the negotiator between the fire fighters and police and the city of Boston. Some analysts would dispute Siegel's contention that the relationship between city and union officials has been characterized by mutual respect and cordiality. See "City, Unions Not the Best of Friends," Boston *Globe*, 4 October 1979. Most analysts of city-union politics, however, would agree that the relationship has never been characterized by irreparable strain.

[37] Interview with a longtime aide of White, 25 April 1979, Boston, Mass.

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leverage in negotiating with agencies. Finally, White has become increasingly invulnerable to the great weapon of bureaucrats, the sense that they can outlive any chief executive. Many of the agency personnel who early in White's career as mayor treated him as a temporary nuisance have had to make peace with him, for they have come to recognize that a four-term mayor can, if he wishes, exercise a great deal of control over the quality and even the existence of their jobs.

Of all the questions that could be asked about the political environment in Boston during White's tenure, perhaps the most crucial is the question of why White has not had to face more formidable opponents, opponents who by force of their own political skills would be able to wrench the mayor's job away from White. There are several reasons for the scarcity of powerful challengers. First, unlike some other large cities, Boston has no stepping-stone institutions that lead naturally to the mayor's office. There is no single congressional district. Members of the City Council and the School Committee are elected every two years in city-wide elections, but both organizations have limited power and visibility and are overshadowed in power and authority by the mayor's office. In addition, members of these bodies, and indeed city politicians in general, have traditionally been held in low esteem in Boston.[38] In contrast, during White's tenure in office, citizens have viewed both White himself and the office he holds with respect and, often, affection.[39]

Election to Boston political office, moreover, has always required a personal organization, something that is difficult to build in the face of a powerful and well-organized incumbent. Historically, political loyalty has not been transferable from one person to another in Boston.[40] There are not tightly knit party organizations in the city. More importantly, Boston mayoral primaries and elections are nonpartisan. Incumbents such as White benefit from having a tightly organized cadre of activists who vote in the preliminary election and who serve as an already established electoral organization to work in the short period between the September preliminary election and the November final election. It is difficult for challengers with no electoral base to build such an organization and to raise the money and attract the staff necessary to defeat an incumbent.

Finally, one can argue that there have been no powerful challengers to White because the demands of Boston's coalitional politics are difficult to meet. Because of the diversity and heterogeneity of the city, it is impossible to win the election with the support of only one group. The kind of coalition building at which White has excelled is complicated in the best of circumstances and ex-

[38] In 1960 Murray Levin found widespread distrust of politicians. See *The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), esp. p. 61. In 1970, Eric Nordlinger found that 51 percent of Boston residents expressed extreme disaffection with public officials as a class. See Nordlinger, *Decentralizing the City*, p. 79.

[39] This is reflected in polls taken by John Marttila from 1970 through 1975.

[40] Even James Michael Curley, the legendary Boston political boss, ran the city through a personal organization. For a thoughtful analysis of the Curley organization see Paul Grogan, "James Michael Curley: The Machine Politician as Maverick" (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Department of Political Science).

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tremely difficult to manage in opposition to an incumbent mayor who has won and held the loyalty of a winning electoral coalition. Many of the most astute observers of Boston politics have argued that a successful challenger would have to look very much like White himself. The likelihood that someone of this ilk will challenge White is small, both because most of the credible challengers who fall in this category are White supporters and because, even if they were to become disaffected, they would have to overcome the tremendous advantages of incumbency and long-term loyalty that White enjoys.

The Threat to Mayoral Survival

Kevin White has managed to survive and, even it would seem, to prosper at a time when many analysts of cities predicted that big-city mayors would falter. He has been elected four times. Throughout his years as mayor, public-opinion polls have shown him to be extremely popular.[41] The city of Boston has survived a financial crisis, and its financial condition seems healthy. The flow of persons moving into the city is steadily increasing, and public-opinion polls indicate that residents of the city feel more optimistic about its future than they have felt in many years.[42]

Yet as White ran for his fourth term in office, his whole style of campaigning and politicking seemed to have shifted dramatically from his style in earlier elections. In each of his mayoral campaigns White has maintained a tight electoral organization, but in 1979 he seemed determined to flaunt it, to work both in public and in private to centralize electoral and political control of the city in his own hands.

As early as 1977 White had seemed to feel that one of his most pressing problems was that of centralizing power. Accordingly, he proposed that the city charter be changed to increase the powers of the mayor. After a protracted battle in which his opponents characterized his efforts as a power grab and as a selfish attempt to achieve personal gain, White's proposal was defeated.[43] But this defeat did not stop him from focusing on his attempt to centralize power and authority. In his 1979 campaign he made an undisguised effort to create a tight political organization, an organization manned by city workers who knew that pay increases and, in fact, their very jobs might depend on their success at working in precincts and wards.

White's strategy and actions were neither uncalculated nor careless. For White, the survivor of the politics of the late sixties and early seventies, had

[41] According to John Marttila, White's campaign organizer in 1971 and 1975, White's "favorable" ratings in polls remained a consistent 60 percent (with a 20 percent "unfavorable" rating). Though White's "unfavorability" rating increased after the 1976 tax increase, it remained well below the 35 percent figure that is more typical of elected chief executives in office.

[42] See "Report of Findings: A 1978 Survey of Boston Resident Attitudes Toward Their City, Their Neighborhoods and its People" (Paper prepared for the City of Boston Office of Program Development by Consensus, Inc., Boston City Hall).

[43] For a detailed account of the charter battle, see Heymann and Weinberg, "Paradox of Power."

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come to believe that the terrain of mayoral politics had shifted, that the major concern of the voters was that chief executives be strong leaders and that, therefore, the major threat to mayoral survival was to fail to pull together enough power to satisfy the public's increased craving for strong leadership. As White himself put it:

> The issue of the political machine, the "imperial mayoralty," is no longer dominant. People want leadership, but they're demanding it at a particularly difficult time.
>
> The rule used to be that he who won had the right to govern. But since 1970, there's been an unstructured assault on the political profession's right to govern, to lead. Until we recapture a very diffuse political process, nobody can do anything. . . . When I'm faced with this kind of situation, you bet your life I'm going to pull together all the scraps of power I can assemble.[44]

White is not alone in seeing dispersion of authority as the central issue that elected chief executives face. As early as 1965, Banfield and Wilson pointed out that one of the results of the reform movement in cities was to increase the trend of decentralization of power and to decrease the power of the politician: The reform movement

> compensated for this to some extent by increasing [the politician's] authority. . . . But, because the increase in authority was usually not enough to make up entirely for the loss of power, the politician's total influence declined. While this was happening, more and more accomplishment was being expected of public officials (i.e. politicians in office); both the quantity and quality of public services being demanded increased. This left elected officials in a difficult position: as their need for influence increased, their supply of it declined.[45]

Walter Dean Burnham has argued that the collapse of political authority is characteristic of all levels of government and that there is an ever-increasing tendency toward dispersion of political authority. His argument for the need to centralize authority sounds much the same as White's when he writes: "In the American system, above all, the price for creating the support of mass electorates and cadres of activists—a support essential to the accumulation of power resources by executives—is the existence of some organized force able to overcome the fragmenting which the institutional structure mandates."[46]

But to recognize that chief executives need to be leaders in a system characterized by increasingly dispersed authority is, for mayors, only to begin the battle. By acting on his belief that centralization of power and influence in himself was the single most important issue he must face, White took an enormous gamble, a gamble that many chief executives must face. He gambled that he could actively and publicly seek to win power both for himself and for his office, without being thrown out of office by an electorate fearful of and angry at a

[44] Interview with Kevin White, 4 June 1979.

[45] Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, p. 336.

[46] Walter Dean Burnham, "The 1976 Election: Has the Crisis Been Adjourned?" in *American Politics*, Burnham and Weinberg, p. 22.

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politician hungry for power. White had to gamble on striking the correct balance between assembling enough power to satisfy the public's craving for leadership and remaining aloof enough from pursuit of power to survive the public's enduring suspicion.

Kevin White won his gamble in the 1979 election. He placed his bets on assembling power visibly and on risking the electorate's perception of him as a strong, if at times unscrupulous, leader and, once again, survived. One might well argue that White's victory is a true example of mayoral success, both for those who have supported him in the past and for those whose primary concern is that the mayor, any mayor, be able to govern. For if White is correct in his assessment that authority is becoming more and more fragmented, defeat for White, a mayor who has marshalled considerable resources and authority, would only have ensured further fragmentation and decentralization of political power. One might also argue that without the leadership of someone such as a Kevin White, someone able to glue together a diverse and heterogeneous coalition, the Boston electorate might well choose a series of one-term mayors, each elected by ad hoc coalitions formed around the issue of throwing the incumbent out or held together by promises of rewards that mayors have a great deal of difficulty delivering. In such a situation, all of the forces that analysts have argued make cities ungovernable could easily come into play.

But there are also costs and risks attached to survival in mayoral politics in the current era, and these affect mayors, active constituents, and members of the electorate who care about the substance of public policy. For Mayor White, the cost associated with his most recent victory may be an increasing reluctance to pursue any goals other than those associated with building his own power and with keeping his naturally fragmented house in order. The risk of this for those who care about the quality of policy the administration makes is that White may come to believe that the job of the elected politician is to seek power for its own sake and to dismiss policy and programs as irrelevant. For those who have worked for White or who have supported him because they believe he has stood for the right issues, the costs of his winning and governing as if the accumulation of power were his central concern may be very great.

The citizenry of the city may pay a great price for the current state of mayoral politics. For all mayors, even adroit survivors such as Kevin White, may have to pay so much attention to amassing power to ensure survival that they are unable to ask themselves what beyond survival they want to achieve. The great obstacle to true mayoral leadership may be that even the survivors must focus on the mechanics of organizing power to the exclusion of caring about the substance of policy.

In his fourth inaugural address, White announced that "racism in any and all of its ugly manifestations won't be condoned and will be confronted directly and aggressively by this government."[47] His promise to deal with a complicated and

[47] "Text of Mayor White's Inaugural Address," Boston *Globe*, 8 January 1980.

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emotional issue of public concern may or may not bear some relationship to his announcement during his campaign that he would not run again for the job of mayor. Skeptics have argued that White's commitment is largely rhetorical or simply a fleeting fancy. Even those who accept White's sincerity and commitment suggest that Boston's racial problems can only be attacked by a mayor who will not seek reelection, but many of these same individuals argue that a mayor who is not constantly tuning an electoral machine has very little chance of making sweeping reforms. Whatever White's motivation for singling out racial tension as a problem that his administration must face, it is clear that in dealing with it he will face a stern test of mayoral influence and strength.

The story of White's successes or failures in his fourth term almost certainly will not tell interested observers all they would like to know about mayoral leadership and public policy. But it may suggest something about the limits of and possibilities for executive leadership on issues of public concern. Kevin White has proven that under some circumstances big-city mayors can survive and, in so doing, has defied many of the obstacles to survival identified by social scientists. Now that White has survived and has paid the attendant costs of survival, the more interesting questions become whether he wants to affect and shape public policy and if he does, whether or not he can succeed.

Conclusion

What are the lessons to be learned from this discussion of Kevin White and his career as mayor? The first is perhaps the most obvious, that personality and leadership style are important factors in determining mayoral success, though probably not in as straightforward a way as much of the literature about chief executives written in the 1960s would lead readers to believe. Organization charts are misleading in depicting executive influence: mayors are not dominant simply by virtue of their position in the formal structure of government; therefore an engaging personal style and a will to achieve power are not in themselves sufficient to ensure success. An individual's personality and style must mesh with the characteristics of the particular environment in which he plies his trade. Kevin White's personality and style fit with Boston's political and cultural environment, and this fit provides him with strength. But to argue on the basis of this that White's same style or traits would be effective in New York or Atlanta or San Francisco would be totally misleading. Generalizations about leadership style are useful only to the extent they are coupled with an understanding of the particular context in which the leader operates.

The second lesson is closely tied to the first. To be successful, a mayor must be not only skilled and intelligent, but also lucky. He must govern in a favorable environment, the elements of which he cannot control. Not even the strongest mayors are powerful enough or influential enough to survive all the kinds of racial, fiscal, or other crises that the contemporary American city almost routinely faces. Kevin White's success, to a certain extent, is a result of the fact that he has

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led a charmed life. Without a favorable political climate, no mayor can succeed, no matter what his talent or skill.

The third lesson to be learned from the story of Kevin White is that in contemporary urban politics skill and a favorable environment are necessary but not sufficient to ensure a mayor's electoral success. For even the most powerful and long-lived mayors must attempt to assemble influence in a political system in which power is increasingly dispersed. In so doing, they must face the ambivalence of an electorate that is increasingly skeptical of those who seek power for its own sake but one also anxious for strong political leadership. Because mayors are no longer automatically perceived as having a legitimate right to govern, they must constantly assemble power and appear strong; at the same time, they must publicly deny their quest to be powerful. One might argue that this is the greatest obstacle mayors face, for they must perform this delicate balancing act not only at election time, but, increasingly, throughout their term of office.

The final lesson to be learned from the story of Kevin White is that even mayoral "success" in the contemporary environment is not without costs. For even the most electorally successful mayors must develop an obsession with holding enough power together to continue to win. When this obsession becomes firmly entrenched, the choice of policy directions and commitments to programs may remain instrumentally important but is unlikely to dominate the mayor's agenda. The price of this success may be high. Even though the electoral success of mayors such as Kevin White may bode well for the possibility of stability in governance in large American cities, it bodes poorly for the possibility of commitment to programs and of strong leadership in solving the most pressing problems that urban residents face. The success of Kevin White may seem to mute Lowi's warning that cities may be "well-run but ungoverned."[48] Instead the major dilemma for cities in the 1980s with electorally successful mayors may be that they are governed but poorly led.*

[48] Lowi, "Chicago Revisited."

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The Social Bases of an Urban Political Machine: The Case of Palermo

JUDITH CHUBB

The Italian South (*Mezzogiorno*) is ideal terrain for studying the relationship between clientelist politics at the local level and the processes of economic and political development. Much of the literature on this topic points to the eventual inflationary consequences of clientelism as a means of mobilizing political consent, concluding that clientelist political systems can be sustained over time only in the presence of a constantly expanding resource base.[1] In the Italian context, observers of clientelist politics have emphasized the massive transfer of resources from the national government to the underdeveloped South; this substitution of public resources by the center for scarce local resources, it is held, has provided the economic underpinning for clientelist power at the local level.[2] This approach focuses on the role of the dominant Christian Democratic party (DC) as a mediator between the resources of the center and the needs of a resource-scarce periphery.

While not denying the importance of the resources of the state in sustaining

[1] This perspective is developed most explicitly, for the Italian case, in Mario Caciagli et al., *Democrazia Christiana e potere nel Mezzogiorno* [Christian Democracy and power in the South] (Florence: Guaraldi, 1977), while a more general argument is made by James C. Scott in "Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December 1969): 1142-58.

[2] In addition to the Caciagli volume, see Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), and Percy Allum, *Politics and Society in Post-War Naples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

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positions of local power in the South, this article attempts, on the basis of an in-depth case study of one of the most powerful DC machines in the South, that of Palermo, to demonstrate that such an emphasis on the inflationary aspects of machine politics seriously underestimates critical *local* patronage mechanisms that depend only minimally on public resources. This evidence suggests that, contrary to the predictions of the resource-based model, economic crises need not spell the demise of clientelist systems of power; the case of Palermo demonstrates instead that the machine has substantial nonmonetary levers of power at the local level that can sustain it even in the absence of substantial external resource flows. Finally, this article questions the validity of a typology of political parties that considers patronage-based parties, such as the DC in southern Italy, as a transitional stage of political development between traditional patron-client ties and modern mass ideological or interest-based parties.[3] The experience of southern Italy demonstrates instead the ability of clientelist systems of power to perpetuate the conditions of poverty and socioeconomic fragmentation upon which they thrive. Far from being progressively undermined by inevitable processes of social and economic development, machine-based elites have proven capable, through their links to national power and their consequent control over critical resources, to impede indefinitely precisely those processes of development that would transform the nature of political organization.

The Failure of Development in the South

In order to understand contemporary politics in southern Italy, it is necessary first to give a brief overview of the "Southern Question" and the reasons for the dramatic gap—economic, social, and political—that continues to separate North and South more than 100 years after Italian unification. The economic and social dualism between a modernizing, industrializing North and a largely feudal, agricultural South, already in existence at the time of unification in 1860, was exacerbated by the subsequent process of national economic and political integration. The political underpinning of liberal democracy in unified Italy was an alliance between the northern industrial bourgeoisie and the southern landed aristocracy, one of the conditions of which was the preservation of the social and economic status quo in the South. The developmental choices implicit in this alliance, reinforced subsequently by the logic of market forces, meant that, by the beginning of the postwar period, the dualism between the North and South had become so consolidated that the only possibility of reversing it lay in the adoption of a deliberate policy of state intervention to promote and sustain economic development in the South.

[3] The model of the party of mass patronage as a transitional form of political organization midway between the traditional patron-client relationship and the modern mass party can be found in Allum, *Politics and Society in Post-War Naples*, and Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," *European Journal of Political Research* 1 (April 1973): 3–34.

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Such a policy of state intervention was initiated in 1950 with the establishment of the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (State Fund to Develop Southern Italy), set up as an autonomous arm of the government, independent of the regular ministries, in order to facilitate rapid and effective action in the South. After twenty-five years of "extraordinary" intervention by the Cassa, the face of the South has indeed changed. A massive exodus from agriculture nourished a migratory flow of about 4 million people from the South to northern cities and to the industrial nations of Western Europe between 1951 and 1971. Modern refineries, steel mills, automobile factories, and chemical plants have sprung up where recently one encountered only impoverished peasants and flocks of sheep. Both income per capita and the share of total income produced by industry have increased substantially. Yet, after twenty-five years of activity and approximately 10,000 billion lire (U.S. $16.5 billion) invested in the South, even government spokesmen have judged the Cassa a failure: the gap between North and South has widened rather than narrowed; industrial employment has grown at rates far below those anticipated; and overall employment has actually decreased.[4]

Given such a massive state commitment, how can the failure of economic development in the South be explained? While the poverty and backwardness of the South may once have been attributable to objective natural factors and to the subsequent workings of the market in a unified economy, such arguments are less persuasive after more than two decades of deliberate public intervention aimed at eliminating at least the most glaring disparities between Italy's "two nations." To understand the present gap between North and South, one must examine the guiding strategy of Cassa investment. After an initial period of concentration on the creation of infrastructures, in 1957 the orientation of the Cassa shifted to a new strategy of providing direct incentives to public and private industrial investment in the South. These investment incentives were concentrated in "development poles," the majority of which were sited in the vicinity of the large coastal cities, and, although originally intended to favor small- and medium-scale, labor-intensive industries, were increasingly granted instead to large public and private firms in precisely those sectors—steel, chemicals, and petrochemicals—in which the ratio of labor to capital is lowest. Thus began the process Hytten and Marchioni called "industrialization without development."[5] Because of the priority accorded to the creation of "cathedrals in the desert"—industrial giants, often subsidiaries of northern monopolies or state-controlled firms, placed in the South without linkages to the local economy and with little capacity to create either new employment or a supportive network of small and medium firms—industrial employment actually fell in many areas as the new industries undermined the traditional artisanal firms

[4] For data on North-South differences, see the table in Gisele Podbielski, *Italy: Development and Crisis in the Post-War Economy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 137.

[5] From the title of the book by E. Hytten and M. Marchioni, *L'Industrializzazione senza sviluppo* [Industrialization without development] (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1970).

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without creating a sufficient number of new jobs to absorb the labor thereby displaced (in addition to the massive outpouring of manpower from agriculture). Enormous public investment thus had the paradoxical effect of encouraging rather than restraining the burgeoning migratory flows from the South.

Political as well as economic factors, however, lie behind the failure of the Cassa in the South. Designed as a special streamlined instrument to channel state funds into carefully chosen economic development projects, the Cassa was soon transformed into a political bandwagon for the maintenance of local clienteles: in numerous cases the selection and siting of public works and development projects were determined not by criteria of economic rationality but by the political needs of local Christian Democratic bosses. Seen from this perspective, the investment activity of the Cassa, while failing in its proclaimed objective of industrializing the South, did perform important political functions: on the one hand, it undermined the opposition through a massive program of industrial investment in the South, while on the other hand it preserved in large part the traditional economic and social structure of the South upon which the DC's clientelist local power bases depended and, not coincidentally, at least throughout the 1960s, sustained a flow of low-cost migrant labor to northern factories.

The Structure of the Urban Economy

Despite the failure of industrialization in the South, important changes have taken place in the past two decades. The most striking of these has been a massive population shift from the agricultural interior to the large coastal cities, which have since the mid-1950s constituted the real locus of DC power in the South. An understanding of the economic structure of the southern city is an essential prerequisite for an analysis of the bases of political consent. The city in southern Italy is emblematic of the phenomenon of "urbanization without industrialization," that is, rapid population growth without a concomitant expansion of the productive base of the local economy. The urban economy is thus characterized by extreme resource constraints and, for the individual, extreme economic insecurity, reflected in an extremely low rate of formal labor-force participation (26.2 percent as compared with a national average of 34.8 percent and 40.5 percent in a northern industrial city such as Milan) and very high levels of unemployment and underemployment.[6] The character of the urban poor, or *sottoproletariato*, in large southern cities is best described by the term "*mille mestieri*" ("a thousand professions"). Without fixed professions, changing their trade from day to day as the vagaries of the city's "marginal" economy dictate,

[6] The data on labor-force participation, as well as subsequent figures on occupational structure, are taken from the ISTAT, *11th General Census of the Population* (Rome: ISTAT, 1971). As for unemployment, the official rate in Palermo as of June 1979 was about 12 percent, but this figure seriously understates the gravity of the actual situation, since it does not take into account either the city's vast "marginal" labor force or those unemployed who have withdrawn in discouragement from the formal labor market.

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the urban poor in Palermo have been estimated at between one-fourth and one-third of the total urban population.[7]

In a situation of urbanization without industrialization, the industrial sector is very weak (accounting for only 35 percent of the labor force in Palermo as opposed to 47 percent in Milan), and most of the existing firms are "industrial" in name only. The construction industry, noted for its cyclical instability and for the precarious nature of the employment which it provides, alone accounts for one-third of the "industrial" work force in Palermo; the bulk of these workers are unskilled laborers who are hired on short-term contracts and return to unemployment as soon as the project is completed. The manufacturing sector, usually considered the index of industrial development, is polarized between a handful of large and medium-sized firms sustained predominantly by public capital (in Palermo there are only four firms employing over 500 workers) and a myriad of traditional artisanal shops and small family firms.

Reflecting the weakness of the industrial base, the urban economy is heavily weighted toward the tertiary sector. In Palermo the public administration accounts for up to 30 percent of the urban labor force, keeping in mind that this category includes not only civil servants in the offices of the municipal, provincial, regional, and national government, but also workers in a variety of public services, most banks and hospitals, and a myriad of autonomous public and semipublic agencies. The remainder of the tertiary sector resembles that of Third World cities more than it does other Western cities. Dominated by petty commercial and service activities (from family-run food shops to hawkers and street vendors of every conceivable variety), it serves primarily, in the absence of alternative employment possibilities, as a "refuge" sector for a large proportion of the urban poor.

The Social Bases of the Machine

Since 1956 the Christian Democratic party has governed Palermo through a formidable machine that has extended its control into virtually every sphere of the social, economic, and political life of the city. In Palermo alone of major Italian cities, the DC has not only withstood the challenge of the Left in recent years, but actually increased its share of the vote in 1975 and 1980. The party finds its mass base in the three major components of the city's social structure: the white-collar middle classes, for the most part public employees; the local entrepreneurial class, concentrated in the construction industry; and the urban poor. Each of these key social groups will now be examined in turn, focusing on the specific type of patronage mechanism linking them with the holders of local power.

[7] This estimate is from the classic study of the Palermo slum economy by Renee Rochefort in *Le travail en Sicile* [Work in Sicily] (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961). Although this study was completed in the late 1950s, there is no evidence to suggest that the economic situation of the city has changed radically since then; if anything, it has worsened.

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Public Employees

The case of public employees conforms most fully to the "resource theory" of clientelism, which sees the key to the success of the machine in its control of the public treasury and its large-scale distribution of public resources, primarily in the form of job patronage, for political ends. It is undeniable that job patronage has played a fundamental role in the system of power built up by the DC in Palermo over the past thirty years, although its significance goes far beyond the simple exchange of a job for a vote. In an economic context like that of Palermo, where a stable job is a rare commodity, employment in the public sector, however lowly, has become a universal aspiration—the dream of stable and dignified employment, of a regular salary and fringe benefits, in sum, of security. As a result, for a large part of the population, politics revolves around the *posto* (job or position) and, when all is said and done, "a job signifies a vote and vice versa."[8] Although this is undoubtedly an exaggeration, its common acceptance conveys the political atmosphere of a city where politics is widely perceived as the only road to obtaining secure employment. The reality of massive hiring on the basis of political "recommendations" which underlies such a perception can be documented in the uncontrolled expansion, from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s, of local government bureaucracies (in particular the Commune and the Region) to elephantine proportions.[9]

The mechanisms by which patronage hiring has taken place are in themselves a fascinating object of study.[10] Because public competitions (*concorsi*) have been required for almost all public-sector jobs since the mid-1960s, the techniques of patronage hiring have become more refined. Apart from rigging the public competitions, which is common, the foremost instrument at the disposal of local political leaders has been that of *assunzioni fuori ruolo*—the hiring of persons on short-term contracts (usually six months) to positions outside the regularly defined bureaucratic structure; since their employment was allegedly temporary, the public competitions required for all permanent administrative personnel could be circumvented. Once hired, however, the contracts would be regularly renewed until, under the pressure of hundreds of "precarious"

[8] *L'Ora* (leftwing Palermo daily), 28 September 1967.

[9] As of the 1971 census, the total labor force in Palermo was 168,319. Although reliable earlier figures for city employees are not available, they numbered about 9,500 at the end of 1976. For the regional government, whose bureaucratic apparatus is concentrated in Palermo, there are more exact figures. The first law regulating the regional bureaucracy was passed in 1953, limiting its size to 1,474 employees and prohibiting any subsequent hiring except by competitive exam. Clientelist hiring continued unabated, however, so that by 1958 a new law was required, expanding the bureaucracy to 3,567 positions. Despite a hiring ban since 1971, the effective strength of the regional bureaucracy at the end of 1976 was 6,149, an excess of 2,500 employees over the legal ceiling. This figure does not include the approximately 7,000 employees of the special economic agencies run by the regional government.

[10] The information on techniques of patronage hiring contained in the following paragraphs is based on personal interviews with leaders of the public-sector unions of city and regional employees of the General Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL).

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employees (the contingents mounting at the approach of every election), the public-sector unions would be compelled to demand their incorporation into the permanent bureaucratic structure. From the viewpoint of the unions, anxious to justify their presence and to recruit support in a traditionally hostile environment, support for such pressures was unavoidable. The overall effect of such actions, however, has been to draw the unions as well as the opposition parties into objective collusion with the very system of clientelist power that they are ostensibly seeking to overthrow.

Another tactic by which the unions have been drawn into legitimation of clientelist hiring is known in bureaucratic jargon as *svolgimento di mansioni superiori* (performance of a job superior in rank to that for which one has been hired). The key to the usefulness of this concept is the requirement of public competitions only for persons filling administrative positions, while for all other positions (clerks, typists, ushers and doormen, janitors, laborers) personnel can still be hired on a direct personal basis. (Of 3,056 positions in the city government in 1976, 2,514 were nonadministrative; only 542 required public competitions.)[11] This has not meant, in general, that the DC has used these positions to link significant sectors of the city's low-income population to the party. Instead, what often happens is that, in order to circumvent the public competitions, persons with high-school and even university degrees are hired as typists, ushers, and janitors. Since these individuals could hardly be expected to perform tasks so far beneath their dignity and qualifications, however, they are rapidly assigned appropriate functions, while continuing to be paid for the lower-ranking job. Eventually, like workers hired on short-term contracts, the unions are obliged to protest such blatant exploitation, putting pressure on the administration to promote these people to positions commensurate with the duties which they are in fact performing. As might be expected, the impact of such a system of hiring on the functioning of public offices is disastrous: despite continual hiring for subordinate positions, many offices suffer such an acute shortage of clerical and maintenance personnel that they find it difficult to maintain even a minimal level of services.

Another highly successful technique of job patronage has grown out of national legislation requiring all public offices or agencies to set aside 15 percent of all positions for the disabled. Since this legislation provides that a person certified as disabled can be hired without the normal public competition, the potential for political speculation, particularly in a context such as that of Palermo where anything is possible with the proper "recommendation," is extremely high. At the approach of every election, large numbers of "disabled" persons are hired on short notice, providing hundreds or even thousands of dependable votes for certain well-placed candidates. The key to this operation is the medical commission of the city government's Office of Hygiene, which examines applicants and provides the required certificate of disability. With the same party controlling both the certification of disability and subsequent hiring, the pros-

[11] Data from the Office of Personnel of the Commune of Palermo.

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pect of political gain from the hiring of the "disabled" can hardly help but prove tempting.

The ramifications of clientelist hiring and the networks of political obligation created, however, go far beyond the mere act of placing a person on the public payroll. Otherwise, it might be objected, how can the continuity of the patron-client bond be guaranteed once the original vote-for-job exchange is consummated and the client is securely installed in a public-sector job from which he cannot, for all intents and purposes, ever be removed? The "recommendation" by which the public employee accedes to the object of his aspirations is only the first link in a chain of reciprocal obligations which will progressively bind him ever more irrevocably to his patron and protector. If he wishes to further his own career and to insure the possibility of future employment for other family members, the public employee can ill afford to neglect his obligations to his patron once he has secured his job. Within the bureaucracy, for example, promotions and pay raises proceed almost exclusively on the basis of political favoritism. In a highly competitive situation for both hiring and promotion, with virtually everyone recommended by one prominent politician or another, the weight of the recommendation is directly proportional to the power of the patron, which is in turn closely linked to the number of personal preference votes received in the preceding election. The employee's fate, as well as his chances of placing other family members, is thus directly dependent on the continued electoral success of the patron, with loyalty and its rewards being measured in the currency of an ever-increasing number of personal preference votes.

A final consideration about patronage hiring in Palermo is that, even though the staffs of the numerous government offices and public agencies in the city are swollen far out of proportion to their effective personnel needs, the demand for public-sector jobs continues to exceed the supply by a ratio of at least 30 to 1—for example, a 1976 public competition for 1,000 positions in the city government had over 35,000 applicants. Such figures underline an essential qualification to an analysis of the problem focusing entirely on the expenditure of public resources for patronage jobs. In the last analysis, the system works less through the mass distribution of benefits to all comers than through the astute management of *scarcity* and, above all, the critical element of hope. The key to the successful politician is not mass patronage but the maintenance of the maximum clientele with the minimum payoff in terms of actual benefits.

In conclusion, the overwhelming consensus for the DC among public-sector employees is based on a complex interlocking of short-term material incentives (or at least the promise thereof) with a broader sense of self-interest, both individual and corporative. It is beyond question that, more than in any other social class, support for the DC among this sector of the middle classes is directly linked to the large-scale expenditure of public resources in the form of patronage jobs, politically based promotions, and a system of compensation that creates entrenched positions of privilege, both for individuals and for the category of public employees as a whole. In this case, however, consensus im-

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plies more than just the buying of votes with patronage; it implies a deeper unity of interest or ideology. The instrument of such consensus has been the ideology of individualism and social privilege that pervades the middle classes in southern Italy, an ideology based on two fundamental elements: the conviction that one can get ahead only on an individual rather than a collective basis and that to do so "it is necessary to have saints in heaven"—that is, one can rely only on an immediate and personalized relationship with an influential patron; and the very real sense of privilege, in southern Italy, conferred by public-sector employment, not merely in terms of material benefits (which may be substantial), but above all in terms of stability and security. There are thus two distinct components—the ideological and the material—at work producing support for the DC machine among public employees. The former is probably the primary factor in producing the general party vote for the DC, which is attributable at least as much to a perceived identity of class interest as to any specific clientelist exchange; the latter is expressed above all in the preference vote for individual DC candidates, in which the conception of the vote as a direct expression of the patron-client bond predominates.

The Local Entrepreneurial Class

The linkages between the Christian Democratic party and the local entrepreneurial class concern the relationship between political and economic elites. In contrast to American theories of the "power elite," which posit the domination of politics by business interests, what is found in Palermo is the opposite extreme—the subordination of the entrepreneur to the politician and of the profit motive to the exigencies of party and factional struggle. The causes of this dependency relationship lie in three interrelated factors: the nature of the southern bourgeoisie; the model of postwar Italian development, which has perpetuated the subordination of the South to the needs of northern industry; and the expanding role of the state in the economy since 1945, which is particularly pronounced in the South because of the weakness of the private sector.

Since the latter two points have been discussed previously, the focus here is on the problem of the southern bourgeoisie. The new bourgeois class which came into existence in the South in the decades just before 1860 was in its outlook more closely wedded to the conservatism of the landed aristocracy than to the independent initiative and propensity for risk characteristic of the entrepreneurial spirit, tendencies which have continued to mark the southern bourgeoisie until this day. This class has thus preferred investment in sectors producing rapid, short-term gains (in particular, construction and real-estate speculation) to more productive, but riskier, uses of its capital. As a result, productive investments in the South have been disproportionately the result of external, predominantly public intervention. Even those firms that are formally part of the private sector are in most cases dependent for their survival upon some form of political support; thus, a truly private sector is virtually nonexistent.

What, then, has been the nature of the linkage between the DC and local en-

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trepreneurs? Lacking the resources for autonomous development, the southern economy has become increasingly dependent upon public intervention, in the form both of direct public investment and of various programs of incentives and subsidies for private investors. In each case, the intermediary role of the local political elite has been a central factor. This does not necessarily imply the absence of entrepreneurship in the South, but rather the weakness of an entrepreneurial class sufficiently autonomous to bargain on an equal basis with political elites. In the last analysis, the entrepreneurial function in the South has been assumed by the politician, who controls the access to all forms of public resources and who thereby holds the power to determine the success or failure of the individual economic actor. As a result, a solid bond of reciprocal obligation is formed between the political intermediary and the entrepreneur, a confluence of interests having more to do with political power than with economic development. "The criterion of maximization," notes Alessandro Pizzorno, "is not the productive efficiency of the credit conceded, but rather the solidity of the bond of gratitude established and the type of service which will be made available in return. . . . Economic credit, that is, generates a political debt."[12]

This interaction further reinforces the marginal nature of the local economy. Empirical studies have shown that political contacts are proportionately stronger for the marginal firm which, because of its weakness, is less able to resist pressures to provide patronage jobs in return for the requests for special credit, subsidies, tax reductions, and building licenses that are essential to its survival.[13] As a result of such exchanges, the small firm with the requisite political contacts is protected and sustained, but at a substantial cost to the economy as a whole, because of the sacrifice of criteria of economic rationality and profitability in the distribution of benefits. Thus, where the goal of economic development has been subordinated to the interests of local power, political intervention, rather than breaking the vicious circle of underdevelopment, serves instead to reinforce it. "The goals of development end up by coinciding with the creation of an industrial apparatus capable of absorbing labor, but in no way efficient and rational with regard to production," observes Raimondo Catanzaro. "In sum, the allocation of public funds serves latent functions of a welfare nature as well as sustaining local entrepreneurial groups for political ends, rather than promoting economic development."[14] The result is a self-perpetuating process by which marginality, and with it the bases of clientelist power, are continually re-created.

Public intervention in the southern economy has taken three general forms, which correspond to three distinct types of linkages between the Christian

[12] Alessandro Pizzorno, "I ceti medi nei meccanismi del consenso" [The middle classes in the mechanisms of consensus] in *Il caso Italiano* [The Italian case], eds. Fabio Luca Cavazza and Stephen Graubard (Milan: Garzanti, 1974), 2: 330.

[13] See S. Bonazzi, A. Bagnasco, and S. Casillo, *Industria e potere in una provincia meridionale* [Industry and power in a southern province] (Turin: L'impresa edizioni, 1972), chap. 13.

[14] Raimondo Catanzaro, "Potere e politica locale in Italia" [Power and local politics in Italy] *Quaderni di Sociologia* 24 (October–December 1975): 291–92.

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Democratic party and the local entrepreneurial class: direct public spending by national and regional governments in the form of incentives, subsidies, and special industrial salvage programs, on the one hand, and favoritism and corruption in awarding highly lucrative public works contracts and profitable concessions let out by city governments for certain public services, on the other; control of access to credit, both public and private, through special publicly financed programs of low-cost credit and through DC intermediation with commercial banks and credit institutions, the majority of which are controlled by party representatives; and the discretionary implementation of the "powers of licensing and interdiction" of local government, particularly in the areas of urban planning, the issuance of construction licenses, and the enforcement of zoning and building codes.[15]

The discretionary use of regulatory powers of local government assumes particular importance in a city such as Palermo where the local entrepreneurial class is made up predominantly of building contractors. The process of postwar urban development in Palermo has been one of chaotic, unregulated expansion in which the logic of speculation has reigned supreme. One of the outstanding characteristics of local politics in Palermo during the building boom from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s was the overt collusion between the competent organs of the DC-controlled city administration and powerful speculative interests, in this case represented disproportionately by the mafia.[16] As a result, the city's once rich agricultural hinterland has almost been totally submerged under endless waves of high-rise towers, an entire "new city" constructed in abeyance of any public control and of even minimal standards of public service provision. Palermo has become a national symbol of the ravages of uncontrolled speculative development, but in the meantime immense fortunes, both economic and political, have been accumulated.

This privileging of speculative interests, which initially took the form of episodic operations of favoritism on the part of the old DC notables—undertaken without any broader strategic vision and limited to a restricted social elite—was transformed by the 1960s into a comprehensive strategy of urban expansion and of DC power, managed directly from key posts of power within the city administration. In one way or another, almost every social and economic group in the city (including not only the working class proper and the thousands of urban poor who found employment in construction, but the leftist building-trades unions as well) found that it had something to gain from the tumultuous

[15] The phrase is Pizzorno's, from "I ceti medi nei meccanismi del consenso," p. 329.

[16] For a detailed discussion of the process of postwar urban expansion in Palermo and the collusion between the city administration and the mafia, see Judith Chubb, "The Organization of Consensus in a Large Southern Italian City" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978), pp. 231–70. Extensive documentation of this question can be found in the reports of the Antimafia Commission of the Italian Parliament, *Testo integrale della relazione della commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia* [Full text of the report of the parliamentary commission of inquiry on the phenomenon of the mafia], 3 vols. (Rome: Cooperativa Scrittori, 1973).

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expansion which completely transformed the face of the city in the space of a decade.

While alike in their generation of consensus on the basis of short-term material benefits, the three types of patronage linking the DC to the local entrepreneurial class imply very different relationships between the dominant political party and public resources. While the distribution of public funds in the form of subsidies and contracts constitutes a direct and substantial government expenditure, thereby conforming to the traditional view of machine politics squandering public resources for political ends, the control of access to credit, while confirming the critical intermediary role of the party, concerns resources that emanate only in part from governmental sources. Finally, the discretionary use of the regulatory powers of local government provides a striking example of the creation of a solid clientelist bond between a critical sector of the local entrepreneurial class and the Christian Democratic party that depends only in small part on any direct expenditure of public funds and therefore constitutes only a minimal drain on party or public treasuries. Yet it is precisely this final category that has provided one of the most solid pillars of DC power in Palermo over the past twenty years.

As this example demonstrates, city governments possess a wide range of powers which, while conferring significant economic advantages or disadvantages, do not impose any *monetary* costs on the bestower. In contrast to studies that emphasize the inherently inflationary, and hence eventually self-defeating, characteristics of a political system dependent for support on short-term material incentives, this evidence shows instead how, through manipulation of the substantial regulatory powers of local government, a high level of clientelist support can be maintained over an extended period of time, and in a context of severe resource constraints, without such inflationary consequences. Naturally the long-term social costs of such a policy—the sacrifice of broader social interests and policies to immediate individual benefits—are very high, but this is not a constraint imposed by the exhaustion of available public resources through patronage spending, nor does it necessarily imply the imminent collapse of the DC machine. In conclusion, it can be argued that the primary linkage between the DC and the local entrepreneurial class has not been the outright expenditure of public resources for political ends, but rather the critical intermediary role of the party as an obligatory middleman between the individual entrepreneur and a variety of benefits, only a portion of which imply a direct outlay of a monetary nature.

The Traditional Middle Classes and the Urban Poor

A third pillar of DC power in Palermo is made up of the traditional middle classes (small shopkeepers and artisans) and the urban poor. These two groups, though analytically distinct, will be considered together because the economy of the center-city slums revolves around small-scale commercial and artisanal ac-

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tivity and because, in the absence of alternative employment possibilities, many of the urban poor find precarious employment in small shops, street vending, and petty services. Probably the most fascinating aspect of the DC machine in Palermo is its solid electoral base in the poorest neighborhoods of the city, where, given the incredible poverty, the crumbling housing, overcrowding, and sanitary and health conditions reminiscent of Third World cities, one might expect instead substantial support for the Left. Unlike public employees and industrialists, the traditional middle classes and the urban poor have received remarkably few material benefits from the machine; yet, since the collapse of the Monarchist Right in the late 1950s, they have provided a stable reservoir of votes for local DC notables.

Why, then, do the city's low-income residents support the DC machine? In the case of the traditional middle classes (including street vendors and hawkers), the regulatory and police powers of local government form the basis of DC consensus. Within the city government the department responsible for the distribution of commercial and vending licenses has traditionally constituted a major center of clientelist power and thus an important object of dispute among ambitious DC politicians. Equally important, however, and particularly fascinating as an illustration of the concrete ways in which the patronage bond is forged, is the exercise, or better yet, the *nonexercise* of the surveillance and enforcement powers of the city police. By what means, one might ask, can an ordinary city policeman become a powerful political figure? On closer examination, it becomes clear that, in the course of his daily rounds, there are literally thousands of ways in which a vigilant police officer can either perform a favor or make life miserable for a shopkeeper or street vendor.

> If a policeman wants to be fussy, he can ruin a shopkeeper. He can slap him with a fine of 30,000 or 40,000 lire if he lowers his grill five minutes after the official closing time. He can levy another 50,000 lire fine if the price tag has fallen off the crate of oranges. And if the shopkeeper is very careful and commits neither of these infractions, the policeman always has an ace up his sleeve: he need only express a doubt as to the sanitary conditions of the shop and its merchandise, and the merchant will never reemerge from the troubles which will beset him—controls, inspections, months of closing, endless expenses.[17]

Each of the above examples is, in and of itself, a relatively trivial matter—but one which can take on vital importance for the individual shopkeeper should the policeman decide to enforce the letter of the law. In practice the power of the policeman derives less from the controls he enforces than from those he *omits* (failing to denounce, for example, an unauthorized shop or vendor, of which there are thousands in Palermo), in return for an immediate payoff or, more often, a debt of gratitude that will be repaid on a future, preferably electoral, occasion. One reason such a system of control over the individual shopkeeper or

[17] Giuseppe Sottile, "Ecco come un vigile può essere trasformato in grande elettore" [How a policeman can be transformed into a wardheeler], *L'Ora*, 13 November 1972.

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artisan has been so effective is that a large proportion of these persons—especially at the level of neighborhood food shops, market stalls, and street vendors—themselves come from the ranks of the urban poor. Their ignorance of the law is compounded by an inbred fear of and deference toward the powerful, particularly if they wear a uniform. An able administrator can thus transform a routine bureaucratic procedure into a personal favor, just as the policeman can exploit the slightest infraction of the law, real or imagined, to create a network of personal obligations that he can then use to bargain with the holders of local power.

For the urban poor in general, however, the most important linkage mechanism is the role of bureaucratic intermediation performed by the party. To some extent this is an extension of the practice of using public offices for the purpose of petty clientelism. Rather than use its power to influence the distribution of public funds or the implementation of certain regulatory codes, however, the party intervenes in the processes of ordinary administration. This is by its nature a much more continuous relationship than that produced by the dispensation of subsidies or "favors" just prior to elections, which is the aspect of patronage politics among the poor most often pointed to in studies of political machines. The possibility of such intervention in normal bureaucratic procedures for political ends can be explained by the failure of the Weberian ideal of impartial bureaucracy to take root in southern Italy; in contrast to Weber's rational, impartial model of bureaucratic conduct, all relationships are highly personalized and politicized, even those regarding the most trivial administrative procedures. As a result, the citizen's legal right is transformed into a personal favor and used as an instrument of pressure to obtain votes.

One reason this system functions so well is that the bureaucracy in Italy, and particularly in the South, is such an inefficient, slow-moving apparatus, bogged down in endless red tape, that it is often indeed only by the personal intervention of an influential intermediary that one can obtain any immediate result. Thus, what strikes the observer as a pathological dysfunction of the bureaucracy serves in effect as a highly efficacious instrument for generating and maintaining political support. For practically every necessity of day-to-day life—the innumerable documents required for even the most trivial public act in Italy; eligibility for a welfare benefit, pension, or family allowance; admission of a family member to a day-care center, hospital, or other public institution; application for public housing or a public-sector job—the individual citizen must confront an impersonal and unresponsive bureaucracy. In such a situation ordinary citizens, and in particular the poor, disadvantaged by their illiteracy and lack of experience in dealing with bureaucratic institutions, are compelled to seek assistance from a higher-status "patron" who can intervene directly on their behalf. In a system where the functioning of the public bureaucracy has been so entirely subordinated to the logic of personal political gain, the individual simply has no alternative but to seek a particularistic solution to his problems. Thus, once again, consensus is rooted in the critical intermediary role of the party or the individual politician in every transaction between the citizen and the state.

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A final type of linkage between the DC and its electorate in the low-income neighborhoods of the city depends upon a different kind of intermediary network within each neighborhood, one which functions independently of any direct personal relationship between the party or candidate and the individual voter. The superficial version of such linkage mechanisms can be seen in the case of petty electoral corruption, where votes are essentially sold to the highest bidder, without the slightest regard for the candidate, his party, or his political positions; because of the system of preference voting in Italian elections, many people in fact vote only for a number, with no idea of the actual person to whom it corresponds. The real networks of electoral influence within these neighborhoods, however, are of a quite different nature: they are based on the ties linking a person of influence within a given neighborhood—the local *capomafia* (mafia boss), the parish priest, a doctor, or prominent merchant—to a particular party or candidate. The nature of the bond—friendship, *clientela*, or an outright exchange of cash—varies according to the case. What is important is that the local "boss" is capable of mobilizing blocks of votes through his personal influence alone, an influence which may be based equally on respect or fear, without any exchange of benefits between the candidate and the individual voter. These votes, which depend entirely on the prestige of the local influence broker, are thus independent not only of the individual candidate and the party but also of all the traditional patronage levers of local power.

A critical factor for understanding the nature of political behavior in the low-income neighborhoods of Palermo is the extreme social and economic fragmentation of these neighborhoods and the absence of any associative structures that could serve as poles of aggregation for the population. This fragmentation stems above all from the lack of stable employment among the urban poor. With the disintegration of the traditional economy of the old city, the social and cultural fabric associated with it largely disappeared as well, leaving behind entire neighborhoods cut off from the mainstream of the city's economic life and relegated to abandonment and decay, both physical and moral. Those economic activities that remain are dispersed in thousands of individual expedients for day-to-day survival. The absence of centers of employment within these neighborhoods or of any form of occupational aggregation outside them (for example, stable factory employment) deprives the residents not only of any sense of collective economic interests but also of one of the primary aggregative structures through which political and other organizations can gain access to a mass base.

In the absence of alternative structures to aggregate and mobilize collective interests, each individual seeks to resolve his own problems through whatever personal channels are open to him. People are convinced, on the basis less of cultural conditioning than of direct experience, that nothing can be obtained from the existing power structure without direct personal intervention by an influential patron. Because there are no structures for collective organization, there is no sense of collective efficacy. Even in those collective organizations that do exist, for example, unions, the cohesion of the membership in many

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cases is due less to the ideology or programmatic goals of the organization than to a series of parallel individual ties to the leader, who carries this personal following with him even if he changes party or union organization.

Finally, while the essence of the clientelist bond is the direct personal relationship with a more powerful or prestigious figure, the maintenance of this relationship is not necessarily contingent upon continual repetition of specific acts of material exchange. Although success in obtaining one's goals depends on the individual patron-client tie, the personal bond which is created may ultimately transcend the specific act of exchange. It has been argued that the critical element for understanding the strength of clientelism, at least in the southern Italian context, is less the concrete exchange relationship than this more generalized personal bond that underlies it.[18] The relationship assumes a value in and of itself, independent of any specific act of exchange which, while serving to reinforce it, is not essential to the survival of the relationship. In this view, the crucial factor is rather that of access—that is, it is less the immediate benefit received that maintains the relationship than the constant anticipation of possible future favors as a result of the personal tie to an individual in a position of power. Such an analysis, by pointing to the ability of the clientelist relationship to endure over time without continual reinforcement by concrete acts of exchange, underlines once again the importance of the element of hope in sustaining a clientelist system of power in a context of limited resource availability.

Conclusion

The image that emerges from the preceding discussion is one of a stagnant, immobile political system, in which political control is so complete as to make stimulation of change from within almost impossible. Such a conclusion, pessimistic though it may be, is the only one possible on the basis of the evidence presented here and any reasonable projection of developments in national politics in the foreseeable future. The justification for such a conclusion is to be found in the particular strengths of clientelism as an instrument of political mobilization and in its relationship to fundamental economic and social structural variables.

The strength of the machine as an organizer of consensus lies above all in its incentive structure which, because of the direct particularistic bond linking the machine to its electorate, maximizes the incentive to individual participation. Essential to discussion of the incentive structure of the machine is the question of the resource base required to support clientelist systems of power. Many studies have argued that, because its support is based on the distribution of short-term material benefits, such a political system requires access to an expanding resource base in order to sustain its power over time. These inevitable inflationary tendencies are seen as posing an inherent limit to the scope and

[18] This argument was made by Alessandro Pizzorno in a private conversation with the author.

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duration of systems of political support based on clientelist incentives, a limit to be found either in the restricted resource base of the economy (the case in most developing countries) or in the impact of economic crisis. In the Italian case, proponents of this argument sustain that, while until the present a flow of resources from the state has compensated for the severe resource constraints of the southern economy, the current economic crisis, by shrinking the resource base available for patronage politics, will progressively undermine the local political machines which dominate much of the South.

The evidence presented here with regard to the bases of support for the Christian Democratic party in Palermo demonstrates that such an analysis is only partially valid. Because of the severe resource constraints under which local government operates and the broad-based consensus generated by the DC, Palermo can be viewed as a kind of test case for a theory of clientelism that links sustained support to an expanding resource base. That there has been a tremendous expenditure of public resources for patronage purposes in Palermo cannot be denied. The beneficiaries of this patronage spending, which has drained resources that might otherwise have been invested in public services or economic development projects, have been above all the white-collar middle classes and certain sectors of the local entrepreneurial class, the latter through public contracts, publicly guaranteed low-cost credit, and regional programs of industrial salvage. By contrast, the limitations of the resource argument become manifest when considering the cases of building contractors, the traditional middle classes, and the urban poor. Each of these groups has constituted a major pillar of DC power in Palermo and yet, in terms of direct patronage spending, has received practically nothing.

The key to the strength and durability of the DC machine in Palermo lies in the nature of the linkages between the DC and these latter groups. Patronage mechanisms like the issuing of construction and commercial licenses, variations to the city plan, the wide range of police powers of local government, and bureaucratic intervention on behalf of the urban poor are central to the maintenance of Christian Democratic power, but, in terms of direct public spending, cost nothing. Looked at from this perspective, it is clear that the essence of DC power lies not in the quantity of resources that it is able to distribute, but rather in its monopoly hold on all resources, whatever their level, and in its control over all the critical interstices of society—political, economic, and social—so that the party becomes an obligatory intermediary in all transactions between the individual and public power. Given such a monopoly of resources in the hands of the dominant party, combined with the important nonmonetary sources of clientelist support—and the enduring nature of the patron-client bond—not only is an expanding resource base not essential to the survival of a political machine, but economic crisis alone is not a sufficient condition for the disintegration of a system of political support based on clientelist bonds. In fact, in the short term at any rate, just the opposite may be the case; as economic crisis shrinks even further the already restricted resource base of

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the society, the role of the party as the privileged channel of access to the few remaining resources may actually be enhanced.

A second crucial element explaining the solidity of DC power in Palermo, one which distinguishes it from the experience of big-city machines in the United States, is the relationship between local and national power. As those who emphasize the importance of resource transfers from the center to the periphery in maintaining local machines rightly point out, the monopoly of power in the hands of the Christian Democratic party at both the national and the local level has provided the holders of local power with privileged access to the resources of the state. A second critical factor in this regard is the logic of factional politics *within* the DC. Although the sources of electoral support for the machine in Palermo are primarily local, the domination of the party organization and of all levers of local power by a single faction within the party would not be possible without the protection of the local bosses by the national party leadership. This protection continues, despite national scandals involving prominent DC personalities in Palermo, because of the logic of intraparty factional struggle. So long as the votes that local bosses can carry to the national congress are critical to the success of their respective "patrons" within the national leadership, meaningful change from within the DC at the local level is unlikely.

In the final analysis, however, the perpetuation of a clientelist system of power in Palermo is dependent upon national power and policy in an even more fundamental way. The key variable underlying DC power in Palermo is the economic structure of the city and the social fragmentation associated with it, which impede the aggregation of political demand and the organization of collective interests necessary for the emergence of an alternative model of political behavior. The monopolization of economic resources in the hands of the DC is possible because of the absence of an autonomous resource base at the local level and the consequent dependence of the local economy on the resources of the state. Once this monopoly exists, however, the power of the party rests on the manipulation of *scarcity*, on maintaining large numbers of people in competition for scarce resources, all of which are channeled through the party. In such a situation, there is little incentive on the part of the party to create new jobs; it is in fact economic development rather than economic crisis that presents the greater threat to such a clientelist regime, since it offers the possibility of the creation of alternative sources of economic goods that could eventually elude strict political control, as well as the creation of an industrial working class which, even if subject to clientelist control in the short run, provides a potential focus for alternative models of political aggregation and mobilization. While the possibility for a clientelist model of politics to take root at the end of the war was clearly closely related to a preexisting state of underdevelopment, the situation since then can be described as one of a mutually reinforcing bond between the structure of political power and the economic base upon which it rests—that is, through its political control the DC has succeeded in perpetuating the very conditions of resource shortage and social dis-

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aggregation upon which the survival of the system of power which it has created depends. Thus, far from being a transitional form of political organization, a mass-based clientelist party, once having established control over key economic resources, can block precisely that process of economic development that is seen as bringing about its eventual demise, thereby perpetuating the structural bases of its own power.

What, then, are the possibilities for political change in a situation such as that of Palermo? Having minimized the probability of change from within the DC, the only alternative would appear to be the Left. The critical issue here is what kinds of incentives the Left has to offer as an alternative to the existing structure of power. On the one hand, it has no access to alternative resources, either public or private, to offer in place of those controlled by the DC machine. On the other hand, as the experience of Communist administration in Naples since 1975 clearly demonstrates, even should the Left succeed in gaining power at the local level, the fundamental structural constraints underlying the system of DC power in the South cannot be changed through control of local levers of power alone.[19] If the critical variables determining the shape of the economy and thereby of politics are outside local control, then the only way left to effect change is through external intervention to transform the basic structural variables. This means concretely, in the Italian context, a serious national commitment to the economic development of the South. Although not necessarily sufficient in and of itself, economic development is an essential precondition for political change, because only through stimulation of a process of autonomous development will it be possible to create alternatives to the existing resource monopoly of the DC. The success of such a policy, however, clearly depends on changes in the structure of power at the national level, in terms both of the DC monopoly over the critical levers of state power and of factional politics within the DC. So long as the DC continues to control the major centers of state economic power and so long as national faction chiefs continue to rely upon the votes provided by local machine bosses to retain their power, even economic crisis is unlikely to challenge seriously the bases of clientelist power in southern Italy.*

[19] For an indepth analysis of the experience of the Communist administration in Naples since 1975, see Judith Chubb, "Naples Under the Left: The Limits of Local Change," *Comparative Politics* (October 1980): 53–78.

* A version of this article was first presented at the Conference on Clientelism and Development, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and held in Bellagio, Italy, 7–11 August 1978.

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Legislatures and the Survival of Political Systems: A Review Article

JEFFREY OBLER

In most nations, legislators do not legislate. Executives legislate. True, many legislators have a formal role in lawmaking and many continue to debate, review, delay, and legitimize policies. But when it comes to initiating and enacting policies that regulate public behavior and allocate scarce resources, few legislators have much independent authority. Executives have usurped this authority by various means: imposing party discipline; constitutional tinkering; intimidation; or, in the most extreme cases, dismantling the legislature. Thus if they exist at all, legislatures more often than not merely acquiesce to the wishes of one type of executive or another.

Are legislatures that have so little say over policymaking politically trivial? And, if so, why should anyone pay much attention to them? While these queries do not faze students of American politics who are secure in their knowledge that the United States Congress and American state legislatures are the most notable exceptions to the general rule of legislatures' modest influence, they are unsettling to those political scientists who have decided to devote much of their professional lives to the study of comparative legislatures—to *all* legislatures in every corner of the globe. To justify their considerable efforts and to command their colleagues' respect, these political scientists are anxious to disprove the charge that legislatures are superfluous. And this is just what Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel Patterson, Joel Smith and Lloyd Musolf, and (to a lesser extent) Michael Mezey set out to do.[1] They do not, however, seriously

[1] Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1979); Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf, eds., *Legislatures in Development:*

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dispute the claim that, with a few important exceptions, legislators play at most a peripheral part in lawmaking. Instead, they insist, first, that detractors mistakenly assume that lawmaking is the most important activity legislatures perform and, second, that legislatures deserve attention because they carry out activities that are as, if not more, significant than lawmaking. According to Smith and Musolf: "There is much truth in the view that legislatures, particularly in developing countries, have little real power over decision making. It is also true, however, that judgments about the potency of legislatures tend to center on their decision-making function at the expense of others they might have."[2]

Determined to convince the skeptics that the nonlawmaking activities of legislatures are vital, the authors, along with Loewenberg and Patterson and to a lesser degree Mezey, adopt what they believe is an appropriate theoretical strategy: First, they shift the study of legislatures from the context of allocative theory, where the central issue is how political systems allocate scarce resources, to the context of systems analysis, where the principal preoccupation is how political systems persist. Second, they specify that certain political activities affect whether political systems (or nations) persist. And, finally, they assert that legislatures perform some of these activities.

This strategy has certain apparent advantages. It conveniently reduces the theoretical relevance of policymaking, the area over which most legislatures are notoriously weak. It also gives to all legislatures a uniform political relevance, for concern with how political systems survive is universal. And if legislatures do, indeed, carry out these activities, this strategy also demonstrates unequivocally that legislatures are significant, for any institution that contributes to the very survival of a political system is self-evidently important.

As it is applied by Loewenberg and Patterson, this amalgamation of systems and functional analysis is intended not so much to explain why legislatures do what they do, but rather to establish that what legislatures do is important. In fact, the theme of their book is "that legislatures have a profound effect on their political environments."[3] Legislatures make their presence felt, so Loewenberg and Patterson tell us, by managing conflict, recruiting leaders, and linking people to government. Far more exotic than lawmaking, these "are activities without which government would be impossible. In this sense these activities are indispensable for all political systems."[4] And for most of their book they describe, with obvious affection for their subject and equally obvious impatience for those who do not share this affection, how the legislatures of the United States, Great Britain, the German Federal Republic, and Kenya perform these indispensable tasks.

Smith and Musolf, in introducing a set of excellent essays on legislatures in

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Dynamics of Change in New and Old States (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979); and Michael L. Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979).

[2] Smith and Musolf, *Legislatures in Development*, p. 32.

[3] Loewenberg and Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures*, p. 291.

[4] Ibid., pp. 55-56.

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developing societies, spell out the connection between development and national survival. The difference, for them, is subtle, "for in a new state with a crushingly poor economy and low standard of living, mere survival may be construed as development."[5] They contend that legislatures contribute to national survival, and thus to development as well, by, among other things, resolving conflict, establishing national identities, and articulating interests.

Mezey is the most catholic in outlook, considering how legislatures operate in rich and poor nations, in democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes. He, like the others, describes how legislatures help maintain political systems. Yet he is the least wedded to the strategy outlined above: along with the "system maintenance" model, he examines the "policymaking" and "representation" models of legislatures. Nevertheless, systems analysis permeates and shapes his entire effort; representation, for example, is viewed as theoretically interesting primarily because it generates support for legislatures and political regimes.

Functionalism Misused

With considerable conceptual creativity, Loewenberg and Patterson and Mezey draw on an impressive array of secondary sources to present a wealth of useful information about legislatures. And the essays brought together in the Smith and Musolf volume are consistently thoughtful and informative. Yet, sadly, despite their prodigious efforts, skeptics are not likely to become believers on the basis of the case these authors make for legislatures. Their attempt to rescue the study of comparative legislatures from intellectual oblivion is not especially successful. The fundamental problem, it seems, is that as an instrument to establish the importance of a given political structure, the theoretical approach they use—functional and systems analysis—is not as suitable as they seem to think it is. In fact, the ostensible advantage of this approach—the neglect of allocative issues in favor of the universally significant issue of system survival—may be a liability.

For one thing, it is simply so difficult to demonstrate the functional significance of a particular institution. If legislatures are important because they perform activities (functions) that affect the capacity of nations or political systems to survive, one would expect to see systems or nations collapse or at least to notice signs of disarray if legislatures were abolished or stripped of their responsibilities. However, this is not the case. Victor LeVine, for example, describes with chilling detachment how Francophone African states survive more or less unscathed even after their legislatures had been eliminated.[6] One reason for this may be that legislative activities—conflict management, recruitment, and linking people to government—are simply not indispensable. Another reason, one that the authors under review rightly endorse, is that in-

[5] Smith and Musolf, *Legislatures in Development*, p. 30.

[6] Victor T. LeVine, "Parliaments in Francophone Africa: Some Lessons from the Decolonization Process," in *Legislatures in Development*, Smith and Musolf, pp. 125–54.

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stitutions other than legislatures—political parties, bureaucracies, the media—carry out these allegedly indispensable functions. In the graceless language of functional analysis, there are functional equivalents to the legislative process. In the light of the biological analogy so popular with functionalists, the legislature, like the heart, performs indispensable functions for the system, but, like the appendix, it can be removed without destroying the system. The legislature that carries out indispensable functions is thus dispensable. And since political systems do survive without their legislatures, the one absolutely convincing empirical test to show that legislatures are significant is unavailable.

Nevertheless, this should not stop anyone from showing that as *one* of *several* institutions fulfilling vital functions, the legislature still makes a key contribution to political systems. Yet even this more modest goal is elusive. Thus one should appreciate at the outset that the connection between what legislators do from day to day (for example, debate laws, consult with constituents, campaign for support) and the survival of political systems is not intuitively obvious. On the contrary, this connection is obscure and distant; and therefore to make this connection takes an especially meticulous conceptual and empirical analysis of how legislative activities satisfy the essential needs of political systems. Loewenberg and Patterson fail to make this connection because they define legislative functions so broadly, presumably to encompass as many legislatures as possible, that it is no longer clear how these functions actually serve systems' needs, and because in discussing these functions, they do no more than describe rather conventional legislative activities without carefully explaining how these activities are related to the persistence of political systems.

For example, Loewenberg and Patterson contend that legislatures manage conflict, one of the activities indispensable to all political systems, when they "alter the terms of that conflict" by making or legitimizing laws and policies.[7] "Laws establish enforceable standards of behavior. They therefore prevent some behavioral manifestations of political conflict."[8] Policies that do not assume the form of laws "regulate conflict by authoritatively deciding disputed issues in a variety of ways."[9] Their conception of this activity is sweeping. In altering conflict, they say, legislatures not only alleviate but also exacerbate social tensions, not only blur but also accentuate social divisions. For them, any impact legislatures have on conflict, whether benign or malevolent, constitutes conflict management. This loose conception conveniently permits the claim that legislatures from highly diverse settings all perform this function.

The inclusiveness of the term conflict management, albeit convenient, promotes confusion. They define "manage" in a way that does not conform to usual, everyday usage. To manage is to regulate, control, handle, direct, or administer; merely to alter or affect is not to manage. Terms of conflict may be

[7] Loewenberg and Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures*, p. 290.
[8] Ibid., p. 58.
[9] Ibid., p. 63.

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changed through disruption; conflict is not managed through disruption. Shoplifters may alter but do not manage the operation of stores. Protesters may alter but do not manage conflict when they heave buckets of paint onto the floor of the House of Commons.

Loewenberg and Patterson's conception of conflict management is peculiar and misleading; it mistakenly subsumes "to manage" and "to mismanage" conflict. To manage conflict is to resolve and limit conflict, and it is usually functional; to mismanage conflict, whether out of ineptness or maliciousness, is to make it more difficult to resolve and limit conflict, and it is usually dysfunctional. Failing to distinguish between manage and mismanage, the authors become ensnared in an unfortunate contradiction: they maintain that activities that may be dysfunctional are indispensable to all political systems. Conflict management, as they define it, is *not* indispensable. It is not true, as they imply, that "government would be impossible" unless the pattern of conflict were changed, even if this change exacerbated tensions between rival interests; or that political systems could not exist unless legislatures established enforceable standards and decided disputes, even if these standards and decisions were so unpopular that they produced angry reactions.

This careless application of functional theory does not, however, refute the proposition, so central to their book, that legislatures *do* matter. Legislatures may have a major bearing on political events whether they manage or mismanage conflict, whether they provoke order or disorder. Thus it is with considerable anticipation that one approaches the chapter on "Conflict Management" to discover how all this managing and mismanaging actually takes place. But anticipation quickly yields to disappointment, for, strangely enough, this chapter says practically nothing about how legislatures carry out this activity. "Conflict Management," in fact, is no more than an exotic title for a chapter that presents a conventional, though solid and informative, treatment of lawmaking, covering such familiar ground as "The Legislative Agenda," "The Deliberative Process," and "Patterns of Decision Making."

Linkage, Loewenberg and Patterson claim, is another one of those activities without which governments could not exist. Linkage is a neologism that refers to how people are linked to their governments. It is not that much different than the more familiar notion of representation. Thus, according to Loewenberg and Patterson, people are linked to government when they elect legislators whose attributes are, at least in some respects, similar to their own, and who are responsive to their "political expectations."[10] If the authors truly intend to demonstrate the theoretical relevance of legislatures (and if, as they tell us, linkage is a vital function for all political systems), then one would expect them to describe carefully the dire consequences that would follow if legislators ignored citizens' demands, acted in their own and not the people's interests, were drawn from a narrow segment of society, or, more generally, simply failed to make the "link." Yet on these issues, Loewenberg and Patterson are almost entirely silent. Con-

[10] Ibid., p. 168.

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sider their discussion of legislators' attributes. Data they present reveal, for example, that only 2 percent of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives and fewer than 1 percent of the members of the German Bundestag are manual workers, while 96 percent of House members and 91 percent of Bundestag members are professionals, managers, white-collar workers, or businessmen. These, and similar data, go almost unnoticed. There is no hint that Loewenberg and Patterson consider these legislatures as unrepresentative, or that overrepresentation of some occupational groups at the expense of others may be related to linkage, or that, under certain conditions, such overrepresentation may have a bearing on the ability of political systems to persist. Instead, with no direct allusion to the data, they urge readers not to expect too much. "Ultimately, it is impossible to mirror the diversity of millions of inhabitants in the composition of institutions having only hundreds of members."[11] And then they warn us that "if the degree of representation is perceived by the public to be unsatisfactory, the legitimacy of the institution may suffer."[12] But they say no more than this on a point that is so profoundly germane to the theoretical purpose of their analysis. The authors do not consider the conditions that might prompt dissatisfaction or how many people from what sectors of society must be dissatisfied before there are significant repercussions. Such treatment of "linkage" is no more than a routine discussion of representation decorated with superfluous theoretical trappings.

This is also true for their discussion of legislators' responsiveness. Loewenberg and Patterson do not consider whether legislators' failure to respond or to respond only to particular demands is related to system stability. Instead, they merely describe the multitude of ways in which legislators do respond. They define responsiveness so broadly that it is difficult to see how legislators could ever be unresponsive. Thus legislators who ignore local constituents may respond to a political party, to a particular social class, to an ethnic group, or to special interest groups. And those legislators who ignore everyone adopt the handy trustee role whereby they act solely according to their conscience. Insensitive to their constituents' demands for policy changes, legislators can still respond by offering services or symbolic rewards. Loewenberg and Patterson specify the conditions—electoral and constitutional provisions, party organization, social divisions—that may explain why legislators are responsive in different ways. But they do not even reflect on what would happen if legislators systematically ignored, for example, landless peasants. The authors never even raise the issue of unresponsiveness; indeed, for them, there is no objective standard by which to judge how responsive legislators are. Instead, "the test of how effectively legislatures link government to the people," note the authors, "is ultimately public satisfaction with legislative performance and public support for the legislative institution."[13] Yet

[11] Ibid., pp. 111–12.
[12] Ibid., p. 112.
[13] Ibid., p. 195.

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support for and satisfaction with legislatures, when analyzed in the final chapter, are related not to particular forms and levels of legislators' responsiveness but rather to the general performance of the political system (for example, support for the Bundestag has varied directly with German prosperity).

The defense of the legislature proferred by Loewenberg and Patterson is thus unconvincing. Yet even when a more serious attempt is made to use systems analysis to show how the legislature affects whether political systems continue, another, and more subtle, difficulty invariably surfaces. Systems analysis prompts two modes of investigation. On the one hand, an investigator may consider (and perhaps try to synthesize) the wide range of conditions that may explain why political systems persist or topple. This seems to be a sensible way to proceed. Students of comparative legislature usually do not pursue this reasonable course. Instead, they try to understand the destiny of political systems exclusively (or primarily) in terms of one condition—the legislative process. In other words, they try to show the relevance of a particular independent variable instead of trying to explain the dependent variable. This strategy is bankrupt, for it inevitably yields a truncated view of the enormously complex process whereby some political systems fade and eventually collapse. Moreover, for those who follow this mode of investigation, the temptation to exaggerate greatly the importance of the independent variable (the legislative process) is considerable.

Arturo Valenzuela and Alexander Wilde, in their fine study of the Chilean Congress, succumb to this temptation.[14] They argue that until the 1960s the Congress helped preserve Chilean democracy by eschewing ideological confrontation and global reforms, concentrating instead on satisfying its supporters through modest disbursements of public funds. The Congress, they explain, focused political attention on how specific issues could be resolved through logrolling and compromise, thereby establishing a norm of accommodation for the handling of minor issues that mitigated conflict over major issues and throttling the potentially debilitating ideological struggles that the national political parties were ready to wage over how to organize Chilean society. All this seems eminently plausible.

In explaining the demise of Chilean democracy, however, Valenzuela and Wilde overstate the Congress's significance. They relate how after becoming president in 1964, the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei set out to achieve economic growth and reforms, in part, by replacing the pragmatic, incremental policymaking of the Congress by more centralized, rational planning. Accordingly, Frei took from Congress much of its control over the budget. This move, Valenzuela and Wilde aver, had ominous consequences for Chilean democracy. Denied any real power over the public purse, the Congress "had no other choice than to be either an acquiescent body or a negative center of opposition" when it confronted Frei's successor, the Marxist Salvador Allende. With Congress so

[14] Arturo Valenzuela and Alexander Wilde, "Presidential Politics and the Decline of the Chilean Congress," in *Legislatures in Development*, Smith and Musolf, pp. 189–215.

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impotent, "politics moved outside of institutional channels—out of the hands of politicians—into the streets—and eventually into the hands of the military."[15] The unstated inference of this argument is that if the Congress had been able to retain some control over public policy, and particularly, the budget, Chilean democracy might not have given way to a military junta. This is eminently implausible. What the authors overlook is that the extension of executive at the expense of legislative authority was part of a more fundamental ideological shift from a tacit acceptance of a hierarchical economic and social order, embodied, in part, in the Congress's politics of "give and take," to a rejection of this order as expressed in Frei's and, more notably, Allende's demands for far-reaching social and economic change. The new socialist order envisioned by Allende threatened established socioeconomic interests and polarized Chilean politics. In the face of imminent and widespread collectivization and redistribution of capital and land, it is highly unlikely that the continued capacity of the Congress to award modest favors to its sundry followers would have placated either those who opposed or those who were eager to accelerate the implementation of Allende's socialist order. It is also highly unlikely that by conducting "business as usual" the Congress could have prevented Chilean politics from spilling into the streets. It is far more likely that the crippled Congress was a symptom rather than a cause of disorder. If the erosion of the Congress's authority had not been accompanied by a campaign to transform radically Chilean society, the outcome might have been quite different. Consider, for example, how after 1958 de Gaulle, like Frei and Allende, enlarged the power of the executive and restricted the once considerable authority of the legislature without provoking unrest or the collapse of the regime. The Fifth Republic survived, in part, because de Gaulle, unlike Frei or Allende, did not exploit his domination over the legislature to impose sweeping reforms. While de Gaulle did introduce an alternative conception of political authority, he did not seriously tamper with the basic patterns of French social and economic life.

Valenzuela and Wilde go astray perhaps because they compulsively place the legislature at the center of the political universe. They isolate the legislature from the political world of which it is a part. They assume that the legislature bends and shapes political events, not realizing that how the legislature is composed and how it operates mirror, in many respects, the basic characteristics of the political system it serves. They inflate its significance by attempting to explain the evolution of global political events primarily in terms of what it does or does not do. But what the legislature may or may not do is, at most, only one piece in a terribly intricate process whereby political systems change or, occasionally, fold. To focus on this piece and to ignore the others is to offer a misleading view of the legislature and, more generally, of the political world. Mezey, for one, has a better appreciation of legislatures' limitations: "Legislatures are essentially creatures of the political system in which they exist and while they can contribute much to that system, they are ordinarily incapable

[15] Ibid., p. 212.

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of transforming it—of creating integration out of disintegration, or legitimizing that which has no other claim to legitimacy, or mobilizing support for unpopular and oppressive policies."[16]

There is yet another reason why these authors' arguments are so unpersuasive. Relying so much on systems analysis to establish the political relevance of legislatures, Valenzuela and Wilde tend to set aside allocative politics. They remove legislatures from the struggle among competing socioeconomic interests for power, wealth, status, and security. Although this struggle and its outcome as defined by the way resources are actually distributed have a direct bearing on the stability of political systems, they are not an integral part of these authors' analyses of legislative politics. This is an unfortunate omission.

Mezey's treatment of how representation promotes support for legislatures underscores the implications of this omission. For Mezey, representation entails how legislators respond to demands. He distinguishes particularistic demands, that call for specific action to help a group or a few people, from generalized demands "that require government actions that can affect the nation as a whole."[17] He then states that mass publics are more likely than elites to make particularistic demands. While mass publics, he explains, readily seek concrete, immediate benefits from legislators, elites, as high-status people with less pressing needs, are not as interested in short-term, tangible gains. Indeed, elites, he claims, often do not want legislators to respond to the narrow demands of constituents and clients. He describes how technocrats in Chile, the military in Thailand, and the "urban-based media" in the Philippines have railed against their legislators for acceding to the pressure of special interest groups and thereby making rational, long-range policy planning more difficult. For Mezey, then, legislators (and especially those sitting in marginal and vulnerable legislatures) face the agonizing choice between alienating powerful elites by catering to narrow, specialized demands or alienating their constituents and clients by ignoring these demands. Mezey thus spells out how support for legislatures (and political regimes) may be related to how legislators choose to represent their followers.

While useful, this analysis is confusing. Mezey sees legislatures as instruments for processing demands without much regard for *whose* demands they process. Questions of whether and how legislatures represent class, religious, racial, and ethnic interests are only tangentially, and hence confusingly, addressed. His notion, for example, that high-status elites do not make specific demands because they are more concerned about long-term policy implications than short-term gains is simply absurd. Rich people are not shy about asking legislators for favors. He subsequently contradicts his position when he refers to studies that show that Latin American legislatures often have little public support because legislators are far more receptive to middle- and upper-class interests than to mass needs. The elite to which he refers apparently includes only nonlegislative public officials who make few specific demands not because they have more

[16] Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures*, p. 256.
[17] Ibid., p. 146.

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modest needs but rather because they are so often able to satisfy their needs through direct executive action.

Adhering so closely to systems analysis, Mezey leaves out so much from his discussion of representation. As a result, his analysis is oddly apolitical. What is most noticeable for its absence is any careful consideration of how representation molds public life and affects people's welfare. It is not clear, for example, who benefits when legislators respond to particularistic and general demands. Nor is it clear whether powerful economic, religious, or ethnic interests, who perhaps articulate their demands more forcefully, are able to use the legislature to extend and preserve their privileged position. Nor is it clear whether legislators preoccupied with particularistic demands, in fact, preclude long-range, national policymaking, and who in society would benefit if such policymaking would prevail. It is also unclear whether those people who are consistently neglected and abused by legislators become so disaffected and embittered that they turn to more radical and unconventional forms of political expression. It is unfortunate that in his treatment of representation, Mezey chooses to ignore such central issues.

Functionalism and Ideology

Given these drawbacks, one wonders why students of comparative legislatures opt for this strategy. Perhaps it serves an ideological purpose. Alvin Gouldner, among others, insists that functionalism is inherently conservative, not so much because it seeks to justify a particular established order—for example, capitalism—but rather because it supports all established orders, no matter what form they assume.[18] It defends, he says, all those who possess power, no matter who they may be, and opposes those who call for change. As it is used by Smith and Musolf, functionalism, as Gouldner opines, is fundamentally conservative. They look solely at how legislatures promote order, expressing no strong preference for what kind of order is sustained. While they readily concede that legislatures may not be able to create order where chaos prevails, the authors do not see legislatures as the source of disorder. Legislatures may be helpless, but they are rarely culpable. Mezey, too, is primarily concerned with how legislatures contribute to stability, though he does hint, in passing, that irresponsible and incompetent legislators may, occasionally, share the blame for the woes of unstable regimes. And in the final pages of his study he belatedly registers his support for representative government, a preference that is well concealed from the reader throughout his book.

To Robert Merton, functionalism is not necessarily conservative. He suggests that functionalists become apologists for the status quo when they assume that social structures perform *only* functions. But to make this assumption, Merton contends, is to compromise the logic of functional analysis, a logic that requires

[18] Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 331–33.

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one to recognize not only the functions of social structures but their dysfunctions as well. These dysfunctions, he points out, provoke social strain and stress, make political life more difficult, and may, in some instances, destroy established institutions; in short, dysfunctions precipitate change. Merton concludes that while functionalism can be (and often is) used in the service of one ideology or another, it is intrinsically neither conservative nor radical, but is instead ideologically neutral.[19] (Not convinced, Gouldner cynically wonders why functionalists do not label their theory "dysfunctionalism.")[20]

True to Merton's interpretation, Loewenberg and Patterson reveal no strong ideological biases in their functional analysis of legislatures. True, when they say that legislatures carry out functions for all political systems, they seem to be accepting the conservative ramifications of functionalism. However, this is not their intention. As noted above, their concept of functions subsumes dysfunctions. Thus when they refer to the functions of legislatures, they also include those activities that foment change. In fact, Loewenberg and Patterson stress how legislatures have been a force for political change, citing the English Parliament of the seventeenth century, the American Continental Congress, and colonial legislatures in the 1950s and 1960s.

Apparently no ideological passions inspire their fervent support for the simple proposition: *legislatures matter*. For them, it makes no difference why legislatures matter. Ignoring allocative theory, Loewenberg and Patterson do not even consider if legislatures are agents of prosperity or social and economic justice. While preoccupied with how legislatures affect the survival of political systems, they do not seem to care whether legislatures support or undermine political systems or what kinds of political systems they assist or jeopardize. Legislatures are not viewed as guardians of liberal democracy, or social democracy, or socialism, or, for that matter, any particular political order. They do not care what purpose legislatures serve, as long as they serve some purpose. Accordingly, in bringing their book to a close, they approvingly reiterate the words of Walter Bagehot, "A great and open council of considerable men cannot be placed in the middle of society without altering that society." Loewenberg and Patterson then conclude: "A century after this plain assertion that legislatures are bound to change their political environment, we can do no better than to echo his [Bagehot] confidence that when political leaders collectively deliberate on political issues in public, *that* they do so, *how* they do so, and *to what effect* they do so have profound consequences for the survival of political systems."[21] It is baffling that scholars who are ostensibly so committed to a value-free social science are at the same time so eager to show the value of a particular institution. As part of the political world, legislatures should not be

[19] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 91–104.

[20] Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis*, pp. 336–37.

[21] Loewenberg and Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures*, p. 304.

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ignored. But why—as Loewenberg and Patterson do—should anyone proselytize for them?

Ironically, it is their very single-minded determination to convince the world that legislatures as legislatures are significant that ultimately makes their case so unpersuasive. Their obsessive defense of an institution is self-defeating. So intent are Loewenberg and Patterson to bestow significance on *all* legislatures that they adopt the general theoretical approach of functional and systems analysis, which tends to highlight the doubtful and overlook the plausible. The simple fact is that only rarely does the fate of nations hinge on what legislatures do. Yet this is the theme around which they choose to organize their research. They grope for ways in which the legislative process affects the capacity of political systems to survive. And the links they find are, too often, tenuous and remote. Offering little compelling evidence, they ask us to accept, for example, that the simple act of lawmaking allows conflict to be managed, and this, in turn, allows systems to persist. By focusing so exclusively on such dubious connections, they neglect the more modest and tangible but nevertheless noteworthy products of the legislative process. They seem to forget that so much of political life has so little to do with whether political systems continue. Thus in particular settings, how legislators are elected and how they behave may have a direct bearing on the quality of democratic government. Those legislators that do make laws and policies may have a profound impact on the welfare of individuals independent of how they affect the welfare of the political system. In some nations, legislatures serve as a principal arena for the conflict between opposing ideological and socioeconomic interests. These issues of political life escape their attention. As a result, the legislature, which in some nations is the quintessentially political institution, becomes strangely apolitical as it is engulfed by the black box of systems analysis. This does not suggest that systems analysis is never a useful instrument for research; of course, it is especially pertinent in those instances when the issue of survival is obvious and salient. But to concentrate so narrowly on systems analysis is to sacrifice so much that merits attention. Furthermore, systems analysis obscures the fact that what makes legislatures interesting may depend to a considerable extent on the setting in which they operate. Theoretical approaches should be adapted to suit different settings.

Finally, it can be argued that "comparative legislatures" as a subfield will atrophy as long as its primary mission is to establish that legislatures have a substantial impact on political life. This mission is not likely to trigger much interest. The enthusiasm these authors have for their subject is not likely to become infectious. If we are to care about legislatures, we must do so for a reason; we must show that what legislatures do is tied to issues and values other than the survival of *any* political system, to issues and values about which people are deeply concerned. Indeed, many of the "topics" around which American political scientists have centered their research over the past thirty years have been related to conceptions of good government, or a good society, or the good life. The "end of ideology" controversy, for example, was inspired by competing

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views of Western politics: those who sought to document the demise of ideology insisted that Western democracies had successfully resolved the political and economic conflicts that had torn so many European societies apart before World War II, while those who tried to show that ideology was not dead believed that since much in Western societies remained undone, further change was essential. In different ways, such other topics as the value of responsible political parties, the appeal of pluralism, the legitimacy of dependency theory, the cultural bases of stable democracy, and even the importance of issue voting have been all embedded in values that concern a larger public. (Although these values are often obscured in subsequent research by conceptual and methodological tinkering and bickering, at least an inkling of why these issues are vital lingers.)

Thus one should study legislatures not to show that they have clout but to show how they affect, for example, the preservation of representative democracy, the promotion of social and economic reform, or the erosion of authoritarian rule. This requires students of legislatures to abandon their search for a "theory of the legislatures" or a general theory that will account for what all legislatures do. Instead, they should place the study of legislatures at the heart of more traditional and conventional political concerns.

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Book Reviews

Why the Poor Get Richer and the Rich Slow Down *by W. W. Rostow. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1980. 376 pp. $19.95.*

Why do the poor get rich and the rich slow down? Answer: It is easier to adopt existing technical processes than to invent new technical processes. What is not answered is why this seems to be true for some countries—Korea and Japan—and not for other countries, such as India. Nor do we know that the Japanese and Germans will slow down when they catch up to U.S. productivity levels. In many industries where they now exceed U.S. productivity levels, they do not yet seem to have slowed down.

But the main focus of this book is not on the question posed by the title. Instead the book is basically an argument that the static equilibrium theories of economics need to be replaced by dynamic growth theories where technical change is an endogenous factor. On the defects of static equilibrium theory the author would get no arguments from me. The difficult problem, however, is in constructing the alternative superior dynamic growth theory.

Consider the problem of induced technical progress. In one of the essays that make up this book, the author argues that the United States is on the edge of a period of high economic growth because the increase in energy prices will lead to extensive induced technical progress and investment in alternative forms of energy. But is this the case? Should firms direct their research to focus on saving diamonds rather than sand simply because diamonds cost more than sand? The answer is no. A dollar saved is a dollar saved regardless of whether it results from using less diamond-cutting tools or less sand. Therefore the research director should be instructed to look for new processes to cut the costs of production but should not focus his attention on any one factor of production simply because it is expensive.

As imported oil becomes more expensive the United States will certainly invest more in domestic sources of energy, but it may not be accompanied by big technical breakthroughs. And the extra investment in alternative forms of energy may simply reduce the investment in other areas of the economy, in which case the net result will be a shift in investment, but not a spurt in aggregate growth.

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The chapters on the impact of relative prices on the absolute price level are excellent. In static equilibrium models relative price changes have no impact on absolute price levels but in the real world they clearly do. The author is probably also correct that economic models should be based on the relative prices of basic raw materials vis-à-vis produced goods rather than the relative prices of labor vis-à-vis capital. The first set of relative price changes is the basic factor affecting economic growth in the last decade and is apt to be the basic factor affecting us in the next decade.

The first chapter in this book goes into detail on business cycle theories more than many readers may wish to do so. Kondratieffs, Juglars, Kitchins, and Kusnets cycles are not everyone's meat. If so, skip it and move on to the chapters that interest you. The later chapters are going to be much more interesting to the average reader who is not an economist. And it should be said that the basic technique of this book is not econometrics but historical flashbacks. Whatever its defects, this technique has the advantage of making the book much more accessible to noneconomists.

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Farm and Food Policy: Issues of the 1980s *by Don Paarlberg. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1980. 338 pp. $16.50.*

This book is highly recommended to all those who wish to have a fair-minded, pragmatic, learned, and reasonably comprehensive overview of the major food and agricultural issues confronting us now and probably throughout the 1980s. It comes as no surprise that Don Paarlberg would write such a book. Those who have learned from his scholarship over the last three decades or so, and have observed him as a public official in two Republican administrations, would surely have predicted this end result. In the preface, he states clearly the purpose of this book: the identification of the major farm and food policy issues of this decade. Simply to identify would, of course, be insufficient; Paarlberg's methodology is "to report the known facts, to outline the alternatives, to see the probable alignment of various interested parties, to estimate the relative strength of contending groups, and, if possible to anticipate the outcome" (p. vii).

This approach to the study of public policy is sound, and Paarlberg adheres to it with rigor, fairness, and an occasional flash of pithy humor. He seems to hold no particular love for politicians, or at least not political rhetoric; readers are occasionally admonished "to look rather than listen." What is happening is often more important than what is said. Pragmatism, fused with a deep concern for justice, is the key to his approach. Adam Smith seems to be his patron philosopher, although the political theorist might also view Paarlberg as a modern disciple of John Locke, the "judicious Hooker" (Locke's phrase) and Aristotle.

The reader will be particulary impressed with Paarlberg's forceful, well-balanced review of important, sensitive, and critical issues – the food stamp program, environmental legislation, the allocation of water rights ("the great thirst," to use his phrase), the energy-gasohol issue, food aid to the poverty nations, and nutrition and food regulation

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are among the outstanding examples. And he leads into these issues with verve, vigor, and more than a touch of vitriol of his own.

Nonetheless, the study has some flaws. One criticism is really only a disagreement in emphasis and interpretation. That is, during the last few years, Paarlberg has been admonishing the "old establishment" (farm organizations, land-grant universities, U.S. Department of Agriculture, among others) to come to their political senses, realize that they have lost control of the political agenda (the football, to follow his analogue) and are really playing defense. The "new establishment" (environmentalists, consumers, religious and welfare groups, urban interests, among others) have moved on to the farm and food political scene, and are more and more calling the plays. In my opinion that is a partial truth; the major commodity interests, in particular, continue to "win," at least when and to the extent they expect to win. But this is a complex argument, and one that can best be carried on in a different forum. Second, Paarlberg's discussion of just what he meant by distributive justice, which he views as "the prime mover in public policy," is inadequate (p. 34). Readers would want to hear more from him on that issue. Third, readers also need more assistance, insight, and enlightenment relative to the power and influence of agribusiness interests. Paarlberg is quite likely right in his claim that the issue has too many populist overtones, too much political rhetoric. But the whole farm-food infrastructure is becoming an industrial complex of sorts and interested students have a right to expect a more positive analysis from him as to who gets what, when, and how. Finally, Paarlberg keeps tantalizing the reader with "the greatest argument of the 20th century, not only in our land but around the globe" (p. 42). At that point this "greatest argument" is defined as "the clash between the advocates of individual and of centralized decision-making." Later he refers again to "the major issue of the twentieth century" and poses it as a question: "what mixture of individual decision-making and centralized direction should we have" (p. 53)? Farther on, he modifies the expression somewhat by referring to "the major economic issue of the twentieth century," which is now defined as "the legitimacy of the capitalistic system" (p. 216). A seminal theme, however formulated, and one which calls for another book!

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Thunder on the Right: The "New Right" and the Politics of Resentment *by Alan Crawford. New York, Pantheon Books, 1980. 381 pp. $13.95.*

For those who may have wondered who those noisy people are who are systematically exploiting the most divisive issues in American politics—abortion, gun control, busing, and so on—Alan Crawford has provided a lively, readable, well-researched, and well-documented guide.

The core of the book is a series of profiles of the individuals, the interlocking organizations, and the ideas that make up the self-styled New Right of American politics. As a tour guide leading the reader through this political terrain, Crawford speaks with the

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authority of a journalist formerly employed by New Right publications, yet with admirable restraint and detachment.

On the tour, one meets the leading personalities, such as the "grand strategist" of the movement (Kevin Phillips), journalist-advocates (William Rusher, M. Stanton Evans, Patrick Buchanan), officeholders (Senators Jesse Helms and Orrin Hatch, Congressmen Mickey Edwards and Steven Symms), organization executives (Paul Weyrich, John Dolan, and Howard Phillips), single-issue specialists (Phyllis Schlafly and Reed Larson), "Christian soldiers" (the Reverend Jerry Falwell), a financial angel (Joseph Coors), and, most important, the fund-raising wizard whose genius at composing direct-mail appeals and assembling computerized mailing lists has made it all possible (Richard Viguerie).

One visits the "network" of New Right organizations—American Conservative Union, Conservative Caucus, Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Young Americans for Freedom, Heritage Foundation, Christian Voice, John Birch Society, National Conservative Political Action Committee, Moral Majority, Young Republican National Federation, Stop-ERA, National Right to Work Committee, Gun Owners of America, and so on—and samples their publications, including *Conservative Digest* and *The New Right Report*.

Finally, one hears the voices of the movement, presenting their themes and ideas in often vivid quotations from interviews and writings, artfully selected and woven together. The ideology is summarized in the author's subtitle, "the politics of resentment," and the strategy defined by Howard Phillips: "Organize discontent" (p. 165). The object, says Dolan, is to "stir up hostilities. We are trying to be divisive. . . . The shriller you are, the better it is to raise money" (p. 272).

And what is the hostility against? The liberal establishment. The eastern seaboard. The Ivy League intellectual elite. Big Labor. International bankers. Abortion. Homosexuals. Busing. Gun control. Big government. The media. Wall Street. Politicians who are not "one of us," including even former favorites who are no longer ideologically pure, like Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan.

All this, of course, is not conservativism, and Crawford's aim is to make the distinction clear. He traces the New Right not to the traditional conservatism of Edmund Burke and Russell Kirk but to Jackson, Bryan, and the Populists by way of Joseph McCarthy and George Wallace. The menace of the movement is to Democrats and Republicans alike, for while the New Right may work opportunistically within either party to elect its candidates, it has no loyalty to either—the movement comes first. And the author finds the rightist attack on the Constitution and its use of plebiscitary means to achieve its ends—as in Proposition 13—not conservative but radical.

Both conservatives and liberals will find the book alarming, in its portrayal of the zeal of the New Right, its resources, and consequently its power to divide and disrupt. But the resources are less than they seem. The New Right raises millions, but most of it goes for mailing costs and organizational overhead; as little as six, twelve, or sixteen cents of each dollar raised is actually donated to candidates—even, in one case cited, none at all (p. 70).

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The Nature of American Politics *by H.G. Nicholas. New York, Oxford University Press, 1980. 134 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $4.95.*

This survey of American politics is broad and brief. Six chapters review political institutions: federalism, separation of powers, the Supreme Court and judicial review, the party system, elections, Congress, and the presidency. The opening and closing chapters discuss, respectively, the nation's challenges to government and its political style.

The themes are familiar: The country's size, the heterogeneity of its population, and its antigovernment tradition make it unusually difficult to govern; abundance of resources has blunted conflict between the haves and have-nots; federalism means legalism; the major parties each necessarily seek to be all things to all people; the machine, the classic form of political organization, is in irreversible decline; elections do little to educate but much to unify; congressmen, individually ombudsmen and Santa Clauses for their constituents, collectively lack a comprehensive view of governmental policy; the South and the Irish have put an indelible stamp on the American political style; the presidency, *the* great American institution, is increasingly insulated from outside influences.

Not written for specialists, the book can be read profitably by the general reader and by students. It says succinctly what others have often belabored, and it does so in a clear and readable style. Comparisons with Britain, explicit and implicit, lend perspective to what is said about American institutions.

Nonetheless, the book has substantial shortcomings. It has little to say about the issues that activate the contending forces of American politics. Its persistent tone of authority suggests, contrary to fact, that all its observations are equally well grounded. Few questions are raised for which the author lacks a ready answer. He holds, for instance, that the United States is more difficult to govern than Britain because its population is more diverse. But Britain is no amoeba among nations: It is a fully articulated industrial society, still bearing marks of its feudal birth, harboring substantial minorities, heterogeneous in dialect, composed of ancient nations with ancient quarrels. Populations may differ in many ways. How, then, does one measure their overall diversity? What kinds of diversity are politically relevant? Is the relationship between diversity and governability strictly linear, or are there thresholds beyond which further diversity makes little difference? The author writes as if these questions had not occurred to him.

He is also sloppy about details. He observes that the United States is a society that is 37 percent Catholic (the true figure is about 23 percent); that fewer than one-third of U.S. presidents have had previous experience of federal office (75 percent have served as U.S. representatives, U.S. senators, or vice-presidents before taking office); that election day is a public holiday. He equates the situation in the presidential election of 1800 with the very different circumstances of 1824, refers to Richard Nixon's "so-called landslide victory of 1968," and speaks of cross-filing in California as if it still existed. Unmindful of recent party history and of *Cousins* v. *Wigoda*, he reports that the manner of choosing delegates to national party conventions has been left to state legislatures, and, not having read the document closely enough, he reports that the Constitution divides the United States into fifty-one winner-take-all constituencies in presidential elections. These errors are not very

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grave, perhaps, but one would hesitate to assign the book to students without commenting on them.

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The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution, 1959–1972 *by Michael Foley. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980. 342 pp. $17.95.*

Michael Foley has done an admirable job of setting forth and demonstrating a simple, but important, theme: the transformation of the U.S. Senate from a basically conservative institution in the 1950s to a more liberalized body in the 1960s. Although the theme is not a new one, the author provides a competent and thorough exposition.

The critical turning point for Foley and other scholars who have written about the Senate of the past two decades is the election of 1958. With a net gain of seventeen seats in that election, Senate Democrats shifted their control from a margin of one or two seats in the mid-1950s to the 2:1 ratio characteristic of most of the 1960s. Equally important, that election brought into the Senate such liberals as Edmund Muskie, Eugene McCarthy, and Phillip Hart—men who became increasingly influential legislators as they and their contemporaries gained in seniority.

Foley uses as his starting point the descriptions of the Senate in two influential books: William S. White's *The Citadel* (1956) and Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (1960). His study is derived from three major sources: the published record, including both primary and secondary accounts; detailed analysis of Senate voting behavior from 1959 to 1972, utilizing Guttman scales to identify Senate liberals, moderates, and conservatives; and open-ended interviews with senators, staff assistants, and other observers of the contemporary scene. Unfortunately, his twenty-three interviews with senators are heavily skewed toward the liberals. Only two or three of the respondents could be classified as conservatives. One consequence would seem to be an interpretation that equates the liberals with the "good guys," the conservatives as the "dark hats" over this fourteen-year period.

Foley concludes that the Senate has undergone three major changes from the 1950s through the 1960s: a modification in structure, particularly in its leadership and committee operations; a transformation in culture, especially in its abandonment of its apprenticeship norm; and finally, a restoration of an assertive role in policymaking. Although the book is not likely to "become the standard work on the Senate today" as its book jacket argues, it is a valuable contribution to an understanding of the Senate in the 1960s.

ROBERT L. PEABODY
Johns Hopkins University

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Employing the Unemployed *edited by Eli Ginzberg. New York, Basic Books, 1980. 209 pp. $15.00.*

Eli Ginzberg's spirit of critical inquiry and the ability to look beyond the computer printout seem to be infectious judging by this volume of collected essays. The task undertaken by Ginzberg and the ten other contributors is a wide-ranging evaluation of federal employment and training efforts. In general this balanced and thought-provoking series of studies concludes that the net impact of the $64 billion innovation in human-resource policies has been highly positive both for society and program clients. Yet the authors often express strong reservations about various aspects of the system.

In his capacity as professor of economics and director of the Conservation of Human Resources Project at Columbia University, as adviser to successive policymakers, and as the chairman of the National Commission for Employment Policy, Ginzberg is well aware of, and does not flinch from showing, the weak links in the chain of the employment and training system. His historical overview repeatedly indicates where policymakers and social scientists were wide of the mark. Federal human-resource programs were launched in the early 1960s to retain what was believed to be a vast army of structurally displaced workers due to automation. Instead, initial training efforts attracted a considerable number of poorly educated, low-skilled, and often minority workers with highly unstable employment histories. The new main objective became to improve the employability of hard-to-employ persons.

Even this objective, however, has been lost sight of at times, as some programs seem to be more interested in income-transfer payments than in skill training, or as short-run means to reduce the unemployment rate give little thought to the long-term consequences on program clients. Also, the emphasis has shifted from the supply side of the labor market to demand-side pathologies. At the same time there has been a renewed attempt to involve the private sector in the human-resource efforts, but as Ginzberg notes, the record of the private sector in this area still leaves much to be desired.

These themes are picked up and expanded by the contributors. One of the best features of this book is that complex statistical and econometric subjects are dealt with in clear and readable prose. For example, in assessing the impact of training programs Michael E. Borus provides a concise summary of the major quantitative studies. Most research has found a statistically significant increase in the earnings and employment stability of program participants. Borus is quick to emphasize, however, the major weaknesses in methodology and data sources. The statistical regressions may give one an indication of the net impacts, but computer studies are a long way off from providing final conclusions.

A central point driven home in this volume is that the value of so-called objective statistical inquiry is limited because of data problems and other real constraints. Yet despite these problems policymakers must continue to experiment in this area. For example, Robert M. Solow presents a good case that selective employment programs may be less inflationary in reducing unemployment than are general monetary and fiscal policies. But it so far has proven impossible to base this view on firm quantitative evidence. Isabel V. Sawhill and Lauri J. Bassi indicate that employment and training policies may be able

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to reduce slightly the level of unemployment that can be maintained with relative price stability, but once again hard proof is lacking.

The political consequences of these efforts are also explored. Richard P. Nathan's essay outlines the various conflicting objectives of federal, state, and local leaders concerning the role of public-service employment, and he concludes that even given these difficulties the system of public-service employment has in general run smoothly. Lester C. Thurow believes that in conditions of high unemployment some programs have operated more as reshuffling devices of unemployment, not as solutions, and this has created real political problems.

Other essays include Bernard Anderson's analysis of the impact various programs have on minorities and youth; Judy Gueron's exploration of supported-work experiments; John Palmer's assessment of human-resource programs as jobs versus income transfers; and Robert Haveman's review of direct policies of job creation.

Policymakers will continue to be forced to make decisions often based on value judgment and intuitive feelings concerning human-resource efforts. But as Ginzberg makes clear, a society built on the work ethic will have to continue to experiment and take risks since self-corrective market forces cannot be expected to solve many of these labor-market problems.

RICHARD S. BELOUS
George Washington University

The Cost of Good Intentions: New York City and the Liberal Experiment *by Charles R. Morris. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1980. 256 pp. $14.95.*

This excellent study seeks to explain the breakdown in New York City's political system, leading to the current fiscal crisis, which occurred during the period 1960 to 1975. The author distinguishes between those city policies that were primarily due to external factors beyond the control of local officialdom and those actions and decisions that were the responsibility of the city's own political system. Policy areas that fall into the first category were those whose programs were replicated in other, large central cities; these policies presumably were the result of broader forces buffeting and constraining all big-city administrations at the time. On the other hand, New York City officials were considered to be at fault for those policies that were unique to the city.

The author's primary focus is on these latter policies and on explaining the idiosyncratic behavior of city administrations. His thesis is that the dominant belief system of the city's governing bodies during this period best explains its divergence from other localities; their commitment to liberalism led the city astray. To illustrate this theme, the author analyzed city policy in the area of race relations, its reform managerial style, and its unwillingness to cut back on services when the local economy began to decline.

The race issue was conceptualized, particularly in the first Lindsay administration, solely as a white problem—white discriminatory practices and racism were preventing black advancement. This framing of the race problem, according to the author, was both

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intellectually and politically flawed; there were other equally defensible ways of conceptualizing the problem which would not have polarized the city.

Similarly, the city's approach to management and administration reflected its liberal tradition. It was an approach that assumed that government could solve large problems; that science, professionalism, and rationalism could be used to help solve the pressing social problems of the day. As Morris points out, however, this administrative style ignored the difficult empirical problems associated with this approach and seemed oblivious of the normative component associated with all governmental decisions.

The city's inability to cut expenditures as its economy began to decline also reflected its liberal biases. The liberal commitment to an expanding public sector left the city highly dependent on the willingness of the financial community to continue funding its deficits.

The author has provided a valuable study. It is well written, remarkable for its clarity in light of the vast array of substantive policy areas and technical issues covered. Most importantly, the author is to be congratulated for his focus on conceptualization and problem definition in his analysis of the city's policymaking; all too often, this very important component of the political process is either ignored or treated cursorily.

The book raises a number of important questions for future research. The author's conclusions concerning the importance of ideological considerations in policymaking must be systematically tested against alternative explanatory models. Secondly, future students may want to consider the possibility that liberalism's failure was primarily due to its application at the local level; it may be that the competition between cities requires public programs for the disadvantaged to emanate from the national government. Finally, we need to determine whether liberalism as a philosophy was at fault or merely the liberal tradition as it was defined at a particular time by a limited group. *The Cost of Good Intentions* is a valuable contribution; it provides readers with a fruitful perspective on New York City's experience and raises important, generic issues.

STEPHEN DAVID
Fordham University

The State and Human Services: Organizational Change in a Political Context *by Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980. 217 pp. $15.00.*

Case studies of reorganization or attempted reorganization of human-services programs are developed for six states: Georgia, Washington, Florida, Arizona, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. Laurence Lynn, Jr., makes no attempt to judge whether the results of reorganization were effective (that is, whether better services resulted); rather he attempts to draw conclusions about the policymaking process itself, how change comes about, and whether policymakers who initiate change are likely to be successful or unsuccessful. Lynn concludes that state reorganizations are more often than others aimed at saving money, that appointed heads of state agencies cannot act independently without gubernatorial or legislative support, that the political skills to sustain an effective reorganization are in short supply at the state level, that state reorganization generally undermines pro-

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fessional interests, and that "the governor is in an excellent position . . . to manage and control the conflict associated with change, whether or not he or she is the initiator" (p. 174).

Primarily based on case studies, this book reflects the inherent strengths and weaknesses of that approach. There is richness of detail on the particular reorganizations in each state. Unfortunately, the material is not always organized to facilitate comparisons among the six states which are studied in a systematic way. Only chapter 7 (approximately fifteen pages) attempts to draw conclusions from the cases.

Lynn argues that he is not attempting to develop systematic knowledge but to foster understanding of the policymaking process. He recognizes that his cases may be atypical and stresses the importance of providing an organizing framework for presenting information. Since the six states selected provide examples of states that attempted human-services reorganization and states that did not, and of states that attempted to go beyond reorganization and attempt services integration, it is unclear, however, what the organizing framework of the study is. Moreover, the policy conclusions appear to be relatively weak.

The richness of detail of the case studies describes a variety of factors that impinge on the course of reorganizations that Lynn does not attempt to organize and discuss systematically. These include variations across states in the strength of county governments, the extent of civil-service or patronage coverage of state employees, the strength of professional groups such as medical societies in controlling the boards that govern state agencies, and the strength of accounting and fiscal management procedures in different counties and states. Lynn also fails to note whether human-services workers at the local level are county or state employees. The explanation of the success or failure of attempts at human-services reorganization, or even whether a reorganization was attempted or not (for example, whether the governor judged it to his political advantage to try), may lie less in "personal and political goals" (p. 173) than in how these different characteristics of state administration come together to create an environment that appears to be resistant or permissive to governors, legislators, county commissioners, and administrators. Simply cataloging all the factors that in Lynn's account influenced action in the different states dilutes his primary explanatory focus on the interplay between governors and legislatures.

There is an apparent contradiction. Lynn concludes that "state officials would mix and match human service resources in different ways if not for federal categorical constraints" (p. 177). Yet, he also argues that reorganization requires the mobilization of a powerful and durable constituency primarily because of the need to overcome inertia and the need to overcome resistance by those who stand to lose from change (p. 173). If the latter is true, removal of categorical restrictions alone will not be enough to stimulate change.

Despite its weaknesses, the reader puts this book down with a better understanding of the political process and its variations at the state level. There are few studies that present the empirical richness of the political, administrative, and bureaucratic environments of the several states and how these environments create the opportunity for or discourage action. The reader gains an appreciation of the complex problems federal administrators face in attempting to negotiate with state officials to obtain uniform administration of

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federal statutes, because of the unique combinations of factors the state administrators they deal with themselves face. Thus, Lynn has accomplished his major stated purpose of enhancing understanding of the policy process, even if the conclusions drawn seem weak in explanatory power.

GEORGE D. GREENBERG
Department of Health and Human Services

The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency 1945-1953

edited by Francis H. Heller. Lawrence, The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980. 247 pp. $15.00.

The historical reputations of American presidents tend to have a certain ebb and flow. Where recent administrations are concerned, it takes historians and political scientists alike a certain amount of time to change focus and let the tools of their professions reshape their responses as voters. Some presidents also have independent popular reputations based on personal characteristics that make them particularly good subjects for periodic revival. Few presidents have been subjected to tides like those that continue to carry the reputation of Harry Truman in and out of professional and popular view. That this should happen to an unlikely vice-president whose only election to the office he held for almost two terms was itself a remarkable event is part of whatever puzzle one chooses to see. The Truman presidency is in some respects the first modern administrative presidency as we know it today and as no president before him did. Although Franklin Roosevelt succeeded in getting the legislation that created the Executive Office of the President, he had little time and even less inclination to use it as a fully staffed administrative invention, preferring to follow habits formed in the two chaotic terms of the New Deal. The Truman presidency has been criticized, too, as the first "Imperial Presidency," although both the term and the criticism mean different things to different people, differences that depend less than one might expect on Truman as the supposed architect of the cold war.

In May of 1977 the Truman Library assembled twenty-two members of the Truman administration to discuss the operation of the White House during the Truman years. The participants were given copies of Stephen Hess's book, *Organizing the Presidency,* and a list of fifteen questions in advance. Most of them ignored both. The book includes neither a list of the questions nor the replies of the only person who tried to answer them, the late Justice Tom Clark. Instead, participants for the most part tended to reminisce, sometimes pertinently, sometimes not. The discussions that followed groups of statements vary enormously in their relevance and their utility. One suspects that the editor, Francis Heller, had a difficult job cut out for him but one he did with the necessary skill and compassion. One cannot help wishing that it had all taken place ten or fifteen years earlier; but it did not.

To leave it at that, however, would be a mistake. There is much more to this book than its organization or the insurmountable problems that did not get surmounted. It is, quite

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simply, a veritable magpie's nest, but of a remarkable magpie. Mixed together, one finds pebbles, straw, rare gems, and wisps of absolutely irreplaceable fabric. Those interested in the period will find it a chore, but one I would urge them to undertake. Surprising and revealing glimpses of Truman come through often enough to repay one's efforts. Indeed, the evidence that counters the now popular image of the outspoken little gamecock who often squawked his way through a fight with that of a sensitive and gentle listener concerned for the feelings of his staff, at times to a fault, provides an image of Truman that is interestingly collegial and thoughtful. The management of the presidency as a personal experience, a relationship between the boss and his associates, comes through.

Although one is almost halfway through the book before one reaches the superb Richard Neustadt piece, the sudden and unmistakable feel of the carpet of the Oval Office under foot and the sense of the light through the curtains that surround the calm and familiar center of American government wipe away whatever sense of drudgery might have been generated in previous pages. And there are other insights as well: the development and use of the National Security Council is described usefully and effectively. One senses a White House that was as different from what preceded it as from what followed it, but one that nonetheless had a determining effect on what the presidency has become. Such things appear again and again, unexpected openings and revelations by people who need not be aware of how much they are in fact remembering for us.

Again, one can argue points that are more than quibbles. There were others who perhaps ought to have been represented. Or a more systematic effort might have been made to include statements from key figures who were unable to attend: Clark Clifford and John Steelman, for example. But still, as a raw document it is useful. It represents a marvelous kind of entrapment between the kind of organized narrative and discussion a historian might have urged and the establishment of useful principles of administrative management a political scientist might have preferred. These participants do little to further our sense of the narrative direction of history or our hunger for principles beyond asserting their disagreement with the efforts of others to press them to generalize. Again, without intending to be, it is a case study in the problem of trying to find reasons for resurrecting the past, let alone actually resurrecting it. There ought nonetheless to be more efforts of this kind. They are all we have of a kind of history we very much need. Administrative history cannot be left in the hands of historians, who tend to think it is all magic, or public administration specialists who believe it is all technique. There is as yet not much place in between, but if there ever is, it will have to start with books that attempt tasks like this.

BARRY D. KARL
University of Chicago

The Presidential Election of 1916 *by S. D. Lovell. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1980. 229 pp. $22.50.*

This compact monograph is in some ways a model of narrative political history and tells us nearly all that we are ever likely to want to know about the presidential election of 1916. The author sets the stage with fine discussions of the Republican and Democratic

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preconvention campaigns; the discussion of the former, based on much new research, is particularly good and makes it clear that, in spite of much maneuvering, the nomination of Charles Evans Hughes and the defeat of Theodore Roosevelt were virtually inevitable. Then there follow good accounts of the Republican, Progressive, and Democratic national conventions, the organization of the Democratic and Republican campaigns, the conduct of their own campaigns by Wilson and Hughes, and the impact of the candidates and the issues upon important segments of the voters. Lovell pays special attention to the two states whose votes turned out to be the crucial ones—California and Ohio. The case of California has been well covered in the literature; however, the campaign in Ohio, which Wilson had to win in order to be reelected, has heretofore been strangely ignored.

The author does not use regression analysis or ecological regression analysis to determine how various segments voted. But he does use voting statistics to good (and, I suspect, the same) effect and demonstrates that Wilson won because of Hughes's incredibly ineffectual campaign and Wilson's success in appealing to the labor vote in general and to the farm vote in the West.

This book is not without defects, some of which are rather glaring. It is extremely dubious that Colonel House was the mastermind behind the Democratic campaign. In any event, the author's account of the Democratic organization and campaign would have been much stronger if he had used the papers of the chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the Democratic National Committee—Vance C. McCormick (in Yale University) and Homer S. Cummings (in the University of Virginia). The latter collection is particularly rich. The author tells us, down to the penny, what the Democrats spent; but he says not a word about Republican expenditures. True, the Democrats made a financial report while the Republicans did not. Several students of expenditures in presidential elections, however, have made sophisticated estimates of Republican outlays in 1916.

Lovell has a hard time getting names and some facts straight. Colonel House was Edward M., not "Edwin" (p. 4); Nathan Straus used only one last *s* in his name, not two (p. 7); Senator Fall was Albert B., not D. (p. 13); Albert D. Nortone was Albert D. Nortoni (p. 22); the "Dudley" mentioned on page 94 was Dudley Field Malone; Homer S. Cummings wrote his last name with a *g* in it (p. 95); Judge Ben B. Lindsey, not Lindsay (p. 100), and so on. The errors of fact are not monumentally important, but a careful scholar should not have made them. Albert B. Cummins did not support Roosevelt in 1912 (p. 29); Mrs. Vance C. McCormick was the wife of the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, not of the chairman of the Republican National Committee (p. 73); William G. McAdoo was vice-chairman, not chairman, of the Democratic National Committee in 1912 (p. 92); Daniel C. Roper was assistant postmaster general, not postmaster general (p. 93); Francis J. Heney was a famous reformer in San Francisco, not in Los Angeles (p. 106); Mrs. Peck *never* entertained Ellen Axson Wilson in Bermuda—perish the thought! (p. 113); "Mrs. Gordon" was Miss Alice Gertrude Gordon. She was an heiress, to be sure, but not the "heiress and ward" of Mrs. Galt (p. 114), and so on.

Such careless errors mar an otherwise fine book.

ARTHUR S. LINK
Princeton University

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Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949 *by Aaron David Miller. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 320 pp. $19.00.*

Several years ago diplomatic historian Bradford Perkins regretted the lack of scholarly monographs dealing with the growth of American involvement in the Middle East. Recent events have only accentuated our need to learn more about the evolution of American ties to key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. It seems fitting then that Aaron Miller, a former student of Perkins, should make a major contribution to filling that gap.

Based on a thorough canvass of documents from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, as well as intelligence files and British Foreign Office records, Miller has traced the interplay of oil, national security, and the question of Palestine statehood in shaping American relations with the Saudis. What immediately strikes the reader is the evenhandedness with which the author tackles what have been for both scholars and policymakers emotionally charged issues. He finds no villains, bigots, or conspirators. Rather, he presents the record of "uncoordinated, heavy-handed diplomacy," explained in large part by the State Department's need to protect a vital American interest "in an area where it had little influence and experience" (pp. xv–xvi). Miller recognizes that the oil companies often lobbied for such government policies as lend-lease aid to Ibn Saud that served their private advantage, but he concludes that "access to strategic resources like oil," not some economic imperative, determined State Department attitudes (p. xvi). Any scholar who has read through the documents would be hard pressed to fault his conclusions.

The book makes its most important contribution by explaining official opposition in the State and Defense Departments to statehood for Palestine. While many Arab hands "may have mixed anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism," Miller believes those people acted to "assuage the Arabs" in order "to preserve American interests and prestige" (p. 210). Once again, his argument is persuasive.

The author's dispassionate treatment does not come without a price. His personal views remain largely unstated. The reader often wishes that Miller would interrupt his narrative to evaluate the actors and their policies. For example, he does not clearly state whether he thinks State Department policies on Palestine and Middle East oil did serve the national interest. The problem may stem from his decision to adopt a narrow conception of the policymaking apparatus. Though the Departments of State, War, and Navy did play a crucial role in U.S. foreign oil policy, they did not totally control that policy. A similarly close scrutiny of Roosevelt and Truman, the British, the Saudis, Congress, domestic and international oil companies, Harold Ickes, Max Thornburg, and other key actors who shaped policy would make the book more comprehensive. For instance, in discussing the private oil deals that led to abrogation of the Red Line agreement, Miller alludes to criticism from Congress and "other American companies" without explaining the nature of that opposition (p. 163). A number of important initiatives like the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the Anglo-American Oil Agreement, and postwar oil deals do not receive the attention they merit.

Fidelity to his sources forces Miller into frequent repetition of themes and ideas.

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Though circumstances changed, most officials reiterated the same arguments to support their policy preferences. As Miller reports their views on successive occasions, the reader senses that he is recrossing familiar ground. A broader conceptual or analytical framework with less emphasis on narrative and the view from "old foggy bottom" might have alleviated that problem.

It would be misleading, however, to allow such criticisms to obscure the strengths of this book. Miller has provided scholars and policymakers alike an opportunity to learn how the United States entered into its "very special relationship" with Saudi Arabia, one upon which our national security has come to depend, just as the Arab hands had anticipated during World War II.

MARK HAMILTON LYTLE
Bard College

Public Opinion: Coalitions, Elites, and Masses *by Harry Holloway and John George. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980. 286 pp. $14.95.*

This is a straightforward textbook, written in simple language and appropriate for use in introductory political behavior courses. Because its conception of public opinion is quite broad, the book could also be used as a supplementary text in general American politics courses. Public opinion is examined in terms of social context, rather than psychological theory. Consequently, this is more a text on the relationship between American political culture and public ideology than an explanation of the genesis and character of the attitudes of individuals. The book is empirical at base, and survey data are frequently employed to support arguments and provide examples. Yet *Public Opinion* is somewhat unique among texts on the subject in that these data are woven into the prose and rarely presented in tabular form.

Although the book does not set out to champion a particular perspective on public opinion in American politics, one theme recurs and serves to organize much of the material presented: namely, the authors' attempt to reconcile democratic theory with observed levels of public quiescence. This effort leads in various directions. Early on, readers are introduced to Richard Hofstadter's observations that violence in the service of conservative values has been commonplace in our political history. Holloway and George later offer a chapter on the failure of socialism to take root in American soil and devote two subsequent chapters to a somewhat rambling and inconclusive discussion of the relative merits of pluralist and elitist models of the political process.

The more standard topics of religion, ethnicity, education, family, and mass media each receive one chapter, and the authors try to integrate the research cited in these with the organizing theme of the book. The form of the presentation is a good one, offering one- and two-page descriptions of major pieces of research on the topic at hand. The authors' arguments are well supported (even if the overall structure is a bit disjointed), and Holloway and George facilitate further study by giving students an adequate introduction to the relevant scholarship and by including an annotated list of references at the end of each chapter. Unfortunately, some noteworthy works are missing; for exam-

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ple, the authors say nothing of the writings of Walter Lippmann, and in the chapter on the failure of socialism in America they make no mention of Robert Lane's study of working men in the late 1950s.

Public Opinion contains much praise for the flexibility and resourcefulness of the American political system. Occasionally, the analysis seems to support quite conservative positions, as when the authors write that "in the 1970s there were no large concentrations of individual or corporate wealth that could be tapped to pay for sizable additions to the welfare state" (p. 272). One might argue that, at the least, their definitions of terms such as "large concentrations" need clarification. Nevertheless, the book faces up to important questions of ideology and mass political participation in postindustrial America. The authors note that economic growth has been the means of deferring the issue of income maldistribution and that economic stagnation of the last half-decade is likely to raise the salience of that issue. Enthusiasm for the welfare state has declined, in their view, because it worked: it helped the majority to achieve a decent standard of living. The privatism encouraged by the successes of the welfare state contains the seeds of the political apathy with which much of the book is concerned. Holloway and George attempt with mixed success to clarify these linkages, but their efforts have produced a thought-provoking introductory textbook.

SCOTT KEETER
Livingston College, Rutgers University

Promise and Performance: Choosing and Implementing an Environmental Policy *by Alfred A. Marcus. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 204 pp. $18.95.*

Using case studies of air- and water-pollution control policy implementation by the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the author concisely analyzes congressional and presidential roles in policy formulation and then proceeds to examine how fragmented authority pulled EPA in several directions and resulted in less than intended achievements. On the one hand, Congress set ambitious statutory goals—costs be damned; on the other hand, the White House was concerned about the costs of environmental regulation and wanted to integrate functionally separate pollution control programs. EPA sought to accommodate both authorities and to preserve its existing structure; the bureaus remained inviolable.

This analysis of bureaucratic responses to conflicting instructions and competing authority is important because it studies the often hidden elements of policy implementation. For example, Marcus carefully documents the dilemma of EPA researchers faced with deadlines to set standards for problems for which they lacked an adequate data base. How these researchers responded to the cross-pressures of remaining loyal to the agency and to the scientific and technical professions is a fascinating study. Similarly, the observation of the Office of Management and Budget's attempt to approve EPA regulations (p. 125) is an important prelude to more recent attempts by the White House to override environmental regulations when they threaten major energy projects.

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EPA's retreat from its ambitious statutory goals through amendments and variances is attributed to a decline in public support for environmental protection (pp. 165–67). But no recent data are provided to establish such a decline. In fact, a 1978 Resources for the Future survey conducted by Robert Mitchell found widespread national support for environmental protection, even in the face of Proposition 13 fever. Similarly, state and local bond issues and environmental referenda continue to pass and bespeak public commitment to environmental protection. Retreat from environmental policy objectives should not be attributed to a fickle public in this instance. Rather, an unresponsive representative system was influenced by well-financed opponents of environmental regulation that capitalized upon energy crises and economic problems to exempt major projects and to weaken statutes (p. 129).

If one could fully explain bureaucratic promise and performance through an analysis of rivalries between the White House and Congress and bureaucratic dilemmas meeting deadlines, this book would be a resounding success; and it is a success as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. For federal policy implementation is also influenced by two other authorities not adequately analyzed: the judiciary, and the states. While the author claims that these actors are beyond the scope of the study, it detracts from an otherwise first-class implementation study. Thus, the discussion in the conclusion of centralized-decentralized decision-making authority is not integrated with the preceding chapters and ignores the fundamental implications of these alternatives for federalism.

Implementation studies can provide important groundwork for political scientists by analyzing the relationship between structure, function, decision-making procedures, and political change. This short volume makes a good supplementary reading choice for courses on public policy and public administration.

LAURA M. LAKE
University of California, Los Angeles

Science Advice to the President: A Special Issue of Technology in Society *edited by William T. Golden. New York, Pergamon Press, 1980. 256 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $9.95.*

Appropriately enough, the year 1984 will mark the centennial of the Allison Commission report recommending the creation of a strong, centralized, federal department of science. Although the federal government has since acquired interests in science and technology more significant and ramified than Senator Allison and his fellow commissioners could have dreamed of, experience has shown that the job of creating a political nerve center for the use and development of scientific knowledge is no easy matter.

The first small step to establish a link between the executive and the scientific establishment was taken by Franklin Roosevelt when he appointed Vannevar Bush to head the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). In 1950–1951, the editor of the present volume, then a special consultant to the Budget Bureau, proposed that a scientific adviser to the president be appointed to head a continuing version of OSRD. When General Lucius D. Clay objected that if this adviser was to counsel on

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military matters, he should be within, rather than above, the defense establishment, President Truman decided to locate the adviser and his committee of scientists in the Office of Defense Mobilization. In 1957, embarrassed by the Sputnik affair, President Eisenhower revived the original proposal, appointed James R. Killian, Jr., as his science adviser, and moved the committee into the White House Office, where it was renamed the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).

This arrangement was continued under Kennedy and Johnson and strengthened by the transformation of the science adviser's staff into the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in the Executive Office of the President. During the first term of the Nixon administration, the structure was kept intact but downgraded in importance. After he was reelected, President Nixon lost little time in abolishing PSAC, on the ground that it was mainly a self-serving advocate for the support of science, but also because certain members of PSAC broke with tradition and publicly opposed the administration's policies concerning the antiballistic missile (ABM) and supersonic transport (SST) programs. (One of the "whistleblowers," Robert Garwin, argues in this volume that the national interest must come before administrative loyalty, but others, notably Killian, contend that dissenters should resign if they feel called upon to go public.)

Although the post of science adviser was formally retained by the Nixon administration, it was assigned to the director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and divested of any role in military affairs. OST, renamed the Science and Technology Policy Office (STPO), was moved out of the White House and into the NSF. In an effort to repair relations with scientists and the academic community, President Ford encouraged efforts to restore the advisory apparatus to the office of the president. In 1976, Congress returned it (this time as the Office of Science and Technology Policy [OSTP]) to the Executive Office and gave the president the opportunity to reconstitute the advisory committee. President Carter's reorganization task force expressed doubt that the apparatus was needed. In the end, Carter appointed a science adviser with a small staff but has not chosen to revive the advisory committee. The reason, James E. Katz cogently suggests, is that his organizational advisers recognized that "many areas of science and technology were politically sensitive and hence should be handled at the political level. They wished to see no competing centers of influence arise in the White House that would dilute their control over these issues" (p. 230).

A strong case can be made for providing the president with a science and technology adviser of his own so that he does not become too dependent on agencies with vested interests. Similarly, a case can be made for providing this adviser with a committee of intelligent generalists whose job it would be to consider long-term issues. Many of the contributions to this volume make both cases effectively. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the system prior to the Nixon administration needs to be revived in its old form, if only because that system succeeded so well in raising the government's scientific consciousness. The Office of Management and Budget, for example, as William D. Carey points out, is now staffed with Ph.D. scientists of its own and no longer needs the help of OSTP as much as it once did (p. 101). The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency proposed by PSAC is now in existence, thereby removing the need to counterbalance the Defense Department's tendency to slight arms-control issues. And there are now a host of other agencies, including the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection

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Agency, that provide scientific advice to the president in areas that demand specialized attention by large agencies.

In view of all the changes, the late Patrick Haggerty's suggestion that the present welter of presidential advisory mechanisms (including the Council of Economic Advisers) be replaced by an integrated council of national development advisers makes good logical sense, but it probably would prove to be unwieldy and even politically unwise (pp. 129–30). Unsatisfactory as it must appear to someone such as Haggerty, who is used to the wonderfully integrated circuitry of Texas Instruments, the present system makes political sense, because it gives assorted constituencies a degree of access and gives the president a variety of potential instruments that he may or may not use as he sees fit. The twenty-four contributions to this volume provide much thoughtful discussion of the issues from experienced and able commentators. This is a book that will be studied with profit not only by students of science policy but by all those with an interest in the presidency and the institutions of modern government.

SANFORD A. LAKOFF
University of California, San Diego

Conflict and Conflict Management *by Joseph S. Himes. Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1980. 333 pp. Cloth, $23.00; paper, $9.00.*

This excellent contribution to the sociology of social conflict aims primarily at summarizing and synthesizing the results of previous research and theoretical inquiries and to present a codified survey of the knowledge that has been accumulated in the last few decades. It will be very useful for both scholars and social activists involved in group conflict who wish to be apprised of recent theoretical and empirical research in the area.

The first part of the book deals with typologies of conflict, explanatory models, the structural conditions giving rise to conflict, the manifest and latent functions of conflict, as well as the crucial importance of power in the conduct and outcome of social confrontations. This part also contains an instructive chapter on the functions and conditions of violence, and one that discusses the possibilities of predicting future conflicts.

The second part of the book, on the management of conflict, deals with the prevention of conflict through the elimination of its causes or the institutionalization of the struggle. Chapters dealing with the resolution of social conflicts and attempts at their suppression conclude the treatise.

Although other areas of conflict are by no means neglected, the author, a leading black sociologist to whom we owe a fine earlier work on *Racial Conflict in American Society*, gives racial and ethnic conflicts pride of place when discussing the domestic scene. International conflict, especially those in which ethnic factors play a major part, are also covered in satisfying detail.

What impresses one most about the book is the extremely wide coverage. The bibliography, one of the best I have seen in the area, runs to some forty-five pages. Himes draws on the theoretical work of all those who have worked in the area in the last few decades, and the reader will find fine summaries of the typologies, attempts at causal ex-

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planation, and accounting schemes of such authors as Dahrendorf, Galtung, Gurr, Gamson, Coser, Turner, and many others. But Himes seems at his best when he summarizes a great number of empirical studies in a lucid and crisp manner.

It is my impression that research on conflict phenomena was most eagerly carried on and provided most productive and searching results during the turbulent sixties when the civil-rights movement, as well as the turmoil in the universities and in major ghetto areas, provided a strong incentive for both theoretical and empirical investigations. This stimulus was no longer present in the quiescent seventies, and as a result the investigation of conflict phenomena recently has no longer loomed as large on the research agenda. I think it likely that the pendulum is going to swing back again in the period to come, and group conflicts and confrontations will again assume considerable saliency. If this will be the case, it is important that future researchers as well as future participants, or at least their leaders, be well informed about the theorizing and research that have already been done. By providing a fine codification of past knowledge in the area, Himes has created an important knowledge base. He not only assesses what we now know, but he also shows how much we do not know. His review of past accomplishments can also serve as the stepping stone for work that still has to be done.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

"Bigotry!" Ethnic, Machine, and Sexual Politics in a Senatorial Election *by Maria J. Falco. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 200 pp. $18.95.*

This is a study of the 1964 senatorial campaign in Pennsylvania. The author, currently dean of Arts and Sciences at Loyola University, New Orleans, began this work as a participant-observer while serving as a fellow of the National Center for Education in Politics, assigned as a campaign aide to Genevieve Blatt, one of the contenders in the Democratic primary. Subsequently, she analyzed the election and its aftermath as a postdoctoral fellow at Yale and now, ten years later, has addressed the same material with a new focus, that of sexism. The original major themes were ethnic politics and the declining role of parties, especially urban machines, in determining electoral outcomes.

The primary and general elections were both closely contested. The Democratic organization's choice for the seat held by Republican Senator Hugh Scott was Justice Michael A. Musmanno. He was challenged by Blatt who had been selected by liberal reform elements led by Senator Joseph S. Clark. Blatt's ethnic credentials were summarized by an aide: "The Jews think she's Jewish, the Pennsylvania Dutch think she's one of theirs, and the Catholics know she's a daily communicant—how can she go wrong" (p. 32)? A question addressed by Clark to Musmanno: "When and where were you born?" aroused immense ire among Musmanno's supporters, particularly Italian-Americans, who continued to chafe after Blatt won a narrow victory (p. 50). Scott conducted a skillful campaign and unquestionably exploited the bigotry issue. He won the general election by 70,422 votes out of 4.8 million cast as President Johnson was carrying the state by a plurality of 1.4 million—the largest vote margin in Pennsylvania history.

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Using extensive interviews and a questionnaire, Falco succeeds in vividly evoking the election. Some of the insights derived from the interviews, especially from participants at the local level, are exceptionally revealing. The picture that emerges is that Blatt's campaign was ill-conceived, that the issue of Scott's relationship to Goldwater was misplayed, that the polling was flawed, and that her campaign was characterized by poor staffing, lack of money, and awkward television programming. As one aide put it, "we had disorganization in buckets" (p. 110).

Analysis of the vote (avowedly inadequate because no postelection polling was done) leads Falco to conclude that Blatt lost because she was "cut" by elements of the party regulars who were in local battles with the reformers led by Clark, that she suffered from the defection of Italian-Americans (particularly in Pittsburgh and environs), and that sex was a factor. Interestingly, she finds the "cut" in Philadelphia even greater in upper-income Jewish wards, where the voters were presumably attracted by Scott's strong support for Israel. Italian-Americans there held fast to their traditional Democratic vote pattern as a result of the efforts of organized labor. After studying Blatt's defeat over a fifteen-year period, the most that Falco can say is, "which of the factors or combination of factors was most responsible is impossible to say" (p. 145).

The work is flawed in several respects. Some words are misspelled. Despite the appendage of a bibliography which includes relevant work on ethnic, machine, and sexual politics, no effort is made to relate or compare findings with those of the scholars cited. Another serious weakness of the book is its naiveté, perhaps prompted by Falco's reformist, feminist, and even antipolitical perspectives. She finds this campaign "tawdry" (p. ix), but fails to examine why nitty-gritty, merciless, and even ugly battles are the *norm* in hard-fought electoral races *at all levels* of government in the United States. Her statement that "whereas prior to the mid-sixties, in most political battles in this country, bitterness of feeling may have run deep, it seldom went beyond the bonds of civility where the opponents could no longer 'kiss and make up' after the dust had settled" has little credibility (p. 12). Helen Gahagan Douglas, Claude Pepper, and Frank P. Graham would surely have disagreed with her after their bruising campaigns in 1950.

Election buffs and students of Pennsylvania politics will find this book interesting; political scientists will not find it very useful.

RITA W. COOLEY
New York University

The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Unions *by Roger Keeran. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980. 340 pp. $22.50.*

In this brilliant study of the Communist party of the United States of America (CPUSA) activists in the United Automobile Workers (UAW), Roger Keeran has written the best scholarly work yet produced concerning the role of the CPUSA in any aspect of American life. Although Keeran challenges strongly both the standard "Communist problem" literature on the CPUSA and the unions and the complementary Trotskyist and

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New Left critiques of CPUSA "Stalinism," "revisionism," and "opportunism," he does so with a more logical and coherent understanding of the American trade-union and political contexts than all previous works. Furthermore, the vast array of evidence that Keeran convincingly marshalls—for example, unpublished manuscript and oral history archival material from the major labor libraries, CPUSA primary materials, extensive press and published primary and secondary source records—both surpasses the previous literature on communism and labor in its thoroughness and makes valuable contributions to the standard historical writing on the modern U.S. industrial labor movement in general and the UAW in particular.

Keeran begins by asking three straightforward questions: "Were the Communists good (or legitimate) trade unionists? Were they an important influence in the labor movement? Were they good Communists" (p. 1)? In answering these questions, Keeran discovers the following: who the CPUSA militants really were in the UAW; what their relationship was with their party's leadership and with various non-Communist groupings in the union; and what the real effects of the larger political and international context were on their activities and those of their opponents. Keeran's findings explode many myths and expose the simplistic nature of the assertions and assumptions behind much of the establishment and "counterestablishment" (New Left) literature.

Thus, Communist conceptions of discipline and organizational techniques produced conflicts with rivals while providing at the same time a structure for unity that made more possible the establishment of the UAW and its early gains. Also, Communists were far less likely to pursue "rule or ruin" policies than their Reuther-Association of Catholic Trade Unionists opponents in union struggles where political lines were often blurred but real differences existed. Finally, Keeran shows that the maturation of the cold war crisis rather than the CPUSA's World War II labor policies (which the author portrays convincingly as having been more complex and contradictory than the conventional wisdom concedes) provided the basis for Walter Reuther's postwar consolidation of power and the ensuing anti-Communist purges in the union.

While Keeran is judiciously critical of major errors in CPUSA policy—for example, the indiscriminate attacks on socialists as "social fascists" in the early 1930s; the inept and inadequate response to and explanation of the Hitler-Stalin pact and the new situation produced by it; the inflexible and mechanical application of the "No Strike Pledge" in the final years of World War II—these errors are neither viewed in isolation nor perceived simplistically and falsely as the results of conspiratorial strategies employed in the service of Soviet power. Rather they are intelligently weighed against what others were doing inside the trade unions and in the larger political context.

In conclusion, Roger Keeran has written a splendidly researched, well-reasoned work of enormous value for all students of U.S. labor history and the history of the American Left. However it may disturb both old-line establishment scholars more at home in the cold war political atmosphere and old-line "New Leftists" who were also products of the cold war period and mentality, the work is empirically sound, analytically arresting, and a model of first-rate academic scholarship. Perhaps it may serve as a foundation for future studies of the CPUSA and other nonestablishment groups and movements in the trade unions, the civil-rights and civil-liberties movements, and the arts and popular culture—

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studies that are sorely needed today if one is to develop a multidimensional view of twentieth-century American history and politics.

NORMAN D. MARKOWITZ
Livingston College, Rutgers University

Memphis Since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civic Reformers, 1948–1968 *by David M. Tucker. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1980. 183 pp. $10.50.*

During the years E. H. Crump ruled Memphis, outsiders found it virtually impossible to comprehend the ruthlessness of the dictatorial grasp in which he held the community. Boss Crump's machine fraudulently expanded voter registration lists, stuffed ballot boxes, manufactured vote totals, intimidated investigating reporters and photographers, maligned with ingenuity and without conscience honorable citizens, effectively embargoed organized labor, and corrupted the black vote; and all the while the Boss prided himself on the economy and good housekeeping that he said characterized his local government. Fear was pervasive. In 1947, when traveling throughout the South as a student of political processes, I visited a voter registration booth in Memphis to inquire about the administration of electoral procedures. The small, bald man on duty received my questions with patent alarm, would hardly respond, and gave the impression I might cost him his job, or worse.

David M. Tucker, professor of history at Memphis State University, describes and analyzes Memphis politics from the last years of Crump bossism through two decades of reform energy to the new political pluralism of the 1960s which was marked by the rise of conservative white Republicanism and black political separatism. He has drawn on rich manuscript sources, interviews with participants, and comprehensive knowledge of the political history of his community. No one who writes in detail of recent controversial events will be thought by participants to have given everything its proper emphasis, yet two people of different political persuasions who were prominent in the events reported gave the author high marks for accuracy and general interpretation. The book is an excellent work of recent local history and exhibits in instructive ways dynamic currents of American politics.

The story of Memphis illustrates again that good governmental structure and procedure, usually sought under the banner of reform, do not in the end weigh as heavily among citizens affected as the tangible benefits seen to result from government. Toward the end of the Crump era—he died in 1954, still wielding much of his power—a coalition obtained among certain upper-class whites, elements in the black community, and elements within organized labor. Their common interest was belief in "democratic principles, which they understood as equal opportunity for the individual to develop his abilities, make his own decisions, and control his own future" (p. xii). They believed their alliance could lead to governmental reform and hence to racial desegregation and liberal political policies. Eventually the common concern of the coalition, the *means* of politics,

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was overridden by the politics of issues, the *ends*. Young, aggressive blacks did not find black aspirations satisfied and split away. White Republicanism grew. The influence of the liberal reformers, who in fact had accomplished much, dissipated. A haunting theme of universal significance runs through the story: the failure of white political activists to understand the uncompromising expectations of liberated blacks.

Memphis Since Crump is a first-rate, pleasantly written, competently constructed, well-researched narrative of political life in a large American city during a unique period of political transition. It is seldom clear when people are the creators and when the products of their political times. Tucker quotes an inscription from the wall of the Memphis City Hall that says a city will be known by its men alone. It is a credit to the book that it attends not only to the men of Memphis (and some women, too) but also to the circumstances that shaped what they did and failed to do.

ALEXANDER HEARD
Vanderbilt University

Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court *by Jesse H. Choper. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1980. 494 pp. $26.40.*

The author, professor of law in the School of Law of the University of California, and one of the leading scholars and interpreters of the Constitution, in general, and the Court's role thereunder in particular, has given us a fascinating, thoughtful, stimulating, and controversial work that, in essence, addresses that elusive, persistent question of the appropriate judicial role in the American constitutional constellation. He does so with remarkable originality and imagination and without intellectual condescension. Measured, informative, free of cant, and blessed by a demonstrably staggering knowledge of the appropriate literature—especially that of legal and social-science journals—Choper's book focuses upon the central question whether the Court should adjudicate certain constitutional issues at all. His stated aim, one faithfully adhered to in this meaty and, arguably, excessively lengthy and sometimes repetitious tome, is to explore the Court's "*jurisdictional* or *procedural* role and judicial review" rather than the question "*how* the Court should interpret various provisions of the Constitution, [namely] *substance*" (p. 1).

In six chapters, replete with incisive analysis and lively proposals for a reordering of aspects of the judicial role, the author propounds his case for a functional revolution that, on the whole, is persuasive, if hardly noncontentious—especially since any attempt to distinguish the frontiers of the proper judicial role involves problems of both value judgments and definition. A superb advocate, Choper lays the groundwork for his thesis by acknowledging at once that judicial review is antimajoritarian and that the Court, neither in theory nor in practice, is or was intended to be as "democratic" as the two political branches. It is a fact, a truth, all too often ignored by sundry observers of the Court—sometimes perhaps even by the author himself—who eagerly second the Court's warm and appealing embrace of the essential role of judicial review, namely, to prevent violations of those categories of constitutional provisions that secure and mandate in-

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dividual liberties. As he puts it so well, the Court's great task "is how best to reject majority will when it must, without endangering not only that critical role but its other urgent duties as well" (p. 59).

There is nothing particularly original about that so eminently desirable and seminal exhortation. What does constitute an original approach to secure, to safeguard, an even more effective judicial guardianship on the civil libertarian front—to cement the Court's indubitably proud record, notwithstanding its often injudicious detractors—is Choper's multiple proposal for preserving its "limited capital" by tightening its adjudicatory belt, by removing from its decisional jurisdiction a trio of areas: questions of power of the national government vis-à-vis the states, what he calls his "Federalism Proposal"; questions of power of Congress vis-à-vis the president; and those of the president vis-à-vis Congress. The author considers the latter two under his "Separation Proposal." Judicial withdrawal or abstemiousness in these three areas would, however, be superseded by the retention of judicial power to address any questions that touch Choper's "Individual Rights Proposal"—and here, of course, we reach a difficult plane of definitional line drawing. Nor would the Choper model vitiate the Court's duty to retain for its review attempted political regulation of judicial authority.

Space limitations permit but a brief listing of specific examples in the realm of the withdrawal triad. Thus, under the Federalism Proposal, since, as the author urges with conviction, the states' interests are amply represented in a host of ways at the national level, such cases as *National League of Cities* v. *Usery* should never have been accepted by the Court for review. Conversely, however, actions by the states that impinge upon the national government (and, of course, upon fundamental liberties of states' citizens) would continue to be handled by the Court. Choper's Separation Proposal argues appealingly that because the lines separating legislative and executive authority are "shifting and ambiguous," the inherent and attendant issues may be trustworthily resolved by the branches themselves, without judicial involvement. Hence, under that Separation Proposal, such ever-contentious issues as the legislative veto, impoundment, executive agreements, pocket veto, and similar interbranch controversies would not be accepted by the judiciary for judicial review. Thus, since *Youngstown* v. *Sawyer* basically addressed an issue (seizure) that Congress could have addressed, but chose not to, the Court should have stayed out. Similarly, *United States* v. *Nixon* and related cases should have been left to the political arena insofar as they did not involve the Individual Rights Proposal. The removal-power cases of *Myers* v. *United States* and *Humphrey's Executor* v. *United States* should, so the author contends, have been resolved by ordering payment of compensation to the aggrieved without Court involvement on the "political battlefield" of the removal power per se (p. 330).

These are but fleeting glimpses into what constitutes a stimulating, scholarly, thoughtful, if hardly uncontroversial study. It eminently deserves attention and discussion by all those who are brushed by constitutional government, politics, and law—which is as the cement of society.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

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Reasoning about Discrimination: The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in Federal Antibias Programs *by Richard A. Lester. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 384 pp. $17.50.*

Since 1974, Richard Lester has written one book and several articles, all of which contain rather similar messages: there is no good reason to fault the universities for discrimination against minorities and women, and even if there were good reason, the heavy-handed antibias programs of the federal government will do more harm than good. Presumably because he feels that his messages have been ignored or misunderstood, Lester is trying once more to convince the public of the validity of his argument. This time, in an effort to strengthen his case, he includes among those to whom antibias regulations are inappropriately applied not only the professoriate but also the upper echelons of the business world and the civil service, all those who do mental work as compared to clerical or manual work.

What distinguishes the world of faculty, business executives, and civil servants from that of clerical and manual workers, according to Lester, is their "systems of work relations," that is, the ways in which specific jobs are defined and performance in those jobs is evaluated. At the highest levels in academia and business, at least, he finds career development to be highly individualized and performance to be assessed on the basis of specialized, but nonetheless meritocratic, judgments; it is on these two pillars that the effectiveness of universities and business rests. By contrast, he is very critical of the civil service, because the protection of civil servants against potential political animus has undermined individualized judgments of performance and therewith any genuine meritocracy.

To this reviewer, Lester's messages are as unconvincing as they were when I first received them in 1974. His new arguments, if anything, make the matter worse. It is not easy to accept his sharp distinctions between mental work on the one hand and manual or clerical work on the other. Nor is it possible to be comfortable with his view that assessments of performance in business and academia are optimally made by a few highly specialized peers or superiors, whose conception of the "best" person for a position may be excessively limited by experience with previous incumbents (who are likely to have been white and male). In some instances, Lester's intuitive defense of the status quo in universities is surely undercut both by judicial decisions confirming the fact of discrimination (as, for example, in the Lamphere case at Brown) and by new research. Thus, his intuitive assumption that married women academics have been paid less because of lower productivity is refuted in Jonathan Cole's book, *Fair Science*, which documents the counterintuitive conclusion that married women are no less productive than single ones.

What is most damaging to Lester's argument is his portrayal of the university world and the business world (especially the university world, which he knows best) as utopias of reason and fairness, without factional struggles, particularistic preferences, and, incredibly, the racist and sexist biases that have so long pervaded the entire society. Even Lester is forced to admit that Jews were until not very long ago underrepresented in this utopia because of discrimination and not because they found other careers more congenial. It is hard to see why the drastic underrepresentation of women and minorities should be attributed, as he implicitly does, to their choice.

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It may well be the case that federal antibias regulations are better suited to increasing the numbers of blacks, or Hispanics, among construction workers than the number of women in the small philosophy department of an Ivy League university. (The small size of the university with which Lester is most familiar may contribute to his sense of the absurdity of federal regulations, though it is true that the application of those regulations to Berkeley did not yield entirely sensible results.) Yet I defy Lester to provide evidence that without federal intervention there would have been any self-corrective initiatives in the universities. On the contrary, his own distorted view of the fairness of the hiring and promotion practices of those universities is evidence that without federal intervention the increased rates of hiring of women and minorities would never have occurred. It is up to those who deplore the consequences of government regulation to demonstrate the capacity of their institutions for self-generated reform and regulation.

ELINOR G. BARBER
Ford Foundation

At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present *by Carl N. Degler. New York, Oxford University Press, 1980. 527 pp. $19.95.*

The aim of this engrossing book is to integrate the history of the family in the United States with the history of women and to show that neither can be understood without the other. It succeeds. It assembles a corpus of fascinating data—ranging from female sexuality to suffrage, from abortion to employment, from black to immigrant female experience, and points in between—and weaves them together to document the theme that "the equality of women and the institution of the family have long been at odds with each other" (p. vi) and never more so than today (pp. 472–73).

The very existence of the family depends on women's willingness to subordinate their own interests to those of others. To the extent that female emancipation releases women from this subordinate status the family suffers. Reconciliation of family values with women's individuality would be an ideal goal but Degler is not optimistic about its achievement (p. 473). The realization of female individuality would call for more male participation in child care and rearing and also a reorganization of industry to accommodate the child-bearing and child-rearing function. Degler notes the persistence of traditional patterns and does not think such changes are imminent (chap. 18). Nor does he think the family has changed fundamentally since the beginning of the nineteenth century. It remains the primary institution for nurturing children and providing affection, sexual expression, and companionship for adults (p. 459).

Still, the number of children to be nurtured and the proportion of a woman's life devoted to this function have declined drastically enough almost to transform the situation. As evidence of the rapidity of ongoing change, it is interesting to note that although Degler is at some pains to explain a decline in nonmarriage (pp. 176, 457), actually nonmarriage is currently on the rise (almost doubling, from 4 to 5 percent among fifty-year-olds to a probable 8 or 9 percent among those now in their twenties). Degler's book was completed in the spring of 1979; in 1980, discussions of role sharing in marriage—in-

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cluding "house husbands"—were already appearing on one of the most popular daytime television programs, "Donahue."

Not until the end of the book does Degler note that family values are at odds with those of men as well as of women, that is, with democracy, individualism, and meritocracy (p. 471). Plato's *Republic* was designed to counteract the inequality intrinsic in the family system, as has also a panoply of compensatory institutions in the United States, such as public schools, social work, welfare services, and the like. An enormous body of research documents the difficulties involved in overcoming the odds against children reared in low-status families. Although the family system creates and preserves inequalities among children, most societies still prefer it to any other, and many attempt to compensate for its defects. Still Degler is right in his thesis, for in addition to the inequality intrinsic in the family system of rearing children, women have been subject to a special kind of inequality in the subordinate position allotted to them both within the family and without.

While I was reading this book the nominating convention of the Republican party was putting into its platform a plank on an antiabortion amendment to the Constitution. Degler's chapter on the subject should be required reading for Republicans. It would not hurt Democrats either.

JESSIE BERNARD
Washington, D.C.

Unloving Care: The Nursing Home Tragedy *by Bruce C. Vladeck. New York, Basic Books, 1980. 305 pp. $13.95.*

On 9 September 1974, John Hess wrote the first in a series of articles for the *New York Times* which began the unraveling of the New York State nursing home scandals and resulted in nationwide attention to the public policy governing long-term care to the elderly and the development of a national Medicaid fraud containment policy.

The scandals have in large part been redressed by both the banishment from the nursing-home industry of many of those who committed fraud and the repayment to the state and federal governments of millions of dollars. But Vladeck's book makes clear why this redress is not enough to assure a system of appropriate and humane care in nursing homes. Those in law enforcement would readily agree that despite the fact that in 1974 no significant state resources were spent prosecuting Medicaid theft, and that today more than half the states have active fraud control units, the imposition of prosecutorial surveillance has had no real effect on solving problems inherent in the system. While policing may produce a spotlight, the passage of time too often dims that light.

Unloving Care is an eloquent and well-documented book analyzing the complex array of administrative, economic, social, and historical factors that interacted to cause a major failure of public policy involving the care of the elderly in nursing homes. Vladeck's book is surely the "Complete Guide" to nursing-home care in American society. He has dealt with seemingly every issue and virtually every question that comes to mind regarding

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the nursing-home industry in terms of structure, finance, reimbursement, and delivery of care.

Although the reader's initial reaction to Vladeck's assessment of government policy is disbelief, the documentation, carefully drawn and widely researched, leads to the conclusion that the government's incremental policymaking in long-term care permitted a system to grow that was step-by-step inappropriately funded, underplanned, and ill-conceived, a makeshift reaction to human need. It was a policy based on reducing the costs of extended hospitalization for chronically ill elderly patients rather than on establishing a system of long-term care to meet the needs of the elderly for continuing health-care and social-support services. A structure built on such a weak foundation invites inevitable abuse. Government regulations tend to grow in haphazard directions, standards of care go unimplemented, and incentives to providers are subverted.

But what is also clear from Vladeck's documentation is that the government's policy failure was shared by the larger society which apparently rejects anyone too poor or too old. This failure is reality itself, and it has resulted in the institutionalization of various populations of needy people who are unable to care for themselves in the absence of community supports. As Vladeck says, "The tragedy is that, even though the intrinsic inadequacy of nursing homes has long been recognized, we continue to rely on them as the principal, and often the only, vehicle for meeting the needs of the dependent elderly" (p. 215).

Thus, Vladeck turns to community-based alternatives to institutionalization for all but the most severely disabled, primarily congregate housing and home-care services. Frustrated by too many areas of poor planning, Vladeck would recommend closing between one-quarter and one-half of the nursing-home beds and using the money thus saved to fund these alternative services. It is in some of his conclusions that substantial new policy issues are raised. While home care is clearly an appropriate and desirable system of care, one must only wonder whether Vladeck's proposal solves anything or is simply another alternative that creates a new industry and fails to adjust the predicate costs in a society unable to deal with its elderly or poor. Forced elimination of nursing-home beds, particularly without sufficient and adequate home-care services already in place in the community, a method that Vladeck seems to suggest, would have a raw nerve effect on the system. It is too great a risk.

CHARLES J. HYNES
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Citizen Participation in the Public Schools *by Robert H. Salisbury. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980. 218 pp. $23.95.*

The research reported in this book seeks to measure and evaluate the impact of participation in school activities on the participating individuals. The theoretical concepts to be explored and the theories to be tested are nicely laid out in the first chapter. Salisbury

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notes that citizen participation in schools differs from other forms of political participation in two ways. First, the parent-child relationship is a critical determinant of participation in addition to voting in tax referendums and in school-board elections. Second, school participation is frequently, perhaps mostly, supportive activity rather than purposive activity seeking change.

Although Salisbury raises some interesting questions, and there is much of value in this book, the methodology of the research project is not adequate to answer most of the questions raised, particularly the central question: to what extent is the participating individual changed by his or her participation? In order to locate active participants, the researchers attended PTA meetings and distributed questionnaires in six school districts in the greater St. Louis metropolitan area, interviewing a total of 507 school activists during the 1974–75 school year. Three-and-a-half years later they conducted follow-up interviews on a subsample of 168 respondents.

In order to understand the effect of a citizen's participation on his or her attitudes and subsequent behavior, one should determine the attitudes and behavior of the respondent before and after participation (or at least over a period of time during which participation took place) and then compare the observed change with that seen in a control group of nonactivists. Salisbury did none of these things. Instead, in the first wave of interviews he asked the respondents how participation had affected their attitudes and behavior and then duly recorded their answers as evidence of the impact of participation on them. The second wave is largely ignored in the discussion of research findings. As in the first wave, the respondents are asked how participation has affected their attitudes and behavior, and again it is assumed that whatever they answer is the actual effect. Changes in responses from wave one to wave two are discussed only in passing, and it is not at all clear what they mean since we do not know what the secular trend is.

Causal direction is asserted on the basis of bivariate relationships displayed in seventy-three contingency tables with no tests of significance, seven tables displaying Gammas (but no discussion of the limitations and biases of the statistic), and two correlation matrices. These tables are often difficult to interpret individually, let alone aggregate into a coherent theory. Rather than presenting simple statistics and ambiguous findings, Salisbury would have done the reader a service if he had used more powerful multivariate statistics capable of reducing the number of tables, increasing our confidence in the validity of the results, and producing a more coherent description of citizen participation in the schools. Of course, the ambiguity of the research findings would be even further reduced if the author had included a control group and actually analyzed change rather than respondents' self-reported perceptions of change.

What then is of value in this book? First, there is an impressive amount of data on the characteristics of citizen participants in school activities which should be of interest to students of school politics. Second, the book contains many critical insights and some innovations in the measurement of participation. Salisbury improves on earlier research by measuring not just whether respondents participate, or the type of activity, but how often they participate.

In summary, then, this book represents an uneven addition to the sparse literature on citizen participation in the schools. I would recommend it primarily to scholars who are

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familiar enough with quantitative research methods, as well as the field of school politics, to be able to select what is of value and what is not in the vast array of data presented here.

CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL
Boston University

The Political Culture of the American Whigs *by Daniel Walker Howe. Chicago, Ill., The University of Chicago Press, 1980. 404 pp. $23.00.*

What was the Whig party? Not much, according to traditional interpretations. It lasted only twenty years, from 1834 to 1854, by a generous estimate. It elected only two presidents, William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor, both military heroes who died in office. It managed to write only two national platforms, both brief and vague. It "was the most feeble in ideas" of all the parties in American history, according to Henry Adams.

Recent historical interpretation has tended to revise this lowly appraisal of the Whigs. Their political era is now portrayed as an enormously creative one when popular participation reached unprecedented heights and party leaders appealed to an informed electorate on meaningful issues. If they were not quite as glamorous or successful as the Jacksonian Democrats, the Whigs are nonetheless now seen as a genuinely major party that mobilized half the voters, in both the North and the South, by expressing a persuasive vision of what American society ought to be. Daniel Walker Howe's new book significantly contributes to this revised view of the Whigs by doing for their party what Marvin Meyers and Eric Foner did for the antebellum Democrats and Republicans—providing a modern, serious, sympathetic analysis of their beliefs and values.

Howe organizes his study around rich biographical portraits of twelve articulate men who he says gave Whiggery "a level of coherence and prescriptiveness that entitles one to speak of it as an ideology" (p. 2). John Quincy Adams personifies the Whig's didacticism, their moral striving, and their misgivings about partisanship; Nathan Appleton and Henry C. Carey illustrate the party's activist, optimistic belief that economic development would nourish moral progress; Lyman Beecher and Joshua R. Giddings represent the evangelical component of Whig culture; Horace Greeley and William H. Seward stand for what Howe calls its "modernizing" aspects; Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate personify the party's conservative tendencies toward traditional values and social control; and Henry Clay, Alexander Stephens, and Abraham Lincoln enable Howe to show that Whig ideas were given concrete expression in every section of the country.

Although Howe by no means homogenizes the beliefs of his twelve subjects, he repeatedly insists on the fundamental coherence of the culture for which they spoke and on its differences from Democratic culture. The Whigs, he says, continued the country-party tradition of eighteenth-century England. They found congenial its language of opposition to the corrupt "court" party of Jackson, and they embraced its tendency to see political evils as the product of conspiracy. Here Howe explicitly extends into the nine-

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teenth century the type of analysis pioneered by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J. G. A. Pocock, and in doing so he takes Pocock's side against Wood by denying that the "classical conception of politics" ended in 1787. Howe would place the demise in the 1850s, when developments in both the South and North carried the peoples of both sections in opposite directions away from the culture of the "country" Whig party. The South rejected economic diversification and defended slavery, while the North chose what Howe labels modernization and social morality. Howe's fine chapters on Stephens and Lincoln pursue this analysis and add a complex cultural dimension to the usual political explanations for the collapse of Whiggery.

The eclecticism of Howe's account will trouble some readers. Concepts from cultural anthropology, psychological interpretations, modernization theory, and the framework of classical republican thought all vie for analytical supremacy here. Others will wonder if what Howe calls a coherent Whig culture was not actually a much more diffuse Northern, bourgeois, Protestant culture. In places Howe acknowledges the difficulty of attaching the ideas he is describing to the Whig party as such. "The culture was more powerful than the party" (p. 3), he says several times. Still, the problem remains. The Whigs were too diverse to share the beliefs that Howe attributes to them and too evanescent a party to do much more than mimic fragments of the majestic values he credits them with propagating. Why, after all, would a party of ideas (as Howe repeatedly calls the Whigs) with such purported cultural differences from its rival be so unable to agree on meaningful platforms, be so prone to nominate unideological battle heroes for president, and be so easily destroyed in the 1850s? Howe takes for granted the existence of the kind of party the Whigs tried to be—but could not—and gives us the best account we have of the ideology they sometimes claimed to embrace, but did not.

RICHARD L. MCCORMICK
Rutgers University

Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review *by John Hart Ely. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980. 268 pp. $15.00.*

One of the more useful functions the Supreme Court performs is to drive thoughtful people like John Hart Ely to write intelligent books. In the tradition of Thomas Reed Powell, Ely is upset by the intellectual standards of the Court's opinions, rather than with the results of its decisions. Baring the foibles of the Court's reasoning has always been easy, and maybe Ely needs Justice Blackmun as much as Powell needed Justice Sutherland, but Ely goes beyond such child's play to the far more difficult task of providing a full-blown model of constitutional jurisprudence for the justices to follow.

This is a project that has occupied the author's mind and many law review pages for a considerable time, and although much of the book is familiar it is far more than the sum of these previous parts. As a subscriber to the "interpretivist" side in the current doctrinal battle, Ely begins with the premise "that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution" (p. 1). Right off, Ely puts to rest the myth perpetuated by Richard Nixon,

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among others, that there is a connection between an "interpretivist approach to constitutional adjudication and political conservatism or even what is commonly called judicial self-restraint" (p. 1). Ely makes no pretense of adhering to a value-free constitutional jurisprudence, but the value that he ranks highest is that the justices curtail their creation of law from whole cloth. In placing a premium on form, Ely elevates it to a new height, beyond Justice Black's literalism and Professor Wechsler's "neutral principles." Ely wisely maintains that not only is reliance on form pragmatically sound, from the philosophic point of view, but is practical as well, since procedural matters is one area where lawyers, including judges, can justifiably claim expertise. One does not have to be a devotee of the late Jerome Frank to realize the impossibility of maintaining distinctions between form and substance in the law. Ely, however, makes a strong argument that his reading that constitutional development as largely procedural is the most valid one.

What Ely's prescription does is to give the justices more latitude in policymaking while restraining them. If this sounds like magic, it is, but is the legerdemain of one who knows his subject so well that the performance is more than a mere juggling of precedents. Systematically demolishing such established preserves of judicial lawmaking as "discovering fundamental values," ascertaining consensus, and the venerable, determining legislative intent, Ely supplies in their stead, less subjective tools, such as revitalized *Carolene Products* doctrine. *Carolene Products* is important for Ely since it serves to justify a role the Court can—hence should—play to police the political processes so that all persons are protected. In this way the Court is no longer concerned with substance and is, moreover, operating in the one area where it is in a better position to function than are legislatures.

The thrust of Ely's complex argument is too easily distorted in condensation to do more than issue a broad invitation to savor fully its richness. That the book has shortcomings is unsurprising and does not detract from its importance. Ironically, it is in the matter of form that the book's chief deficiency exists. Ely does not subscribe in any way to the useful rule that if material is not worthwhile including in the text it should be excluded entirely: an offense that the publisher has compounded by placing the beautiful notes (some, two-pages long) at the rear of the book.

DONALD M. ROPER
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Urban Fiscal Stress: A Comparative Analysis of 66 U.S. Cities *by James M. Howell and Charles F. Stamm. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980. 153 pp. $18.95.*

Along with the rapid growth and changing composition of municipal budgets over the past twenty years has come an increased interest among managers and planners in methods for assessing municipal financial performance. Arguing that prior research has been too narrowly conceived (emphasizing factors relating to the demand for municipal services over factors contributing to the capacity of cities to provide such services), the authors set out to "provide new empirical insights into the performance of cities with widely differing economic, social, and structural conditions" (p. 3). After selecting a

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group of sixty-six cities based on the availability and quality of data on some 100 financial "performance" variables, the authors organize these cities into sixteen clusters according to similarities in economic, social, and structural conditions. These clusters and, in turn, individual cities within clusters are then each measured in terms of 22 financial variables.

As a conceptual framework for sorting through large amounts of information on municipal budgetary flows, this design offers a potentially useful guide. However, the analysis is seriously flawed. First, by choosing only cities for which there were adequate and reliable data on a large set of financial variables, a possible selection bias is introduced that limits the usefulness of an analysis based on internally derived norms. With respect to the clustering, the use of population density as the sole control for structural differences among cities in functional responsibilities and financial arrangements is woefully inadequate. (A subsequent adjustment for variations in public-education responsibility partially resolves this problem, but still leaves open to question the effects of differences in the mix of state-local responsibilities as well as differences across cities in the service responsibilities of counties and special districts.) With regard to differences in financial-management capabilities, surely a relevant consideration in matters of fiscal stress and one which the authors should be particularly attuned to, there are no controls at all.

These design flaws create serious ambiguity in the interpretation stage of the analysis. Without adequate control for structural differences among cities, there is no basis for judging a city with above average per capita operating outlays as under comparatively greater fiscal stress. Similarly, comparisons of local taxes per capita provide no clear indication of fiscal stress. The authors acknowledge this when they note that per capita taxes are "not necessarily an indicator of strain even if [they are] large, since no measure of ability to pay has been included" (p. 40). Yet, they proceed with an analysis of fiscal stress that revolves around this measure. Per capita debt is also presumed to vary directly with fiscal pressure, differences in functional responsibility and managerial capability notwithstanding. Should a city that fails to make adequate use of long-term debt to finance its fixed investments or of short-term debt to manage its cash-flow situation be judged as operating under comparatively more favorable fiscal conditions?

Only with a more fully specified model, especially one that encompasses a broader range of structural and managerial factors which influence the demand for locally provided services and the ability of cities to provide those services, can these budgetary measures be used in a comparative sense to assess the fiscal well being of cities. The absence of such specificity causes one to discount heavily the authors' general finding that "almost all of the 66 cities in this survey have managed to balance financial capability satisfactorily against local expenditures, given their particular economic, social, and structural conditions" (p. 33).

Those who might turn to this book as a guide to other research and data sources will be frustrated by the lack of an index and the relatively few references to other studies.

CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR.
Ohio State University

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The CIA and the American Ethic: An Unfinished Debate *by Ernest W. Lefever and Roy Godson. Washington, D.C., Ethics and Public Policy Center of Georgetown University, 1980. 161 pp. Cloth, $9.50; paper, $5.00.*

The attack on the American intelligence community by liberal and radical intellectuals, and by their outriders in the media and Congress, has run out of steam. Five years have passed since senators postured with dart guns, and four years since the Church committee delivered itself of sweeping recommendations amounting to direct congressional involvement in operational intelligence decision making. In retrospect it is clear that the attack both benefited and disabled the country.

Among the positive results have been the dismantling of the FBI's bloated and inefficient domestic intelligence operations; the likely passage of a statutory charter for the bureau that would recognize its domestic security role while narrowly circumscribing it; and the delivering of unmistakable messages to the CIA and the National Security Agency (and one could include military intelligence) not to dabble in domestic matters which, if any concern of government at all, fall within the sphere of law enforcement. Gains have also been made in limiting the ways in which the CIA may go about gathering foreign intelligence within the United States. The passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, coupled with the exposure several years before of the CIA's illegal mail-intercept program, should sensitize future generations of intelligence bureaucrats to the dangers of playing fast and loose with citizens and resident aliens ("U.S. persons" in the new jargon).

Among the negative consequences of the assault on the intelligence agencies are the demoralization of certain sectors of the community (notably the counterintelligence staff within the CIA); the international perception of the American intelligence community as no longer trustworthy and able to keep secrets; and a "burnt child" reaction which can be seen in the FBI and Justice Department that have gone from doing far too much with respect to politically motivated crime to not doing enough.

Rational people will differ as to whether the final balance is favorable or unfavorable. What cannot be doubted, however, is the low intellectual level at which the debates over intelligence have been carried out. The "literature" is almost entirely polemical. The emotionalism of critics has been matched by a rasping defensiveness on the part of "Old Agency Hands" and their sympathizers. On both sides, the answers to important underlying questions have simply been assumed. The critics *assumed* that it was wrong for the agency to engage in certain sorts of activities such as assassinating foreign leaders and destabilizing governments. The defenders blandly invoked "a rough world out there" as an all-purpose justification for much, if not everything, that was done. What was notably missing was serious consideration of the questions of what is right and what is wrong, when and where—the underlying questions of morality in politics.

The CIA and the American Ethic is a step, albeit a small one, in the direction of engaging fundamental questions and of moving our discussion of the morality of intelligence activities from a level of naive fundamentalism to something more subtle and edifying. The book is composed of four essentially disconnected essays. These are of varying lengths and range from the quite general to the quite specific.

In the first essay, "Intelligence and the American Ethic," Ernest Lefever suggests a

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framework for discussing and for coming to judgments over whether particular intelligence operations are or are not morally justified. While interesting, his presentation is too briefly argued to be satisfying. Crucial to this position is the idea of "just war." The complexities of this idea as it has come down to us in Western political thought are notorious, and its persuasive invocation would require a survey of at least the recent literature (for example, the work of Michael Walzer).

Roy Godson's "Congress and Foreign Intelligence" is a useful review of the highs and lows of congressional involvement with intelligence in the late seventies. It raises the thorny issues of information security, but does not grapple with the ultimately hard question—when should Congress know, who is Congress, and in what detail should it know?

The third essay, also Roy Godson's, on "The Role of Pressure Groups," is an extremely useful chapter that details the extent to which the attack on American intelligence agencies was spurred, not by any ground swell of popular opinion, but by strategically placed and determined interest-group elites. Prominent among these were the National Lawyers' Guild, the American Civil Liberties Union, Morton Halperin's Center for National Security Studies, and the Institute for Policy Studies. What these groups have in common is deep-seated opposition to American political, economic, and social institutions as currently constituted. The old 1930s style radicalism of the National Lawyers' Guild allies comfortably with the new-politics perspective of the Institute for Policy Studies and the gentile trendiness of the American Civil Liberties Union. There is, in fact, a lively movement of individuals between the staffs of these groups, and what emerged by the late 1970s was a very effective, professionalized antiintelligence (and antilaw enforcement) lobby.

"The Performance of the TV Evening News" by Lefever is also useful. It documents by content analysis what informed viewers knew from experience—that the presentation of intelligence-related issues by ABC, CBS, and NBC was distorted and biased. Lefever is certainly correct in identifying the most serious fault in the television coverage as a failure to provide the relevant international political contexts which alone would enable Americans to make judgments about what had or had not been done wrong.

It may be hoped this slim book will be followed by more elaborate work from the Ethics and Public Policy Center.

RICHARD E. MORGAN
Bowdoin College

Technological Terrorism *by Richard C. Clark. Old Greenwich, Conn., Devin-Adair Co., 1980. 220 pp. $10.00.*

This book seeks to demonstrate that terrorist manipulation of technology causing grievous public harm is possible and that the federal government has been derelict in its responses to the danger. The first half treats nuclear threats: diversion of plutonium for bomb making or radioaerosol weapons and the vulnerability of nuclear stockpiles. The second half examines possible malicious use of biological and chemical agents as well as destruction of liquified natural-gas depositories and computer banks vital to the orderly

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maintenance of a modern society. It also includes a critique of the media for airing means and ways terrorists can threaten American society and concludes by calling for establishment of a "crisis government" to combat the danger. The unannotated text appears to draw extensively from the press as well as Government Accounting Office reports, although an extensive bibliography suggests that the author examined a number of other sources. The book does not include an index.

Although this study can be commended for its inclusive treatment of a broad range of technological threats, it is less than satisfactory on several counts. First, Clark fails to probe critically the rationale for technological terrorism. If such acts can be carried out easily, why have terrorists shied away? The author's failure to address this matter seriously suggests that he has given more thought to technological vulnerability than to terrorist motivation—a common weakness in vulnerability studies according to the Rand Corporation's expert on terrorism, Brian Jenkins. The author, moreover, weakens his argument through poor documentation. For example, Clark contends that "terrorist groups have repeatedly shown themselves utterly unconcerned about casualties" (p. 32). Unfortunately, significant supporting evidence is lacking, although other sources suggest the contrary. According to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment's *Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards,* what is remarkable about terrorist activity is the limited loss of life that has resulted in the past fifty years. During this period, incidents involving 20 deaths were rare, while no incident killed more than 150 persons. These figures are well below the thousands of casualties Clark contends terrorists might find attractive and which they have had the capability to induce with conventional weapons, poisons, and aerosols for some time. On another matter, Clark asserts that by 1980 there will be sufficient plutonium in the nuclear energy industry to fabricate "10,000 homemade bombs" (p. 34). At the same time, he neglects to mention that the bulk of this material is locked in highly radioactive spent fuel, the accessibility and manipulability of which by terrorists is barely conceivable. Finally, a minor factual correction. The author refers to an international "Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1977" (p. 35). There is no such act. What the author must be referring to is the nuclear nonproliferation treaty negotiated in the 1960s.

Clark's critique of the media for presenting information on the means for technological terrorism in print and movies such as *Black Sunday* (pp. 163–70) is rather disingenuous, given the author's own writing and speculation in this regard and his commendation of such works as *Nuclear Theft* by Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor. Nor is such hyperbole as "The course of our destruction has thus been paved by a radicalized academic-media-political complex" appropriate (p. 213). Finally, Clark's call for a "crisis government" guided by a "new elite characterized by a dedication to preserve Western civilization not bound by absurd chivalric scruples" (p. 213) is not sufficiently rationalized and is another example of shrill hyperbole. It also reflects insensitivity to the democratic values upon which this country is built.

Notwithstanding some deep reservations about the author's scholarship, this book does prod readers to recognize that technological terrorism is a possibility and that vigilance must be encouraged to insure that the threat be kept minimal.

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Threat Perception in International Crisis *by Raymond Cohen. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979. 229 pp. $17.50.*

This book primarily concerns an explanation of conditions for the perception, as inference and judgment by one party, of malevolent intent on the part of another in ways that may lead to an international crisis. As defined by the author, a crisis is a turning point, often for the worse, in the relations between nations. Cohen briefly reviews some theorists of the literature on threat perception, a very interdisciplinary crowd; and he examines six case studies of what he refers to as crises in relations between nations, using primary sources, though a little quickly, as might a historian. Einstein once opined that "any observation is the joint product of the observer and the observed." Cohen is especially interested in the contribution the observer makes before deciding that some acts, demands, or stated intentions constitute a source of serious danger to the observed as target.

The book concerns an important topic, because threats, and especially implicit or latent threats associated with demands, do play an important role in human affairs at international as well as personal levels. Indeed, the perception of threat is an important factor in arms races and may be one of the critical antecedents to the start or expansion of a war. It must be noted, and Cohen gives brief attention to this point, that there are two very different aspects of threats, the active and the passive. Threats may be regarded as useful and significant means for influence in relations between parties. The user of threats, often a government or nation-state, employs them instrumentally, that is, for the achievement of some objective, whether political, strategic, or merely tactical. Because the user of a threat employs it self-consciously, he controls and even defines the danger and demands involved. Cohen does not examine threats at all from the user's point of view but rather from that of self-defined targets to threats regardless of whether the perceived source intends to be threatening.

What leads a "target" in any definition of threat to regard itself as so vulnerable to the possibility of serious loss as to call for a sober and often serious response? To what extent does context matter, the personality of the leadership, domestic political considerations, or the extent to which the imputed source of the intended danger has acted to violate accepted international norms of behavior, for example, agreements or treaties, in acting to increase the target's vulnerability? In examining these factors, the author avoids explicit theory, quantification, or statistics; rather an implicit model seems to be a basis for the selection of the factors mentioned. Cohen concludes that the personality of leaders may sometimes matter, that domestic political considerations may occasionally play a role, that contextual factors are not very significant, but that it is the violation of international norms and expectations under conditions when doing so may increase a possible target's vulnerability to attack that probably is a major and consistent factor in the definition of threats as very serious, so serious that they demand a strong response.

The responses Cohen lists amount to turning points in these crisis situations, but not so often to the resolution of conflict as to the deterioration of relations between the parties involved. He reviews some thoughts of a few very respectable social scientists who have theorized about threat—J. David Singer, Dean Pruitt, Robert Jervis, Thomas C. Schelling, Richard Lazarus, and Klaus Knorr. Singer gets credited with defining threat in terms

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of the factors of capability and intent and Pruitt for emphasizing the importance of predispositions in the interpretation of evidence. Two of Pruitt's propositions are: the stronger the predisposition, the more influence it will have on what is inferred; and the more ambiguous the evidence, the greater the predisposition. On the other hand, Cohen ignores Schelling's distinction between deterrent and compellent threats, and he appears unaware of the distinction between contingent and noncontingent threats or the conditions under which threats become more or less credible. The cases he mentions rarely involve threats intended as such; it is rather that threats are implicit in some contexts and that their presence is therefore inferred. He suggests that the 1946 crisis over some Soviet demands for joint control of the Dardanelles was a key element in the beginning of the cold war, which is something of an oversimplification. Other crises he examines much too briefly include one between the Germans and the French in 1875, the Italian fear of a French invasion in 1889, the Russian concern over new authority for German Liman von Sanders in 1913, the invasion of Czechoslovakia of 1939 (which led to a change in British perceptions and intentions), and the Polish corridor crisis of 1939. The author writes as a historian.

The book is interestingly written, if a bit superficial, which is perhaps a function of its brevity. Students of threat should find it worthwhile reading because of its different perspective, even though some of its conclusions lack credibility. And, of course, more theoretical development would have enriched it considerably.

THOMAS W. MILBURN
Ohio State University

In Defence of Canada, vol. 4: Growing Up Allied *by James G. Eayrs. Toronto, Ontario, University of Toronto Press, 1980. 431 pp. $25.00.*

Every so often one has the pleasure of reviewing a truly major piece of scholarship. This is that kind of book. Part of a distinguished series by James Eayrs, this volume is written crisply, with perspicaciousness and balance. But the balance observed in the presentation is also a correct reflection of the balance with which Canadian external policy was conducted in the past thirty-five years. While often involved with matters that had nothing to do with the United States and while frequently at odds with U.S. decisions regarding style and substance when bilateral policies were at issue, Canadian policymakers did not take doctrinaire or inflexible positions on defense matters. Indeed, the impression Eayrs leaves is that posterity will judge the Canadian positions to have been right more often than not.

For example, Secretary of State for External Affairs L. B. Pearson quickly opposed the Dulles version of nuclear strategy, soon to be labeled "massive retaliation," by making his critique a focal point of a National Press Club speech in Washington. If Eayrs's account is correct, Pearson had some significant impact on Dulles's thinking shortly thereafter, especially regarding the necessity of consultation with affected allies *before* the threat of nuclear weapons use was employed for broad foreign-policy purposes. Later, Canadian policy took something of an alternate slant in criticizing the Kennan proposals on arms control and disarmament as too idealistic, ambitious, and politically unworkable in the

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context of decentralized international politics. In writing to A.D.P. Heeney, for instance, Arnold Smith noted that such a policy would mean discarding deterrence as a principal strategy to counter possible Soviet aggressiveness. What is interesting historically about these two sets of Canadian responses is that they both opposed aspects of U.S. foreign policy and in the process helped shape global policy. While debate will continue as to what "effectiveness" in Canadian foreign policy means, if effectiveness in external relations is the successful capacity to influence foreign governments, these Canadian actions certainly would seem to qualify as effective.

Although Eayrs can scarcely be accused of uncritical support for the diplomacy of Pearson (see volume 3 of his series), the effect of his portrayal in this volume is to raise the stature of Pearsonian statecraft in the eyes of interpreters not only to a new level of both realism and idealism, but more importantly, perhaps, to a new level of prudent activism. Pearson's political judgment and his capacity to implement policies that were unpopular abroad or even to some extent unfashionable in his own government are both likely to receive greater respect after a reading of this book.

As documents become more and more available, especially on the American side, some amplification of Eayrs's analysis will undoubtedly become possible. The degree of internal bureaucratic support for particular policy initiatives by the U.S. government, for instance, is a difficult judgmental question. Likewise the role that tactical nuclear weapons were thought to play in NATO's overall deterrence strategy remains at issue. In general, however, the analysis in this volume is likely to be reinforced by further research, rather than qualified or countered by that research.

One of the attractive aspects of the book to an American readership is that although Eayrs's study is an account of the evolution of Canadian defense policy, it is equally readable as an account of the shortcomings of American defense policy and as a partial explanation for why American leadership sometimes failed within the alliance. In particular, the theme of the need for adequate consultation echoes throughout this manuscript.

Fittingly, Eayrs closes the manuscript on the subject of the integration of the German Federal Republic into the larger alliance framework. Nothing else perhaps better characterizes the tumultuousness of world politics at mid-century than the inversion of alliance roles of the Soviet Union and Germany. Tensions inherent in such abrupt adjustments continue to affect and condition the Canadian defense outlook.

CHARLES F. DORAN
Johns Hopkins University

West German Foreign Policy: 1949–1979 *edited by Wolfram F. Hanrieder. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980. 245 pp. $22.50.*

The more political and economic clout the Federal Republic of Germany possesses in the international arena, the more important will be its foreign policies in an increasingly interdependent world. Hence, volumes that shed more light on the country's complex exter-

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nal relationships ought to be a welcome addition for readers who seek a greater understanding of such policies.

This volume, consisting of sixteen brief essays originally given as papers at a conference in Santa Barbara, California, in January 1979 marking West Germany's thirtieth anniversary, fulfills the purpose of enlightenment but takes for granted that the reader has a basic knowledge of the Federal Republic's policies toward the West, the East, and the Third World. For instance, neither the details of the intricate treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries nor the specific content or the consequences of the treaties are dealt with. Rather, most of the essays represent interpretative and analytical assessments of key developments in the political, military, and economic arenas.

Written by American and West German academicians and practitioners (ranging from diplomats and politicians to a banker and a journalist), nearly all essays fall into the scholarly mold (in most instances with a welcome minimum of jargon and a less welcome absence of footnotes). Unfortunately, the editor has not provided introductory and concluding chapters to weave together the inevitable disparate strands that sixteen craftsmen are bound to produce. True, Hanrieder's own essay—second in sequence—provides a brilliant analysis of the limited choices available to the German foreign-policy makers during the time span 1949–1979, but it is not a satisfactory substitute. Nor did Hans J. Morgenthau's brief concluding essay on the prospects of German foreign policy serve as a "wrap-up" for the preceding chapters. One more criticism: in such an extensive survey of foreign policy written by many people, duplications are bound to occur, but there is a curious omission of cultural policy that, after all, forms a crucial element in West Germany's goal to eradicate the tarnished image of the Hitler era.

On the positive side, many essays are provocative, controversial, partisan, and contradictory, one with another, or contain little-known nuggets of information. For example, David Calleo, in "Germany and the Balance of Power," writes: "West Germany is an export machine. It has not needed its own empire because the *Pax Americana* has provided one gratis" (p. 11). More controversial will be his thesis that Germany cannot be blamed for its past expansionism, because other states were equally guilty.

William G. Hyland, in "The Soviet Union and Germany," queries whether Stalin's peace note of March 1952 containing an offer of a reunited Germany in return for guarantees of neutralization represented a lost opportunity for the West. This question has been posed before, but for historians it remains intriguing because its acceptance, rather than Adenauer's commitment to a policy of negotiation only from a position of strength, might have changed the status quo. Hans-Peter Schwarz also assesses Adenauer's *Ostpolitik*. Basing his essay on materials in Adenauer's files not yet opened to the public, he maintains that the chancellor, representing a mixture of a hard-liner and a *Realpolitiker*, developed a concept of détente with the Soviet Union as early as 1952 but did not carry it into practice. Karl Kaiser, in "The New Ostpolitik," is more critical of Adenauer, maintaining that the chancellor's attempt to block Allied détente policies to the East were detrimental to West Germany. Willy Brandt is praised instead for undertaking an overdue revision of the *Ostpolitik*.

Other essays, equally as important, deal with West Germany's security policies (by

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Manfred Worner and Catherine McArdle Kelleher), the Atlantic Community (Jan Reifenberg and Martin J. Hillenbrand), relations with France (F. Roy Willis) and with the Third World (Ernst-Otto Czempiel), the role of public opinion (Peter H. Merkl), and economic and monetary policies (Gerhard Zeitel, Julia Dingwort-Nusseck, and J. Robert Schaetzel).

GERARD BRAUNTHAL
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Italy in Transition: Conflict and Consensus *edited by Peter Lange and Sidney Tarrow. Totowa, N.J., Frank Cass & Co., 1980. 186 pp. $25.00.*

This is a very useful and timely collection of essays on the crisis of Italian politics and society in the 1970s. Since, as Sidney Tarrow rightly notes, "the crux of the country's problems is political" (p. 181), it is appropriate that the majority of chapters are devoted to the central actors and institutions of the Italian political system. Individual chapters treat each of the three largest political parties; another examines changes in electoral behavior; and another, the problems of reform of the state apparatus. Other essays separately look at the strategies of organized labor and of organized business and the interaction of political and economic developments.

It is a particular merit of this book that the essays individually and together communicate a clear understanding of what Peter Lange calls "the web-like character of the Italian crisis: the tight entanglement of economic, social and political strands, analytically separable only with great care" (p. 3). The political crisis—narrowly understood in terms of the elusiveness of a stable parliamentary majority capable of sustaining effective governments—is naturally a central concern of the chapters on the political parties. It is, however, but one important component of the larger crisis. As Michele Salvati shows in his chapter on politics and economics, the difficulties of political coalition building have rendered impossible coherent policy responses to the chronic economic crisis that has plagued Italy for most of the past decade. At the same time, political bargaining and accommodation are all the more difficult in the face of wrenching economic problems and the inevitable redistributive issues they raise.

Even when broad political agreement on plausible policy approaches is reached, problems of implementation remain, for Italy suffers from institutional paralysis, whose roots are closely examined in Giuseppe Di Palma's analysis of the Italian state. The fact is that major state institutions in Italy—the bureaucracy, publicly owned industry, Parliament, the courts—simply do not work very well.

Because these various crises are interconnected, progress in one area apparently presupposes, yet is also a prerequisite to, progress in one or more of the other areas; herein lies the seemingly intractable nature of Italy's problems. Nevertheless, Italian democracy has survived, exhibiting impressive resilience and adaptability in accommodating changes over the past three decades. This adaptability has its negative side. Di Palma argues that the Italian political elite has secured the continuity of the system by turning the state into a vast machine for the satisfaction of particularistic interests

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(emanating from the Left as well as from the clienteles of the dominant party). The consequences for effective and consistent policymaking have been disastrous, and Di Palma doubts that any majority political coalition would be willing and able to make the reforms necessary to confront Italy's manifold problems.

Sidney Tarrow, a bit more optimistic, points to the demonstrable progress the Italian polity has made in institutionalizing democracy and broadening the meaning and scope of citizenship. Of particular significance is the integration – albeit incomplete – of organized labor in the policymaking system, analyzed in a fine essay by Marino Regini. Any political order that has withstood the trials Italy's has endured over the past several years must, after all, have important underlying bases of stability and strength. While no one would predict easy years ahead for Italian democracy, it would be almost equally rash to predict its imminent demise.

ANTHONY F. GRECO
Columbia University

Public Policy in a No-Party State: Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era *by Richard Gunther. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 361 pp. $17.50.*

Authoritarian regimes are more difficult to study than democratic systems, but by the time the long-lived Franco regime came to an end most of its secrets had been discovered. This was due both to its long duration, which offered four decades for reporters, analysts, and scholars to observe and study it in practice, and to the steadily increasing liberalization that occurred during its later years.

Richard Gunther's study is one of the best technical monographs to have appeared on any aspect of the Franco regime. Conducted during the very last years of the Caudillo's reign, it benefited from the open atmosphere of semipluralism that became so prominent in the final phase. It is based in part on official and other economic data but relies especially on ninety-seven interviews conducted with government officials. Though begun as a dissertation, it is a firm and sophisticated study that takes its place with Charles Anderson's *Political Economy of Modern Spain* (1970) and several recent economic and commercial studies in Spain as a basic work on economic functioning under Franco.

Conversely, it cannot be said that those already acquainted with contemporary Spain will encounter great surprises. Gunther's main conclusions may be summarized: The Franquist state was strongly conservative and operated by a kind of revenue budgeting. Though it was a political dictatorship, neither Franco nor his chief lieutenant intervened extensively in the budgetary process. Budgeting and planning were almost exclusively an intragovernmental process, though decisions about intrasectoral allocations were widely decentralized. Decision making was legalistic-bureaucratic and highly personalistic, the key determinations in budgeting being made by the ministers of finance and planning. Despite the regime's early effort to construct a system of national-syndicalist corporatism, lobbying and exertion of influence was carried out much more through clientelist than through corporatist means. The statistics that are provided concerning the

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very low incidence and regressive structure of Spanish taxation, together with the very modest level of state expenditure, are probably well known but always important to underscore.

Despite the conservatism and authoritarian personalism of the regime, it was nonetheless open to considerable change, particularly in economic policy. The great mutation occurred, of course, after 1957, when the economic neoliberals, led by Lopez Rodo, gained control of much of Spain's economic policy. In this regard perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book is that which deals with state investment planning, principally in the 1960s. Gunther shows that, despite inferior technical and econometric means, Spanish state investment planning was more fully implemented than in democratic Western countries, a result attributable above all to the personal influence and political weight of the minister of planning development himself. This could not easily have been duplicated in a parliamentary regime.

Altogether Gunther has provided us with a thorough, solidly researched, and keenly analyzed study of the structure of planning and budgeting during the last two decades of the Franco regime. It will be useful not merely for students of contemporary Spanish history and politics but for scholars concerned with the functioning of rightwing authoritarian regimes in general.

STANLEY G. PAYNE
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution *by Michael M. J. Fisher. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980. 314 pp. $17.50.*

Michael Fisher has set himself the ambitious task of explaining the theory and daily practice of Shi'ite Islam in prerevolutionary Iran. Writing from an anthropological perspective, he focuses on the processes of religious debate and discourse and their effect on the structure of Iranian beliefs, logic, and social goals. All of this is of special interest since Fisher's field work in Qum brought him into contact with many figures who became leaders in the overthrow of the Shah and in the political developments which followed.

Fisher analyzes the development of Islamic education and reasoning through a number of intriguing comparisons with Judaism and Christianity. But the particularities of the Shi'ite worldview are even more important. At the heart of this lies what Fisher calls the "Karbala Paradigm," the emotionally potent theme of corrupt and oppressive tyranny repeatedly overcoming (in this world) and often martyring the righteous. In certain circumstances, as in 1978–79, this passive mourning over past injustice can be turned into political action against present complaints.

This dualism between state and religion, between rulers and political culture, exists in every Islamic state, but nowhere was it so clear as in Iran. Fisher's detailed descriptions of the functioning of the madrasa ("the scriptural school"), the curricula and content of religious education, the atmosphere in the religious center of Qum, the cycle of Shi'ite holy days, and the interaction between people and clergy make this quite clear. Although his presentation is idiosyncratic and often reads like a virtual transcription of field notes, the

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examples and anecdotes offered are particularly useful. At the same time, however, the book is weaker on explicitly political areas and on the history of clergy-state relations.

Still, there is an extensive discussion of the two levels of *ulama* (religious leaders) concern over the Shah's policies. On one plane they criticized the regime's pragmatism in contrast to Islamic perfectionism—the ideal society was not being realized. In fact, specific government policies—toward women, foreign affairs, and the specific approach to modernization—seemed to go against their conception of Islamic law and society. In addition, they held more immediate concerns that government initiatives over education and religious endowments attacked the prerogatives and leadership of the *ulama*.

The requirements of the revolution neatly fit into Shi'ite symbolism and ideology. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was portrayed as Hussein, the Prophet's noble grandson, and the Shah was identified with Yazid, the caliph who was responsible for Hussein's murder at Karbala. Religious festivals became staging points for demonstrations, mourning processions for Shi'ite martyrs became marches for anti-Shah martyrs, and the emphasis on self-sacrifice for Hussein and the *imams* (prayer leaders) for the triumph of Islam was transfigured into a willingness to face the rifles of the imperial army.

Fisher's final chapter, an expanded chronology of the revolution based primarily on journalistic sources, is a useful reference but is not really integrated into the rest of the book. His brief section on Khomeini's regime, however, continues the theme of the recasting of Islamic symbols and rhetoric as part of the new order.

This book is fundamentally a specialized study, but recent events in Iran have made it a useful source for understanding an important dimension in those political upheavals.

BARRY RUBIN
Georgetown University

Political Development and Social Change in Libya *by Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1980. 230 pp. $21.95.*

The regime of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, leader of revolutionary Libya, purveyor of petroleum, and darling of the sensationalist Western press, has been singularly neglected by serious political analysts. This book explores calmly and without apologetics the ideology and institutions of Libyan government and society under the regime of the September 1969 revolution; it is distinguished by the evident intimacy of the authors' knowledge of the revolution and their understanding of its inner workings. Easily the most complete description of the Libyan revolution in any language, marked by its sympathy for many of the goals, if not the methods, of the military regime, and by its authors' access to privileged information in a country notably difficult for academic research, this book should be read by any scholar seriously interested in understanding Libya today.

The reader should be forewarned, however, that the book is burdened with a conventional Western political-development perspective whose utility is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny. Theories based on notions such as a dichotomy between tradition and modernity, whatever their value elsewhere, must be particularly suspect for oil-exporting countries such as Libya. Libya's transition from the poorest country in the

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world at independence in 1952 to one of the wealthiest nations on earth, per capita, a mere fifteen years later is part of an unprecedented phenomenon for which conventional political-development theory was completely unprepared and for which its analytical frameworks are proving inadequate. Nonetheless, the authors create an analytical antithesis between the rules and the ruled paralleling that between modernity and tradition. This leads them to describe the purpose of the revolution as modernization in its conventional sense—a questionable assumption at best—and to underestimate the political acumen of the average Libyan: "the revolution had provided the structural framework for the political, economic, and social modernization of Libya; the masses, beguiled by traditional tribal and religious leaders . . . had not been adequately responsive to the revolution's initiatives" (p. 168).

This view of the masses reflects the perspective of the "modernist" Libyan elite—in and outside the government—but it leaves the reader puzzled about the ease with which these masses are "beguiled." Surely the disinclination to abandon "traditional" affiliations is a reflection of their continuing value to a population that lost half its number and its entire economy to Italian colonialism, was later to be further disoriented by the unaccountable wealth brought by petroleum, and is now in the throes of upheaval once again, this time in the name of revolution. Small wonder that the authors' sample survey showed "a preponderance of Libya's citizens were particularistic, lacking in civic responsibility, tribalistic, fatalistic, nonparticipatory, and engrained with values of ascription and distrust" (p. 103). The dichotomy between tradition and modernity suggests, in a vulgarization of Weberian theory, that "rationality" is the preserve of the modernists, an assertion nowhere so clearly inappropriate as in Libya.

El Fathaly and Palmer have nonetheless written a book which, despite its garbled Arabic transliteration and occasional lapses of English, repays careful reading. Its detailed chronology of the various stages of the revolution, its description of the backgrounds, purposes, and frustrations of the leadership, and its exegesis of the first two volumes of Colonel al-Qadhafi's *Green Book* are informed and thoughtful. One must concur with their concluding assessment that the regime had been "far more effective in liberating the Libyan population from the institutions of the past than in integrating them into the institutions of the revolution. People participate . . . but many have yet to become believers. They watch and wait" (p. 215). As do most analysts of Libyan politics as well.

LISA S. ANDERSON
Columbia University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

The Assassination of John F. Kennedy: A Comprehensive Historical and Legal Bibliography, 1963–1979 *compiled by DeLloyd J. Guth and David R. Wrone. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 442 pp. $37.50.*

COMECON Data 1979 *edited by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980. 436 pp. $45.50.*

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Finances of Public School Systems in 1978–79 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 66 pp. $ .85.*

Governmental Finances in 1978–79 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 100 pp. $1.35.*

Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research *edited by Ted Robert Gurr. New York, Free Press, 1980. 566 pp. $39.95.*

Health Policy: The Legislative Agenda *prepared by Congressional Quarterly Inc. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980. 229 pp. $7.95.*

Local Government Employment in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties: 1979 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 133 pp. $2.15.*

Local Government Finances in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties: 1978–79 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 170 pp. $2.55.*

Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman *edited by Robert H. Ferrell. New York, Harper & Row, 1980. 448 pp. $15.00.*

The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. XIII: 1835–1837 *edited by Clyde N. Wilson. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1980. 682 pp. $27.50.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 34: 1915 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 567 pp. $30.00.*

Political Parties: A Cross National Survey *by Kenneth Janda. New York, Free Press, 1980. 1019 pp. $100.00.*

State Information Book *edited by Susan Lukowski and Cary T. Grayson, Jr. Washington, D.C., Potomac Books, Inc., Publishers, 1980. 306 pp. $18.50.*

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

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

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

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

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